Phase 6 – 2005-2009, the 4 th Eelam War

The fourth Eelam War is preceded by a ceasefire that Rajapaksa, the new prime minister, initiates in order to answer to international pressure. However, both parties have ulterior motives again. After the LTTE violates the ceasefire, the government begins its well-prepared military campaign. Eventually, the inevitable happens: the LTTE is forced to surrender and Prabhakaran is eliminated by the government forces.

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Figure 18. Timeline phase 6

Presidential elections of 2005 and new peace negotiations

New elections were necessitated by the withdrawal of the JVP. The elections of November 2005 were boycotted by the LTTE. They not only came out against the elections by telling the Tamil community not to vote, but also forcibly prevented Tamils from voting in the east. Some places were even afflicted by bombings (HRW, 2006, p.9). The elections resulted in an SFLP majority and Mahinda Rajapaksa became the newly elected president. The war in Sri Lanka received increasing international attention and the international community pressured Rajapaksa to invite the LTTE to engage in a new peace process. Thus in January 2006, Rajapaksa responded to the international pressure and started a new peace process immediately after he became president. Talks were held in Geneva in January and March 2006. The talks appeared to be unsuccessful again. Both parties seemed to be more interested in returning to war, showing no serious attempt at negotiating for peace (Uyangoda, 2015, p.114).

The international community

During the conflict, Sri Lanka had been extremely active in the realm of diplomacy, mainly to convince the international community not to get involved proactively in the conflict. Both the government and the LTTE were advocating their own cause against the other. The LTTE tried to advocate its own position by spreading anti-government propaganda, as the poster in figure 19 shows. On the other side, the government was committed to isolating the Tigers in the international community by spreading an image of them as brutal terrorists (Frerks, 2002, p.33; Hashim, 2013, p.183; NCTV).

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Figure 196_{. LTTE propaganda}

This position of the government changed with the new strategy of Rajapaksa, who realised he needed the support of the international community to defeat the Tigers. He stressed how important the international community had been in their support of Sri Lanka’s counterterrorism campaign. He stated how grateful the government was to India, Pakistan, China, Russia, Israel, Japan, Iran, Middle Eastern countries and countries of South Asia, by providing Sri Lanka with weapons, sharing intelligence and by refusing to provide the Tigers with facilities or aid. Although there was some debate about ‘Responsibility to Protect’, UN interference occurred only at a low level. According to Nira Wickramasinghe, this was probably because there was never sufficient sympathy for the Tamil cause. The diplomatic narrative of the government as it tried to prevent international interference also contributed this too (personal communication, 6 October 2015).

While the West did not want to send weaponry to Sri Lanka for humanitarian reasons, other countries, China being the largest provider among them, did sell weapons to Sri Lanka at low prices. The major intention of Sri Lanka towards India was to keep the neighbouring country from intervening as it had in the 1980s. This was possible not because India supported the

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Tamil Tigers again, but because they were concerned about civilian casualties in the Tamil community, which might cause a spill-over effect in the southern province of India. The politicians in this province were extremely critical of the Sri Lankan government and they had positions in the Indian coalition government. Thus Rajapaksa decided to share the government’s strategies and plans with India in order to keep them close and gain their trust. Eventually, this worked, and India even supported the government with intelligence and materials. Later, the Indian government criticised the high level of civilian casualties and demanded the Sri Lankan government to install no-fire zones. However, they did not intervene (Hashim, 2013, p.184). There were international interventions attempting to persuade the government to stop the bloodshed. In April 2009, Ban Ki Moon sent his chief of staff to broker a ceasefire. The British and French foreign secretaries attempted the same. Rajapaksa was not impressed and answered that he would only stop when Prabhakaran was dead or captured (Moorcraft, 2012, p.137-145).

