99 such a plan, the additional payment of the salaries of these officials.

The a ttitude of the Colonial Office began to harde n against the

granting of responsible government.

W h e n the first Cape assembly met in the colonial politicians demanded that the legislative council have the power to amend m o n e y bills which, unde r representative government, only the colonial governor and his appo inted executive council were allowed to have. Immediately, Merivale

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realized the implication: "Responsible government will no doubt be the upshot ; whether it would be advisable to indicate in any way that it may be contingent on the adoption of strong measures of frontier defense may be worth considering."100 As in British North America, Merivale insisted that responsible government meant political freedom for the colonists and that they should take on the responsibilities of providing for their own economic and social development. In this case, settlers at the Cape must, under responsible government, also provide protection for themselves. The Colonial Office was supported by Sir George Grey who was attempting to create harmony between white settlers and Africans by a policy of "amal­ gamation". However, Grey believed that "amalgamation", his solution to the "native" question, should come before responsible government was granted.

In 1855 Merivale was astounded when he learned of Grey's decision to create a federation for southern Africa, an essential part of Grey's plan to "amalgamate" both whites and Africans. If implemented it would mean the end of the convention policy. Therefore Merivale was sceptical of federation;

There is every antecedent probability that the two Dutch South African republics, if left alone, will run through the career of the Spanish South American Republics. Great firmness, and great fore­ thought, will be required to resist the pressure of those who will endeavour to force the British government into interference, ... I think Sir G. Grey premature, to say the least of it, in alluding already to the probability of the reunion of these states under the British Crown in a kind of federation. 101

Despite Grey's intentions the Colonial Office felt, until 1858, that they were bound to support the man they had chosen to solve the problems of

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southern Africa.

ibl® government to the Cape Colony in 1855 had proven to be a wise one. Local administrators had mishandled the colony's finances and there was by 1856, a huge deficit. An official inquiry was held but it proved to be inconclusive. Despairingly Merivale minuted: "This seems to be one of the many cases in which 'Nobody' is ultimately in fault. If the Cape Par i ' t is satisfied, I do not know that we need pursue the subject further

" The Secretary of State for the Colonies, Henry Labouchere agreed 103

and nothing further was done. It proved once again to Merivale that the Cape Colony was not competent to handle its own affairs.

In March of 1857 Grey used Pretorius' claim,, the leader of the Boers in the "Trans-Vaal" r e p u b l i c t o the Orange River Territory, (which Merivale regarded as "preposterous" because it violated the treaties signed with the two republics in 1852 and 1854) to put forward "views of his favourite project of the 'Federal Union' under the British Crown." But Merivale^ supported by Henry Labouchere, saw the implications of Grey's policy:

. . . coalition should be likely to ensure through force from abroad & revolt within affecting one of the two states — that the annexing State should be the most hostile to this country and the most addicted to slave-dealing — and that the event should come to pass under a governor who loses no opportunity of expressing his dissatisfaction at what has been done and his hope of the reunion of the 0. R. Terr­ itory -- these are circumstances which no doubt try the principle of non-intervention to the uttermost,

Merivale minuted that Grey should be warned that the Colonial Office would not sanction any union of the republics, the policy of the Colonial Office was one of "non-interference" and Grey's sole concern should be the

defence of the southern African frontier and British interests within that

p - • 104 frontier.

In 1857, after Grey had been warned by the Colonial Office,, he turned his attention to another area. He recommended a union of British Kaffraria

with the Cape Colony without consulting the Colonial Office. This proposal meant, according to Merivale, "...placing at once the whole of our Sth. African possessions under a popular legislature of two elective houses --and that while we maintain 9 or 10,000 men there." The chief ob­ jection by Merivale and the Colonial Office was economic*105

One year later Grey proposed a federal government which would include the Cape Colony, Natal, British Kaffraria and the Boer republics.

Unfortunately some confusion was created by the changing of ministries in Britain and Grey did not receive, as he had in the past, unequivocal • instructions to the contrary. The new Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton, paid very little attention to southern Africa and he left the problem to Merivale. Lytton was far more concerned with found­ ing the new colony of British Columbia and in September 1858 he left the Office for the weekend without signing the Cape despatches, the ones which were to tell Grey that the Colonial Office would not sanction his proposal. Merivale felt they were so important that he signed them himself and wrote privately to Lytton and told him that it was "not worthwhile to suspend their transmission for form's sake only...." ^ Late in 1858

Lytton became ill and for a number of months, was unable to come to the Office. Merivale wrote privately to Lytton about the decisions being made with, of course, the latterrs approval. For the most part Lytton did not object to Merivale1s actions.

In October 1858 Merivale took a decisive step against Grey in order to bring his policy into line with that of the Colonial Office. At the same time Sir Edmund Head had also submitted proposals for federation in, British North America. If federation was not a suitable policy for colonies with responsible government then it certainly was not for south-

ern Africa, It appears there was no private communication between

Merivale and Grey as there was with Head. As Merivale minuted succinctly on October 5th: "But I think the Governor has fallen into the same

error imputed to Sir E, Head and on a question, in one respect at least^ more delicate: inasmuch as ’federation' certainly means one or the other of two things: either enormous expense to the mother-country, or the independence of South Africa." He recommended that Grey should be re­ minded that there is "another party" which he must consult^ the

108 "Imperial Government".

