Do we perceive things or our impressions of things?

In the Enneads as a whole, on balance, Plotinus thinks we perceive things directly.17 Ennead IV, 6 (41) 1, explicitly states: when we perceive anything, we look directly at

it and perceive it there where it is (1, 11–18; 23–32), not in the sense that we get a physicalsampleofitorbecausewealreadyhaveitsform(1,18–23).Perceptionisreal, directinitsownright,andapparentlytakesplacetherewheretheobjectis(IV,6[41] 1,14–18;VI,4[22]12,109–12).SincePlotinusrejectsAristotle’saffectedtransparent mediumasasufficientconditionforperception(cf.IV,5[29]4,1–7),itisdifficultto

15. See Chapter 4 on V, 8 (31), 1, for the emphasis Plotinus puts upon the importance of testing one’s opinions and conclusions. This is essentially Platonic.

16. Plotinus is deliberately citing Plato’s Republic 589 a–b): “he who says that justice is advantageous would say that we should do and say these things from which the inner man (ho

entos anthrôpos) of man will be strongest.”

know what he means when he says perception takes place there where the object is. Aristotle supposes that subject percipient and object perceived are unified in the act of perceiving by a single activity, but Plotinus seems to go beyond this and to suggest that he thinks of the sensitive organ as extending right out to the object. This is per- haps by virtue of its being a sympathetic part of a larger organism, though as we shall see below, such sympathy does not dispense with the need for the power of perception to be actualized through the senses. However we are to interpret this, while the mate- rial impressionispresentasa transmission in the air (and is therefore divisible), the activity of sound or light as perception is to be understood as an indivisible discrimi- natory power of soul herself, on the part of both percipient and object perceived. We perceive an object that is genuinely external to us, but this requires interpretation and contextualization. So if the “we” who perceive are complex, the object perceived is similarly complex and requires an active discriminating perception to grasp its whole- ness. Active perception in this sense, therefore, is the meeting of subject percipient and object perceived, and a real grasp of the object where and as it is. By contrast, passive perception,orperhapsaformofsensationthatanalyseswithoutseeingtheob- jectwhole, breaks up this wholeness into parts and into collections of discrete quali- ties, quantities, and relations and, to this degree, is more abstract.

InPlotinus’view,then,causalityisnotjustafeatureofobjectsactinguponustopro- duceideasorsensationsinthepercipientsubject;thatis,“copies”or“resemblances”of patternsexistinginmaterialsubstances,asinJohnLocke’s(1632–1704)theoryofper- ception. In Locke’s theory,ourideas are copies of primaryqualities (extension, etc.) supposedtoexistintheobject,asopposedtosecondaryqualities(colours,sounds,tastes, etc.),which“arenothingintheobjectsthemselves,butpowerstoproducevarioussensa- tionsinus...ascolours,sounds,tastes.”NorinPlotinus’viewisperceptiononlyafunc- tionofspiritualsubjects,asmightappeartobethecasewithGeorgeBerkeley’s(1685– 1753) alternativeversionof epistemologicaldualism.18 _{Sense-objects mustbegrasped}

whole,and“whatseesandwhatisseenmustbetwo.Whatsees...mustbeanothersee- ingtheimpression(typos)inanotherplace,butnotinthatwhichseesitis”(IV,6[41]1, 36–9).Onbalance,therefore,Plotinus’statementsinIV,6(41)1andVI,4(22)12,10– 12,supporttheviewthathistheoryisrealist,notconceptualistorrepresentationalist.

Ontheotherhand,twootherpassages,V,3(49)3,33,andV,5(32)1,15–19,sug- gesttheopposite.PassageV,3(49)3,saysstraightforwardly,“weperceivethroughper- ceptionandwearetheperceivers”intheHenry-Schwyzertext;nearlyeveryothereditor (Theiler,Harder,Cilento,Armstrong,Beierwaltes)putsanegativeintotheline:“weare nottheperceivers.”Yet asHenryand Schwyzerpointout,atlines40–1Plotinussays “forwealwaysareperceiving,”whichrendersthenegativeunlikelybutperhapsdoesnot clinch theissue. In thegeneralcomparative textureof thewhole passage(perception, reasoning,andthought),however,evenifPlotinusactuallywroteanegative,hedidnot meanthatwearenottheperceiversbutthatperceptionisnotasmuch“we”asisreason.

18. Though this will depend very much upon how one interprets Berkeley’s theory. For one feature of this interpretation see K. Corrigan, 1994, 67–86.

Thisisalsothepointatissue,asIseeit,inV,5(32)1.HerePlotinusarguesthatsense- perceptionisanimage(eidôlon)ofthethingthat“doesnotapprehendthethingitself: forthatremainsoutside”(15–19).Thispassageisnotfataltotherealisthypothesisei- ther,foritmakesasomewhatdifferentpointthanmightbesupposedatfirstglance.In- tellectknowsits objectasitself,forintellect knowsthe essence,or“whatis,” ofthe thing.Perception,however,isofthequality,nottheessence(cf.V,5[32]2,1–9;II,6 [17]1,42–9),andinperceptiontheobjectdoesremainoutside.WhenPlotinusasserts thataesthêsis,orperception,doesnot “take”(lambanei) thethingitself,he doesnot mean thatperceptionisindirect butthatunlikeintellect,which“takes”and“has” its objectdirectlyasitself,perceptioncannotpossessitsobjectinjustthatway.Perception

islessdirectthan thought.Butthisdoesnotaffect thedirect visionhypothesis inits owncontext. Thus Plotinusholdsthatperceptionis activeanddirect,but lessdirect thanthought.