An Overview of Formal Reason 41

Applied ethics concerns the application of principles in a moral theory to real-world situations. If we understand rationality as reasoning and specifically deductive reasoning, then form is what distinguishes rational from non-rational. Harold Brown, a philosopher of science will be useful in describing this account of rationality. In his book, titled Rationality,

Brown attempts to outline the limitations of traditional analytic accounts of rationality and offer an alternative. The equating of rationality with deductive reasoning is what Brown calls “the classical model of rationality” because “it has been pervasive in Western thought, even though it has not been expressly formulated” (Brown, 1988, p. 5). The form of an argument, on this account will determine its rationality and thus we call this kind of reason ‘formal reason.’ What has been sought has been an objective, certain, and universal method of arriving at a ‘right’ answer. Given the centrality of universality, necessity and certainty to formal reason, we need to understand what is meant by these terms.

Universality

Universalism is the requirement that “all rational thinkers must arrive at the same

solution…they all begin with the same information, and in such cases correct reasoning can only lead to one conclusion” (Brown, 1988, 5). In ethics parlance, universality, or

universalism, is the belief that moral obligations apply to everyone, regardless of culture or context (Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy). This belief leads to the formulation of universal ethical principles and central to the concept of universality is the notion that there is both a definite solution and a procedure to arrive at the conclusion and if rational agents follow the same steps, the will arrive at the same conclusion (Brown, 1988, 6).

Brown notes that we can see this debate take place in many contexts because in ethics some search for the correct principles to apply, whereas others debate whether any such principles exist at all (Brown, 1988, 7). Within the history of Western philosophy, some the most influential thinkers (John Stuart Mill, Jeremy Bentham and Immanuel Kant, to name but a few) attempt to find a universal ethic through the establishment of a supreme moral principle that is self-justifying and under which, the facts of any situation can be subsumed to

determine a proper course of action. While the supreme principle varies depending on the philosophical tradition, the requirement for a universal criterion remains, and this

requirement has become so fundamental that questioning the universalizibility of a discipline is often seen as tantamount to questioning the rationality of the discipline (Brown 1988).

Necessity

There is a distinction, in Western philosophy, between a necessary truth and a contingent truth (Oxford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). A necessary truth is one that could not have been otherwise. In other words it would be true in all circumstances. A contingent truth is one that may have been true in the context of the specific circumstances, but could have been false at other times, or in other places (Oxford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Brown’s account of necessity in the classical model of rationality therefore requires not only that rational agents arrive at the same conclusion, but also that the rationality of that conclusion “must follow with necessity from the information given” (Brown, 1988, p. 14). There must be “a necessary tie between the available information and a rationally acceptable result allows us to

understand why all rational individuals who start at the same point must arrive at the same conclusion” (Brown, 1988, p. 15). This requirement is in place because it is possible to arrive at a correct answer by guessing or by serendipity, not because one has reasoned his or her way to the correct result. There must not only be a necessary tie between the information and the conclusion, the agent must recognize that tie (Brown, 1988, p. 15). This connection between rationality and necessity has produced a “sharp distinction…between accepting a result on a rational basis and accepting it on the basis of experience” (Brown, 1988, p. 15). Accepting a conclusion on the basis of experience is problematic because the truths one knows from experience may be contingent truths and not necessary truths.

Rules

The third feature on Brown’s account of the classical model of rationality states that in order for a conclusion to be rational, it must proceed from a starting point to end point in accordance with a set of rules (Brown, 1988, 17). There are, of course, situations in which people will differ in their ideas about how they ought to resolve an issue (Brown, 1988, p. 18). The question here is how they should decide which solutions to accept and which to reject (Brown 1988, 18). Intuitions run the risk of being poor guides because they are not particularly reliable, and human agents often have competing intuitions. Rules, on the other hand, free an agent from the arbitrariness and subjectivity of his or her intuitions and provide the necessary connections from starting point to conclusion. Rules are central to this account

of rationality because if there are universally applicable rules, then all who start from the same information will arrive at the same conclusion if they follow the appropriate rules (Brown, 1988, p. 19).

The equating of rationality with deductive reasoning and the demand that this formal reasoning be anchored in rules that are universal and necessary has shaped the way that many conceive of ethical deliberation. When making judgments about a situation, it is common to do so on the basis of experience. But, because experience is only contingently true, not necessarily true, subjectivity enters into the picture. If the rationality of a decision is based on its form, and if that form takes the shape of a deductive argument, then one must formulate his or her decision using relevant information. But if there are no rules to tell an agent what is morally relevant information and what is not, then he or she must make a judgment. But if judgment cannot be formalized, it is seen as subjective on the classical account, the enterprise runs into a conceptual roadblock.