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situation may not characterize the mapping typology which draws on two bodily- experienced phenomena.

3.1.1.3. Propositionality and components of source and target domains

We showed in the previous section that the notion of differentiating source and target domains in terms of concreteness and abstractness does not stand on a solid basis. This finding is particularly noticed in the mapping typology which depends on bodily- experienced phenomena as source and target domains, respectively. As shown before (see Figure 5.), target domains also share some of the presumably inherent characteristics of source domains.

In this section we shall consider the components of source and target domains to see whether the entailments of the Propositionality-Linearity theory fit the data. In order words, to examine metaphorical mapping from this perspective, we need to assume that the components of source and target domains are of two different natures: primitive and complex, respectively (for an in-depth analysis of this issue see the previous chapter).

A particularly important entailment of this notion is that while primitive components cannot be understood in terms of other components, complex components are

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reasoned about in terms of those primitive components. Let us analyze the following metaphors:

Human Is Animal

(1)My husband turned out to be an animal.

Money Is Food

(2)The new car took a large bite out of our savings.

Human Is Army

(3)When she opened the door there was an army of journalists waiting for her.

Figure 6 Components of source and target domains Human Is Animal

Figure 8 Components of source and target domains for Human Is Army. Figure 7 Components of source and target domains for Money Is Food

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To analyze the data in accordance with the Propositionality-Linearity perspective taking into account the tenets of the Embodied metaphor theory, we need to assume that the components of source domains are primitive whereas those of target domains are complex. More precisely, in (1), (2), and (3) the components of the domains Animal, Food, and Human are primitive as compared to their counterparts in the target domains Money, Building, and Human, which need to be considered as complex.

This metaphorical mapping typology reveals a theoretical problem within the embodied approach to metaphor. We notice in this set of metaphors that (1) source and target domains are bodily-experienced phenomena; and (2) the domain Human functions as source and target in different metaphorical mappings. In this respect, the embodiment theory needs to distinguish the components of the domain Human when it functions as source and when it functions as target domain. That is, if we assume that certain characteristics allow a given domain to perform the role of source or target, then, the challenge is to explain why a given domain can have the role of source and target in different metaphorical mappings. This means that we cannot rely on the complexity- primitiveness of components to assign domains the function they take on in metaphorical mappings.

In addition distinguishing the components of source from those of target domains in terms of primitiveness and complexity requires identifying how the elements of the domain Army and their counterparts in the domain Human differ. To do that, we need to assume that a given target domain takes on the characteristics of a bodily-experienced phenomenon, which functions as source. Similarly, these very characteristics are considered abstract and complex when the same domain functions as target. It seems implausible to make this differentiation since the components of Army are essentially

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equivalent to the components of the target domain Human (see Figure 8). More specifically, Army may be considered as a subcategory of the domain Human, and consequently, some elements are common to both domains.

Mapping these two phenomena is based on these shared features. Due to the fact that conceptual metaphor hinges on the differentiation between components of source and target domains, a potential challenge to the Embodied metaphor theory is to explain why the components of Army should be considered different from their counterparts in Human. As stated before, Szwedek (2011:342) suggests that the domain which has more physical participants functions as source but the one which has less physical components functions as target. However, looking closely at the data, this criterion cannot explain why Army is considered to have more physical components than Human.

Another problem with this standpoint is how to reconcile the notion that elements from source domains have their corresponding elements in target domains and the notion that source domains have more physical participants, given that in some instances of metaphorical mapping, the same domain takes on the role of source and target domains. Let us consider Human Is Animal and Animal Is Human to illustrate this point.

In order for this criterion to hold, we need to assume that Animal in (1) has more physical participants than the domain Human but in (2) it has less physical participants. More importantly, we need to assume that Animal in (1) has more physical participants than in (2). Again, it seems that this criterion is not reliable to analyze this metaphorical mapping typology. As a result, the metaphorical mapping which engages bodily- experienced phenomena in source and target domains does not satisfy this criterion.

In order to address these contrasting assumptions within the theoretical framework of the embodiment theory, we suggest that source and target domains in this metaphorical

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mapping typology are physical and by the same token, their constituents are experienced bodily. In this respect, we can draw two conclusions about this mapping typology: first, being primitive or complex is not inherent to the components of source and target domains. These features are irrelevant in that they do not seem to be operating in this type of