Problems in Plotinus’ anthropology: Intellect and the range of being human

There are many problems with the range of activities and beings Plotinus wants to in- clude in the human being. Some of these are apparent in the later chapters of I, 1. First, the “we” seems to become so fluid that to pin it down precisely is very difficult (11, 1 ff.). Second, the language Plotinus uses seems to threaten any possible unity of the human being: “the human being within” (i.e., aligned with intellect), the human being as a concrete agent (7, 1 ff.), the living creature (i.e., the compound or ensouled body), the qualified body (which of course is ensouled, but the emphasis is rather upon body), and then “the beast.” How can there be “human” oneness on these terms, espe- cially when the rest of the animal kingdom seems quite intimately related to our lower humanity? My DNA structure may vary only slightly from that of chimpanzees, but from Plotinus one may get the impression that a chimpanzee or a lion threatens to leap out of my emotional experience, even my perceptual experience, if I am not careful. Plotinus is explicitly concerned with this problem since he mentions it directly (11, 8), but he does not give any real answer to it in this treatise. Third, I even seem in danger of being split up altogether, a little like the soul of Fra Alberigo in Dante’s Divine

Comedy, Inferno 33, 122–36, which is already in hell before his physical death. The

case of Heracles is equally disquieting: part of him is here below, part above “because he was active and not contemplative” (I, 1, 12, 37). Finally, then, Plotinus’ cavalier at- titude to the problem of how we reconcile the true self’s faultlessness with Plato’s ac- counts of the soul’s judgement and punishment after death (“Well, one should accept whichever argument one wants,” 12, 4–5) may not exactly inspire confidence (cf. chapter 1, part I, passage 6).

I shall not take up all of these problems here. Instead I shall contrast several rather different views of the human being, all of which Plotinus tends to see at once, though they may seem mutually exclusive to us. Together, however, they shed light on the problems of how human beings are related to the animal and plant worlds as well as on how Plotinus views human substantiality and its limitations. My overall thesis could be summed up as follows: human beings, for Plotinus, are inherently multidi- mensional, and only as such are they definable. But they constitute one species only, and a narrow specific view is not enough for an authentic reflexive scientific model.

Insteadofthetwo-mantheoryPlotinusproposesinI,1(53),11,hesetsoutathree- mantheoryinVI,7[38]andthinkseven“thismanhere”isdefinableinthatcontext (as

well as the rest of the animal kingdom). There is (1) “man himself” in the intelligible, (2) “man” as the productive cause inherent in the thing, and (3) the “composite man” of process. This looks like Plotinus’ solution to the “third man” argument: there is nothing to prevent there being a “Form” in intellect as well as the productive form in soul and the compound because we are not talking of a common abstract nature or concept in any of these cases.

The relationship among these three is complex but worth following through (see especially chapter 1, part II, passage 9). In each thought and activity of man, Plotinus says, “the whole man shone forth bringing himself along with the thought of him” (VI, 7, 2, 51–2). Now if we define the human being as only the casual association of ra- tional soul and body (4, 12–18), we do not catch this wholeness of eternal existence but only “indicate” the “composite man” or “the man who will be” (Aristotle uses this phrase of the composite objects of physical science as opposed to the formal objects of theoretical science, PA 640 a 3–4). We do not even define what “enmattered” forms are (4, 16–20; these we met above in I, 1 [53] 3 ff.). But enmattered forms, as we have seen in I, 1, have to be defined in the light of the productive or causal form (4, 21) “that has made this human being [i.e., the composite man], that exists in him [enhypar-

chon], and is not separate [ou choriston]” 4, 28–30).

To summarize thus far, then, “intelligible man” is present in “man” as a productive cause, just as the whole is present to the part without destroying it or losing its own nature. “Composite man” cannot be defined unless he is brought into this perspective. This leads Plotinus to a very real difficulty, which we too have been feeling through- out our reading of I, 1. Yes, we might say to Plotinus, we are prepared to grant that the human being is a real agent (if you say so), but this business about “by virtue of the soul” (in I, 1), or by virtue of the “productive cause-man” and “man-himself” really makes soul or intellect the only proper subject, and the poor, composite third man a rag-and-bone affair to be manipulated by his two big brothers or sisters.

Plotinus actually formulates this problem and answers it in VI, 7, 4. Either “soul will provide the rational life,” he says, “and the human being will be an act of soul and

not substance, or the soul will be the human being” (4, 34–6). On the first horn of the

dilemma, “soul” will be the form and the “human being” the matter; however, on these terms the human being will not be substance, that is, a proper subject in its own right, but a material puppet manipulated by soul. On the second horn of the dilemma, we should simply have to identify the human being and the soul (which is not possible be- cause “this human being” necessarily includes “this body”).