During the fourth Eelam War, child recruitment continued on a large scale. One of the factors that contributed to this was the establishment of the Karuna group in 2004, which sharply declined the LTTE’s manpower. On 18 June 2007, the LTTE set a deadline to end the recruitment of children. They promised to release all children from the military by the end of 2007. Although they did not meet this deadline, the total number of minor Tigers did decline during this year. It is most likely that these attempts were made by the LTTE because of multiple warnings from the UN. The UN Secretary General threatened serious sanctions if the LTTE did not stop recruiting children (Child Soldiers International, 2008, p.313-314).

The final military campaign

The enormous military offensive of the Sri Lankan government, which would end the war, started in 2006. The Tigers violated the ceasefire in 2005 with suicide bombings and assassinations. The government officially quit the peace process in January 2008, but the military campaigns had already started in the summer of 2006. Again, the government had been investing in the military to a large extent. In addition to its increased resources, the military had also received training in guerrilla tactics. On the other side, the Tigers had faced serious damage to their effectiveness. 2000 military cadres were killed by the tsunami, many resources were lost and the battle against the Karuna group also weakened the LTTE substantially (Hashim, 2013, p.122, p.136-143).

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The first battle of the fourth Eelam War started when the LTTE closed the sluice gates of a major water resource. The government undertook Operation Watershed in order to reopen the gates, and the operation succeeded. More battles followed, mainly in the eastern area of Sri Lanka. In addition to the battles, the LTTE continued its suicide bombing attacks. The map in figure 20 shows the gradually declining LTTE territory in the last phase of the conflict. In early 2007, the LTTE experienced a disastrous setback. By conquering Thoppigala, a city in the eastern part of the island close to Polonnaruwa, the government forces gained control over the entire eastern province. since they lost control over a long stretch of coastline and this disconnected them from the other part of the

Figure 207_{. LTTE-held territory Tamil community. From this moment, the}

remained territory controlled by the LTTE was located in the north. This defeat had a major negative psychological effect (Hashim, 2013, p.136-143; Nicoll & Johnstone, 2009).

The north would be harder for the government forces to fight. The geographical factors worked to the advantage of the Tigers. They were highly skilled in guerrilla fighting, which they used in the areas of dense jungle. Additionally, the Tigers had long had power in the north, so they controlled the infrastructure and had their bases there. What the LTTE lacked in the east, but still had in the north was the broad support of the population, who believed the LTTE would offer protection. Despite determined resistance, the military succeeded in capturing town after town. The next devastating strike for the LTTE was the capture of a major Sea Tiger base in Vellankulam, close to Mannar. The LTTE had almost no access to any coastal bases after this, which eliminated the military and medical resources that had hitherto been brought in by ship (Hashim, 2013, p.143-150; Nicoll & Johnstone, 2009).

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The cutting of the main resource supply routes was a smart tactic by the Sri Lankan army. After this defeat, the LTTE fought back with determination, but they appeared not to be strong enough to withstand the army. Slowly they were forced to retreat to the north. On 31 December 2008, the LTTE was completely demoralised and had undergone organisational collapse. Although many Tigers thought the war could no longer be won, no one dared to tell Prabhakaran about the defeats over the last weeks of 2008. After a meeting, the leadership of the LTTE decided to continue fighting. In order to defend the area that was left under control of the LTTE, it was divided into three zones. This reorganisation was to make the defence of the Tiger area effective, but it did not succeed. In January Kilinochchi fell, one of the most important cities in the Tamil area. Two area commanders were unable to hold their areas, units fled the battlefields, combat cohesion fell apart and the army’s combat capabilities were severely curtailed. After the war, it was determined that there had not appeared to be a lack of munitions and weaponry. The government found enormous LTTE stores of weaponry. What was so destructive for the Tigers was a lack of trained cadres, low morale and no sense of ability to conduct any kind of operation. This does not mean that all the Tigers gave up. Until the end, the remaining Sea Tigers, for instance, attempted to disrupt government military operations. However, on 10 May 2009, the LTTE leadership decided to surrender. On the following day cadres began to desert, destroying everything they had to leave behind. On 19 May Prabhakaran was found hiding in a mangrove swamp and was killed by government forces. In the end, the Sri Lankan military appeared to be the stronger force (Hashim, 2013, p.151-162; Moorcraft, 2012, p.137-145).