Grey responded by sending a long despatch giving his version of recent history of southern Africa at the end of which he concluded there was only one solution, federation. Merivale, who had been at the Colonial Office for eleven years and had observed the development of southern Africa during the "history" of which Grey was writing, minuted to Lord Carnarvon, the parliamentary undersecretary, that Grey's:

. . . historical s k e t c h is very disappointing to me. I had expected greater fairness & freedom from mere passion,..when his judgement was seriously appealed to. The facts are so distorted or loosely stated, as to be worthless: the motives which he attributes (and I speak from knowledge of successive Secretaries of State) purely imaginary. Unless he is referring to some ex­ pressed sentiments of Sir George Clerk, whom he is always con­ troverting: but I cannot suppose so.

Merivale went on to give the young and inexperienced Carnarvon a

lecture on the history of southern Africa. Merivale!s "history" lesson revealed the wide gulf which now separated Grey and Himself:

The Cape Colony was confined for many years to the old Dutch limits. Little more than twenty years ago the Boers began to emigrate in number beyond the limits of the colony -- partly because they were disgusted with slave emancipation: more, I dare say, because, as Sir G, Grey suggests, the countries beyond the boundary were found better adapted for their pastoral purposes. It became the policy of this country to follow them, treat them as rebels & subdue them} a policy chiefly founded I believe, on missionary motives. The Boers

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trekked into Natal they were conquered, & annexed. They trekked into the Orange River Territory -- they were conquered and annexed. They trekked beyond the Vaal — they were not indeed annexed, but they were kept at a distance as enemies. At last a change came over our policy, produced simply by some reaction against the missionary spirit, by a conviction of the idleness of attempting to follow Boers wherever they might "trekk", and, far more than aught else by awful impressions of increasing expense, & fear of Parliament,

These, I believe, have been the mainsprings of our policy — mission­ ary feelings pulling one way, dread of expense the other — and not the strange MachiaveELsras imagined in this despatch. The result is the two treaties of which so much has been said.

Merivale went on to demolish Grey’s analogy based upon the latter*s experience of New Zealand in the creation of a federation for southern Africa. The major difference was that southern Africa was a strategic area and **a vast section of a continent” whereas New Zealand was not. Merivale1s most forceful reason was economic. Grey's proposal, if carried out, would create a "new United States" in southern Africa and would give that state:

... the power of war and peace; while the only consolation for such abandonment of power is to be taken away from us: for we are to find and pay the soldiers, only with the hope of "prospective diminution" -- and we know, I fear, what the "prospective diminution"^ turn out. The ultimate rewards he holds out, of increased trade and advancing colonization, are to repay us.

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He concluded that the whole plan was "wild & impracticable".

When Grey disregarded the next despatches, which ordered him to desist, the Colonial Office had no alternative but to recall him to account for his disobedience. Merivale put the case to Lytton in March of 1859

as one in which ",. .there is no help for it. Sir G. Grey is so evidently, to my mind, bent on forwarding his scheme of Federation, that X must say with all reluctance I have no reliance whatever on his statements on sub-

jects bearing on it On May 30, 1859 Merivale wrote to Lytton in Hertfordshire telling him that, after fully considering the case, he

absolute disregard for orders" otherwise he would "likely bring the Home Government into very heavy difficulties and responsibilities" . Grey had submitted his federation scheme directly to the Cape Parliament without the consent of the Colonial Office. With great prescience Merivale

summed up the dilemma of southern Africa from his own day to present in the form of a question: "The time may very possibly come (if he [Grey] is left alone) when startled by the appearance of a Great South African Republic, men will ask, 'why was not this stopped at the outset when it might have been?1" Merivale also told Lytton to wait until early July to send out a very guarded statement of recall and one without "censure". By the time the letter reached the Cape Colony, however, Grey had de­ parted for London and the ministry which had sanctioned his recall had fallen. The new one, with the Duke of Newcastle as Secretary of State for the Colonies, rescinded the order. The whole business became a fiasco for Grey, Merivale and the Colonial Office.

In the meantime there, were renewed efforts by the Cape colonists to obtain responsible government as well as federation because of Grey's pronouncements. Merivale, very disillusioned with the whole situation, did his best to make sure that responsible government was not granted by linking it with Grey's federation scheme for southern Africa. By 1860, with Grey's recall, responsible government along with federation, was discredited in southern Africa. It was therefore, as Merivale argued once again, inconceivably "... rash to trust Imperial interests too

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exclusively to their cognizance."112 By the end of March I860, Merivale was transferred to the India Office and was no longer involved in the controversy.

If southern Africa was a graveyard for colonial governors, it was also important in Merivale’s administrative career. Merivale wasp within a year, "promoted" to the India Office, There is no evidence that he was removed by the new Secretary of State for the Colonies, the fifth Duke of Newcastle, for his part in this affair although Merivale was partially responsible for these events. It is more likely that Merivale was be­ coming increasingly disillusioned with the continual vacillation of British policy in southern Africa. When an offer came from the India Office, probably from his old friends, Sir George Russell Clerk and Sir

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