43 except support the actions of the colonial governor.

In the late 1840's New Brunswick was just as poor as Newfoundland. Most of the population lived in port towns and were involved in lumbering, shipbuilding, fishing and subsistence farming. Like other British North American colonies, New Brunswick lacked unity because of its geographical position. Only the building of an inter-colonial railroad in the 1860's

44

would bring about any significant change. Nevertheless, Merivale took a greater interest in this colony, probably because his friend,

Edmund Head, was appointed its governor. In 1848 Head consulted Merivale and Grey in London concerning the "strategy" to be adopted in granting

I 45

responsible government to New Brunswick. Head was instructed to choose his "new" colonial ministers carefully thereby ensuring that self-government would be placed in trustworthy hands. As one historian has aptly remarked, this attitude reflected the "characteristic attitude of moderate liberalism — ... sympathetic with reform but suspicious of

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revolution, and inclined rather to build on foundations already laid than to break new ground.

During Head's five years in New Brunswick, Head and Merivale col­ laborated, without too much interference from Lord Grey, in the process of transferring political power to the colonists and trying to educate

47

them for self-government. The most important problems, they realized, were economic. Only free trade and the development of a railroad con­ necting Halifax to Montreal, through New Brunswick,would change the isolation and the primitive economy of that colony. Head and Merivale experimented with the problems arising out of the new relationship between the governor and the assembly. As Head put it one year after his arrival in this colony, the influence of a governor had changed:

... a governor's power is mainly that nothing can be done without h i m . He has only to doubt & hesitate & require further document­ ation. His power of positive action independently must be small but so much the better for his tranquillity of mind. Personal influence with the members of the Council will do much t o o . ^

Although the governor could not interfere in the domestic affairs of the 49

colony, he could still do a great deal to influence the course of - 50

events.

In 1850 a political crisis arose because Head had failed to consult his executive council before he appointed a judge. Under responsible government he was, theoretically, supposed to govern through his council according to the wishes of the assembly. In this case, although the colonial politicians complained to the Colonial Office about the.action taken by Head, they did not quarrel with the appointment and the executive council did not resign in protest. Head was supported by the Colonial Office, especially by Merivale, whose minute summed up its attitude:

” ... if the affair ends in producing more unity of action and purpose among themselves |~the CouncilJ, good will have been done, even at the expense of some discontent with the Lt. Govr. 11 Once again, the primary concern of the Colonial Office was the development of efficient govern­ ment for these colonies. From this crisis Head and Merivale developed a

greater perception of the practical problems of responsible government as Merivale revealed in a minute on the subject:

... the Lt. Gov.[ernoip has very accurately stated the principles of the system called "responsible government" in colonial administration. But his own statement shows in what respect it is, and must be,

anomalous. The Executive Government of an independent community may be responsible to the Legislature only. The Executive Government of a dependency has a double responsibility: that of the Governor's Council towards the Legislature; that of the Governor himself to­ wards the Home Government: and it is the difficulty of reconciling

this double obligation which produces most of the temporary differ­ ences

&

Despite the "hitches" Merivale and Head had little trouble with the political affairs of this colony until 1854. New Brunswick continued to be plagued with economic problems which responsible government could provide no solution whatsoever.

Only free trade, in this case reciprocity with the United States, and the building of an inter-colonial railroad would lessen the economic isolation of New Brunswick in the 1850's. The former was accomplished but not the latter. The facts which governed both these decisions for the Colonial Office were the proximity of the colony to the United States and need to maintain the connection between the British North American colonies and Britain. The British feared that these colonies might be­ come annexed to the United States or become the cause of war between Britain and that country. Much was done in the Colonial Office to obviate

3 M

b o t h possibilities. The proposed route of the railroad, with loans g u a rant eed by the British government, was to be along the Gulf of the St. La wrenc e and the Gasp£ peninsula rather than through New Brunswick. The C olon i a l Office feared that the shorter and cheaper route desired by the colonists would, in time of war with the United States, not only be unsuitable for the military defence of the British colonies but w ould also enable Americans to capture it e a s i l y . ^ For these reasons construction of the railroad was not started in the 1 8 5 0*s.

The reciprocity negotiations were, however, successful and a treaty was s ig ned in 185

k,

B r u n s w i c k more closely to the other maritime colonies and it brought, at least for a time, prosperity to New Brunswick. Hea d had persuaded the Coloni al Office to include New Brunswick in the treaty. The

C olonial Office and Merivale were not opposed to this suggestion because it co mplemented their plan to reduce the economic dependence of the colonies on the mothercountry without noticeably weakening the p o l i t i c a l connection.

Late in 1853 Head wrote a private letter to Merivale concerning the state of New Brunswick. Despite the fact that the implementation of responsible government had been more successful than in many other B r i t i s h N o r t h American colonies Head reported:

... The fact is the last session of an assembly here, where there is no check on the introduction of money votes by any single member, is a scene of lavish jobbing of the grossest kind & it will be more than ever this winter because our revenue is larger. Every member tries to secure his re-election by this species of bribery. As it is of course I should not feel it necessary to weigh this matter further as it ought to rest with my successor if I am to be relieved this autumn. The present House is a very bad one, though too feeble to do much mischief. P r a y give me as early a notion as you can of my prospect of m o v i n g & let me hear from you.

Merivale and the Colonial Office were satisfied, however, with Head's first governorship. Merivale minuted to the.Duke of Newcastle in February of 1854, that it "... must be matter of great satisfaction to Sir E. Head to have witnessed the rapid recovery of the province under his government from the state of extreme depression which existed in the beginning of his administration, and its present very flourishing con­ dition: though not, as he truly says, the result of any specific action on the part of government." Economic conditions improved because of the reciprocity treaty and prosperity in North America and Europe. As Meri­ vale pointed out the colony's political problems, arising from responsible government, continued.

