Partial Mapping and Embodied Simulation 90 

In the previous section, we demonstrated that certain conceptual metaphors are instantiated through different mapping typologies. This is due to the fact that the data indicates that not all physical actions are simulated entirely in the target domains. Taken together with the fact that source domains are not always based on physical actions that need to be activated when processing metaphorical mappings (e.g. Giora 2002), we argued that there cannot be a single pattern characterizing all the mapping typologies that engage physical actions as source domains. It has thus been suggested that the embodied simulation needs to account for metaphorical mapping as involving different cognitive operations. In this section we will assess the partial mapping principle taking into account the embodied simulation.

This principle is claimed to characterize all types of metaphorical mapping (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:54). This pattern is at odds with the tenet of the Embodied Simulation approach in that this theory resides in the fact that physical actions of source domains are entirely mapped onto target domains. Gibbs and Matlock (2008:163), for instance, sustain that the metaphorical mapping which engages a physical action in its source domain involves simulating entirely this action onto the target domain. A typical instance of this mapping typology is instantiated through expressions such as,

(1)She grasped the idea

(2)I managed to grasp the main points of the lecture.

(3)After the interview, he thought the job was within his grasp (see Chapter VI for in an-depth analysis of the mechanisms underlying this mapping typology). These metaphorical mappings could be graphically represented as follows:

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As figures 1 and 2 show, metaphors (1), (2), and (3) can be represented by the same physical topology in the source domain. To illustrate, the three examples draw on a physical action which includes an agent fulfilling the action of grasping an object. This finding is particularly interesting to support the notion that the simulation process of the physical action of the source domain Grasping is carried out entirely. As observed in the two figures, the physical topology of the source domain Grasping is invariable though the target domain is not identical. For instance, in (3) the target domain falls on Job. However, in these examples all the physical components of the topology of the source domain Grasping are simulated in the target domains (an agent, the action of grasping, and an object).

Nonetheless, this finding is not observed in certain metaphorical mappings which engage a physical action as source domain:

Thinking/Believing Is Walking/Traveling

Figure 1 Physical components of the motor actions Grasping.

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(1)My thoughts wandered off on to memories of my last holidays. Activity Is Boat Travel

(2)After the Wall Street crash, the American economy moved into uncharted waters. Love Relation Is Traveling

(3)We arrived at a crossroads and had to split up (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1980:44-45).

Verbal Communication Is Travel/Movement (4)Could you please give way to the next speaker?

Examples (1-4) indicate that though source domains in these cases draw on the physical action Traveling. Though at a general level, the mapping typologies lead virtually to the same inferences, namely an Agent Moving through a Path toward a Destination, not all the physical components of such phenomena are simulated in the target domains in the examples above. First, whereas the physical topology of the example (3) includes by default two different “agents” moving together toward a common destination, in (1), (2), and (4) only one agent is involved.

These metaphors are different from the one analyzed in Figure 1 in that the latter includes always the same components of the source domain. Therefore, this finding supports the notion that when a metaphorical mapping draws on a physical action as source domain, this action is simulated entirely onto the target domain. That is, whenever the action grasping functions as source domain the simulation process includes the same physical components an agent grasping an object.

So far, we have attempted to outline that certain physical actions include determined physical components that are mapped whenever these actions are involved metaphorical mappings (e.g. Grasping). However, certain metaphorical mapping typologies do not

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necessarily involve the same physical components of the source domains (see the examples above).

Another way to test the assumption that the simulation process concerns all the components of the physical actions of source domains is to assess whether the mapping typology which depends on a physical action as source domain activates all of its components. To address this issue, let us consider the following example:

Activity Is Boat Travel:

(1)We went full steam ahead in buying the house. (2)He made heavy weather of ordering just 20 books.

According to the tenets of the Embodied Simulation theory, this metaphor would be a result of simulating entirely Boat Travel onto the activity of Buying the house. The question which arises here is why the entire domain of Travel is not activated in this metaphorical mapping. That is, this example does not show that all the physical components of the source domain are mapped onto the target domain. To further explore this theoretical problem, let us consider the following examples,

Love Is Journey

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(1)We arrived at a crossroads and had to split up (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1980:44-45).

Competition Is War

(2) The two leading brands have been engaged in a price war.

The two examples do not support the embodied simulation theory as based on the notion of simulating entirely the physical actions of source domains in target domains because not all the components of the source domains Journey and War are mapped. For instance, example (1) shows that the mapping between the two domains (Love Relationship and Journey) is partial because not all the physical components of the source domain Journey are mapped onto the target domain. To illustrate, components such as tickets and luggage etc. are not included in the mapping. Hence, the mapping is partial. Therefore, simulating entirely the physical action of the source domain Journey is not observed in this mapping typology. If we argue that the simulation process is being carried out entirely while processing these metaphorical mappings, then the “partial mapping” principle would not fit their analysis. Similarly, in (2) we conceptualize Competition in terms of War, in which not all the components of the physical action of the source domain are mapped. That is, if we simulate entirely such physical actions, then it would be possible for us to conceptualize Competition in terms of an army uniform, bungalow etc.

Therefore, based on the data analysis, it becomes obvious that the embodied simulation does not explain how simulating (entirely) physical actions onto target domains could fit the partial mapping principle. Though certain mapping typologies are based on simulation, it does not follow from this that all mapping typologies that engage physical actions as source domains follow the same pattern—simulating entirely the physical action of source domains.

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3.3.3. Partial mapping and the neural instantiation of