Plotinus rejects both alternatives. As to the first, he simply takes for granted in VI, 7, 4, that it is untenable. Throughout the Enneads, Plotinus insists on the substantial unity of the human being, which prevents manipulation simply by fate, for instance, as though the movement of my leg were determined entirely by cosmic influences (cf. III, 1 [3]), or my actions by providence. I am the agent of my own actions “with” or “against” the influence of providence (cf. III, 3 [48] 5, 48–50). The decision is mine. In I, 1, 13, Plotinus asks if it is “we” or “the soul” that has conducted the investigation.

It is definitely “we,” he replies, “but by the soul.” But what does “by the soul” mean? “By having soul”? No, Plotinus replies, we investigate insofar as we are soul (13, 1– 3). In other words, the historical subject, or ego, is not a reflection or manipulation of a substantial principle but a subject in its own right to the degree that it is that princi- ple. Plotinus does not mean that we simply are “soul” because “soul” possesses an ex- tension that goes far beyond being only human.

As for thesecondhornofthedilemma,whilethehumanbeingcannotbeanactof soul,neithercanheorshebesoulsimply,sinceifwedefinebeinghumanexclusively intermsoftherationalsoul,Plotinusasks,“wheneverthesoulgoesintoanotherliving creature,howisthesoulnotman?”(4,36–8).Justwhenwethinkwearegettingtothe heartofthematter,Plotinusintroduceswhattomostofuslookslikeadead-end: the transmigrationofsouls(althoughofcourse millionsofpeople alivetoday believein metempsychosis and, likePlotinus, could presumably offer a reasonable defence of theirviews).ButPlotinus’pointcansurelybetranslatedintotermsthatfitthepresent contextandlookmuchmorereasonable.Whyisthehumanbeingnotsoulsimply?Be- cause theterm“soul” extendsfarbeyondthe species“human being.”Human beings areonlyapart,andnotthemostimportantpart(cf.I,1,7,8),ofthevisiblelivingcrea- ture,whichisthisworld,andtheintelligiblelivingcreatureinwhichithasitsmeaning and being. So wecannot define “this human being” withoutall human beings con- cretely(forPlotinus)intheproductivelogos(throughwhichthewholeofintelligible “man”shinesthrough),andwecannotdefineasinglespeciesasthoughitheldsupreme swayandborenoessentialrelationtoeverythingelse.Thereisnohumanbeingwithout allbeings.Atthesametime,thehumanbeingcanbedefined,Plotinusconcludes,not asanassemblageofcontingentpartsbutasanactivecompoundunderstoodintermsof acausalrelationamongitselements:“whatpreventsmanfrombeingacompound,soul inalogosofadefinitekind[i.e.,aqualifiedbody,aswesawinI,1above],thelogos

beinganactivity,sotospeak,ofadefinitekind[i.e.,thebodyunderstoodasanactive form,notjustapotency],andtheactivitybeingunabletoexistwithouttheactivesubject [i.e.,thebodydependsuponsoulforitsanimationandorganization]”(VI,7,5,2–5).

Thewholeofthispassageisintenselydifficultandhighlytechnical,anditishard toseethesignificanceofthisfinaldefinitionsinceitlookssoabstract. ButPlotinus’ argumentisratherrevolutionary,foritbringstogetherinanewwayAristotle’sposi- tionthatthesoulisthenonseparateformofthebodywithPlato’spositionthatthein- corporealsoul is thetrue windowupon the intelligibleworld. Onlywhenthe “three men” are brought togetherinto a singleview canthe composite manofprocess be- come definableasan individualwholeform. SoPlotinusholdsthe followingviews. (1)Individualsare definable not becausetheysharean abstractcommon nature, but because their whole beings can be seen in a causally active way when they are grasped interms ofthe immanentproductive soul thatmakes them.(2)Both matter

and form enter into the substance of the human being. Neoplatonism is typically takento task forits negativeview of matter.But asweshall see (chapter 3.8),this dependsupon whatwemeanindifferentcases. Here,ifmattercanbeseenasan ac- tivity, then it becomes meaningful in principle. Thus, while soul is the productive

principle, body andmatter are transformed by soul into a specific logos (or as Aris- totle calls it at De Anima 412 a 20-1, “a physical body potentially having life”). In the

Metaphysics, Aristotle insists that the human being cannot be defined without bringing human matter into the form and that even bodily parts should properly be defined by

reference to their function (1035 b 14–18; 1036 b 21–3). For Aristotle, this is a neces- sary consequence of stating “the substance according to the logos” or “the essence of a specific kind of body” (1035 b 15–16). In other words, the Metaphysics suggests that material potencies should be defined in terms of functions or activities.