The next governor, Sir John Manners Sutton, had greater difficulties with New Brunswick. He kept the Colonial Office informed about the prob­

lems within the colony but little was done. Merivale realized that unless the colony showed some financial stability the British government would not provide an imperial loan or a guarantee for one. Without a railroad to tie these scattered colonies together there was little basis for any kind of union. The Colonial Office was resolved that the initiative had to come from the colonial politicians. In 1858 it came in such a feeble and parochial manner that the Colonial Office rejected it as pre- mature. The greatest pressure came from Canadian politicians who, as Merivale observed in 1859, "... have rather injured the prospects of the whole scheme by using it for their own political purpose, i.e. that of creating a balance in the East against the preponderating power of the

57

West " Any union would depend ultimately upon the development of responsible government in Canada.

146

Merivale had very little to do with the actual granting of responsible government in Canada. Lord Grey was quite clear in his instructions that it must be initiated by colonial politicians. In 1848 he minuted that, if Canada was to develop, the "administration of all internal affairs" should "... be left with very little interference indeed to the local authorities. It may very probably be necessary very soon to extend this system to other colonies in which the principle of responsible government has been established but it is advisable to wait till the necessity shows

58

itself." In this instance Grey relied to a great extent upon the advice of Lord Elgin. Within the next year, responsible government was granted to Canada.

Merivale contented himself with his role as legal adviser to the colony, for example, dealing with the defectiveness of bankruptcy law, with the use of lotteries to finance railroads, with the appointment of judges, and with the complaints from Egerton Ryerson, the Canadian jour­ nalist and educator, about the use of American maps in Canadian school-

60

rooms. In 1850 he helped to bring about the transfer of the postal 61 system in British North America from imperial to colonial control. In addition, he opposed the proposed Halifax and Quebec Railway scheme:

... however desirable it may be to encourage the settlement & improvement of our Eastern American colonies, all arguments which seem to assume that they need only encouragement to thrive like the West seem to be based on a fallacy. Climate & soil make the radical differences which no public work can cure: The State of Maine, with more than an average amount of American enterprise does not advance like Ohio, nor will New Brunswick advance like Canada West. There­ fore all extraordinary outlay on the former is like spending money on barren land when there is still fertile to cultivate and though there may be very good politica^2reasons f°r it:> cannot be justified on strictly economical grounds.

Merivale repeated the same warning throughout the 1850's with regard to British North America and southern Africa. The granting of responsible government to any colony was directly dependent on its economic maturity.

In 1853 Merivale and Head replaced Grey and Elgin. The former con­ tinued the Grey-Elgin practice of dealing with the affairs of the colony by means of private letters and despatches, using informal as well as formal means of communication. Unlike Elgin and Grey, Merivale and Head were aided by economic prosperity in Canada at least until 1858 and no serious crisis arose. Instead, colonial issues centred on mundane and sometimes humorous questions such as the conferring of titles on colonial politicians and the order of precedence for the wives of colonials dining

63

at Government House. In 1858 three important questions confronted Head and Merivale: the possibility of the annexation of the Hudson's Bay

Company territories by Canada, the "double shuffle" crisis and the location of the "seat of government". In all three instances Merivale and Head were

forced to interfere in these domestic disputes. The outcome proved to Merivale and the Colonial Office that responsible government had not developed very far and also that Canada and the other British North American colonies were not ready for federation.

Although the subject of a union of all the British North American colonies had been discussed for many years by colonial and imperial politicians, commentators and administrators, it was not until 1858 that it was seriously considered by the Colonial Office. Like the 1860's, the 1850's also had its debate on the practicability of a British North American federation. The attention of the Colonial Office was focused

148

on this important issue largely because of Head's interest in it. Previ­ ously nn academic, Head was very interested in the abstract as well as the practical political problems of colonial development. In 1857 he set down his ideas in the form of a memorandum on the "expediency" of uniting either the maritime colonies or all of the British North American colonies. In 1857 he wrote that these considerations were not necessary because the "... temper of the United States & their future weight in all public affairs must make us think twice before we add to their strength. But if we cannot shake off the B.N. American provinces -- what must we d o — -

65 we must make the best of them."

Head's ideas on the viability of a federal union became significant in August 1858 because of the "seat of government" question, whether the capital of Canada should be located in Upper or in Lower Canada. Canadian politicians could not agree and the matter had to be decided in Britain. The resulting deadlock brought down "Head's Ministry", a coalition led by John A. Madconald. Another important and related issue was the great

interest which Canadian politicians were taking in the Hudson's Bay Company territories now that the British government, by the recommendations of a Select Parliamentary Committee in 1857, had opened the way for Canada to a n nex Rupert's Land,

Upon receiving Head’s despatch, Merivale and the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton, became very worried. Merivale wrote to Lytton: " I fear it must be, a very serious matter, and ominous of troublesome complications for you to deal with, if not of a general

66

break up of Lord John Russell's united Canadian Republic." The next despatch brought even more serious news because Head reported that he had

refused to call an election for either the coalition of John A. Macdonald or ^ts successor led by George Brown and A. A. Dorion. The consequence-

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was the "double shuffle" crisis. Head explained to Lewis that Brown had no chance of forming a stable government. and he thought, incorrectly

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as it turned out, that Brown knew it also. Head had used his wide dis­ cretionary powers, as the governor of a colony under responsible govern­ ment, not to dissolve the assembly and call an election because he believed the expense could not be justified. After receiving Merivale's advice

69