Atrocities

The lack of independent verification of events in the final stages of the fourth Eelam War means that no one knows exactly what happened. What is clear is that the end of the war was characterised by brutality and countless atrocities and civilian casualties. As with the entire conflict, the government blames the LTTE and the LTTE blames the government forces. The government, for instance, claims it is impossible that they killed so many civilians, since their operation was a ‘humanitarian intervention’. Very little has been reported about the events that took place at this stage because the government denied any media access to the war zone. On the other side, the Tamil Tigers were also responsible for atrocities, including using civilians as human shields and forcing them to fight. More recent reports and documentaries that are now being made, using images provided by both civilians and perpetrators, are slowly revealing what happened. According to estimates from Human Rights Watch and the UN,

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approximately 5000 civilians died during the final stages of the fourth Eelam War (Hashim, 2013, p.162; Nicoll & Johnstone, 2009; Macrae, 2015; Speksnijder, 2011).

Perspective of the government

Both parties had ulterior motives again during the ceasefire that started in the sixth phase. The government initiated the ceasefire to satisfy the international community. Rajapaksa used this peaceful period of time to prepare his strategy and capacity for a large military campaign. Uyangoda (2011, p.114-115) explains why this government chose a military campaign to end the war in the sixth phase. Rajapaksa knew he could win a full-blown war if there were no international interference and if humanitarian issues and violations of human rights were ignored. Additionally, they felt supported by the international community because of the war on terror discourse and the fact that the LTTE had been placed on the terrorist list by many countries. Rajapaksa placed his brother in charge of the military and gave him a free hand in executing the war. Meanwhile, he secured international support by adopting a new strategy. In order to prevent an intervention by India, he also changed Sri Lanka’s strategy to its neighbouring country by involving them in the creation of the military strategy (Interviewee B, personal communication, 26 October 2015).

The government has been accused of countless human rights violations by human rights organisations and the international community, during and after the war. Rajapaksa knew he might violate human rights by launching his military campaign. Nevertheless, he accepted these consequences in order to end the Tamil insurgency. He believed the military option was the only effective solution left. A statement of the leading army commander during the fourth Eelam War, Sarath Fonseka, shows the main intentions of the military campaign: “Our main intention is to kill the maximum number of LTTE area leaders and their cadres within LTTE territory. Then the land they control would come under our purview.” (Hashim, 2013, p.42). The care for the population was something to worry about later.

Perspective of the LTTE

The boycott of the elections by the LTTE had an unintended outcome. Although the initial idea was to make a strong statement that the Tigers did not support the state, the result was the election of a hard-line politician. Prabhakaran underestimated the ruthlessness and determination of Rajapaksa (Uyangoda, 2015, p.114). This also contributed to the overestimation of his chances in the last Eelam War. He underestimated the army, the

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influence of the Karuna group and the ruthlessness of Rajapaksa, a characteristic no previous political leader had shown during the conflict. Moreover, Prabhakaran counted on international intervention because of the humanitarian issues with the large military operations of the government. Prabhakaran believed that an international intervention would at last lead to the end of the conflict and the recognition of a Tamil Eelam (Uyangoda, 2015, p.115; N.K. Wickramasinghe, personal communication, 6 October 2015).

Like the government, the LTTE also had ulterior motives in the last peace process. Like in most of the other phases, the LTTE used the ceasefire to regain strength, to recruit new militants and to augment their resources. The enormous escalation of violence following each ceasefire shows that both parties had been enhancing their capacity during a period in which they should have been focusing on creating peace. They would not have been able to use this much violence without increasing their capacity after the disastrous preceding phases (Interviewee B, personal communication, 26 October 2015).