This is precisely what Plotinus does in VI, 7, 4–5. The definition “soul in a specific kind of logos” brings form and matter together in the substance of the human being (cf. III, 3 [48] 4, 29–41). Soul also has other powers and a nature rather different from the way Aristotle conceives it. For Plotinus, then, the transmigration of souls is still possible (cf. III, 3 [48] 4, 40–4), but this does not affect the conclusion that the human being “here” (VI, 7, 4, 3), who is the object of Plotinus’ enquiry, is the unity of both elements, soul and a specific human body, in the logos. The matter is “potential” in the sense that it cannot function without an active subject, but it appears in the definition as a developed activity. In other words, this developed matter, our living bodies, in the light of its cause, is form. This helps us to see much more clearly what Plotinus means when he says that matter itself is “an ultimate form” (V, 8 [31] 7, 18–23 ). Even the material cause is intelligible in the light of the active beauty of divine and human crea- tivity. So for Plotinus an anthropology rooted in soul and intellect is one in which real human individuals and their determinate material structures emerge as intelligible.30

Otherwise, the human being looks contingent and accidental, and matter becomes more or less only a vanishing point.31 _{Somehow we find ourselves poised between}

these two anthropologies.

At the same time, perhaps this also will provide a framework for understanding the limitations of being human in intellect. To become a human being is in one sense to stop being everything: “And yet man also crafts a form other than himself since he has become other than what he is; for he has fallen away from being the all, now that he hasbecomeman;butwhenhestopsbeingmanhewalksonhigh...foroncehehas cometobelongtothewholehemakesthewhole”(V,8[31]7,31–5).Oragain,when webecomeintellect,thehumanbeing“thinkshimselfagain,notanylongerasmanbut havingbecomealtogetherother...”(V,3[49]4,10–12).Thereasonforthisisthatwhile intellectincludeshumanityinonesense(inmanypassagesthroughouttheEnneads),32_it

isnonetheless ahumanitytransformedby thewhole.AsAristotlesaysoftheoretical wisdomorsophia,itwouldbeabsurdtoidentifyawisdomthatcontemplatesthewhole ofbeingwiththenarrowerinterestsofonespeciesofbeingasthoughthehumanbeing

30. Though the negative perspective of “removal” is important. See V, 3 (49), 9, 1 ff. 31. To get a sense of the range of Plotinus’ reflections upon matter, see chapter 1 and espe- cially chapters 3.8 and 4.13.

32. E.g., VI, 7 (38), 4, 17; VI, 8 (39), 14, 1–4; and more generally VI, 7 (38), 4–7; II, 3 (52), 9.

werethebestthingintheuniverse.Onehastogobeyondspecificintereststo see the in- telligible wisdom of the universe in its own right (cf. EN VI, 6). Moreover, Plotinus never forgets that horses, plants, fangs, tusks, and teeth are not just lowlier forms that we can take or leave but safeguards that have appeared for preservation and protection in a deficient universe of which we are but partial guardians and whose “physical wis- dom” we share with the rest of the animal and plant kingdoms.33

What precisely is involved in this broad extension of being human which ranges from intellect and the divine to human and animal consciousness?

First, how are we related to intellect (I, 1, 8, 1–8)? As we have seen, “we” are not simply intellect, though intellect is always present to us. Intellect is “ours” and “not ours” (cf. V, 3 [49] 3–4) in the sense that it transcends us and we have to put ourselves in touch with it and “use” it. In V, 3, 4, Plotinus distinguishes between being in touch with, or in accordance with, intellect and becoming identical with intellect. In an early work, these two phases are called “intellects” (V, 1 [10] 10, 12). One provides the power of reasoning to the soul (i.e., intellect proper), and one reasons (i.e., the intellect of soul). Sometimes, reasoning is a defect or weakness, but at other times, as both here in V, 1 (10) 10, and I, 1, 8, 2, it is in principle an intelligible reality. Since it needs no bodily organ for its operation, Plotinus argues in V, 1 (10) 10, one could place it as “separate and unmixed” (cf. Anaxagoras, fr. 12; Aristotle, De Anima III, 4–5) in “the primary intelligible realm” (see chapter 1, part I, passage 1). Here in I, 1, 8, 2, it is “that disposition of soul that she has as one of the things from intellect,” and in 9, 23 ff., it is the “true discursive reason of soul” that “is an activity of intelligible thoughts and frequently there is a likeness and community between the things outside and these within.” In fact, reasoning that has to adapt its vision of the good to the changing cir- cumstances of life can provide “more beautiful” activities (energeiae) than the activi- ties of the good person who does not have to make these adaptations (cf. I, 4 [46] 13, 1–4). Adaptive rational creativity can apparently manifest intelligible reality even more than where no adaptation is necessary (cf. IV, 4 [28] 2). The two aspects of rea- soning, positive and negative, are treated together in IV, 3 (27) 18, 1–4, 10–13: the need for reasoning comes into the soul when she is in difficulty, full of care, and in a state of greater weakness; but if one understands reasoning “to be the state of mind [diathesis] that exists in souls always proceeding from intellect and that is standing ac- tivity and impression of intellect, they would employ reasoning in that other world, too.” Reasoning in its positive aspect points the way to our identity with intellect, and the soul’s manner of possessing forms “unrolled and separated, as it were,” anticipates their all-togetherness in intellect (see chapter 3, sections 3.14; 3.19; 3.21).

Second,how arewe relatedtogod(I,1,8,8–23)?“Thegod”istheOne(oralso, elsewhere,intellect)towhichthehighersoulnaturallygravitates.TreatiseII,3(52)9, (writtenimmediatelybeforethiswork)isworthcomparinggenerally:“...totheother soul,whichisoutsidethebody,belongstheascenttothehigherworld,tothefairand divinethatnoonemasters,buteithermakesuseofitthathemaybeitandlivebyit,

withdrawinghimself;orelseheisbereftofthissoul,andlivesunderdestiny”(24–28). (On the natureofsoulandsoul-powersseechapter 3.14,andcf.I,4[46]3,18–40). Third, compareI,1,12, andIV,8(6)5–8.34_{Fourth,regardingthe double“we”and}

the “middle” of our being (I, 1, 10, 1–10; 11),who are we? Eitherthe beastis in- cludedinournature(i.e.,the ensouledbody),or“we”aretobereferredtothe“true humanbeing” whoseexcellences arerooted inthe soulthatseparatesherself(andis separableevenhere).Itranslatechôrizomenê(10,9)as“separating”(cf.Phaedo67c 6andII,3[52]9,20).35_{This(i.e.,toretainherownnature)isthefunctionofthepure}

soulevenifsheisimmanent.Eachisdouble;onehumanbeingis“thecompoundina certainway,”theother“himself”(II,3[52]9,30,1–2);thehighermanmakesuseof the higher soul “withdrawing himself” (like the soul above in I, 1, 10), while the commonlifebelongsmoretobody(9,19–27).Comparethethreekindsofhumanbe- ing,andthedoublecityinthebesthumanbeing(oneaboveandonecomposedofthe lowerelementsorderedbytheprinciplesabove)inIV,4(28)17.I,4(46)4,6andfol- lowingindicatesthat oneisnotahumanbeingatallifone doesnothaveacomplete lifeofperception,reasoning,and trueintellect,butitisbettertobe(rather thanhave) this life. On the other hand, one doesnot havetobe conscious of it,Plotinusargues later (I,4 [46]9); perhapsonehasbeendruggedor overcomebymagic,oronecould simplybeasleep.Wisdomdoesnotstopexistinginthesleepingperson.Sotheactivityis priortoourawarenessoftheactivity(10,1ff.).Characteristichumanlife,itappears,be- ginswiththeintegrationofthehumanbeing(i.e.,theself-organisationofperceptionand reasoningilluminatedbyintellect),butthisdoesnotdependonconsciousness.

Howthenarewe totakeI,1, 11?Thesubjectoflines2–4isnotexpressed,butit couldbeeither“thefacultiesofthecompound”or“thepowersabove.”Ipreferthelatter buthaveleftitambiguousinmytranslation(as Plotinusdoes).Onthisunderstanding, thepowersabovecannotilluminateusifwearenotreceptive,butinordertoberecep- tivethoseilluminationshavetoreachthe“middleofourbeing,”andwehavetobecome consciouslyself-receptiveandreorientourselvestowardaparticularfocus(cf.chapter1, partI,passage1:V,1[10]12).“We”thereforeappeartobeakindofproportionalmean betweenthehigherandthelowerfaculties(asinsomanyotherpassages:III,9[13]3; IV,4[28]3;IV,6[41]3,10;I,4[46]10,1ff.;V,3[49]3,38;6,23ff.).Theselfis neverstaticoragivenbutacomplexspotlightalwaysinactualization.36_Thisdoesnot