Police Command

Two police chiefs presided over police reform during the period 2009-2014; Mathew Iteere, the last Commissioner of Police, and David Kimaiyo, the first ever Inspector General of police. The reform trajectories under the two police chiefs have been different. Iteere’s tenure was characterised by very little reform due to lots of resistance to reform at higher levels of police command. In fact, it was during this period that Eric Kiraithe, the then police spokesman announced that the police would be unwilling to have a civilian as the Inspector General (Ogemba, 2012). No rebuttal was given regarding Kiraithe’s statement, thus suggesting that it was the official position of the police command.

Iteere’s role in the reform process as the police chief elicits mixed reactions from stakeholders in the police reform process. Some members

219 Interview with K-Int2

220 Interview with K-Int2

of the civil society groups claim it was difficult ‘to work with the former commissioner of police Mathew Iteere who seemed to be difficult to even just give audience.²²¹ The rigidity in opening up was due to uncertain future the top police officers faced if reforms were to be undertaken.

Reforms meant losing their jobs hence the resistance (ICG, 2013).

Because Iteere had reached the peak of his career and his stint was transitional, there may not have been the motivation to embrace reform. In fact, it is during this time that the country witnessed heightened insecurity not only targeting the public but also the police. For example, in August 2012, nine police officers were amongst the thirty eight people killed Tana River ethnic conflict between Pokomo and Orma. Three months later on November 10, 2012, forty two police officers pursuing Turkana raiders were killed in Suguta Valley as they pursued the raiders who had stolen livestock from the neighbouring Samburu community.

Despite the internal security challenges during Iteere’s tenure, the fact that Iteere allowed for a comprehensive study by Usalama Reform Forum to determine what ails the police in terms of service delivery is significant.²²² Though little was achieved in reform during Iteere’s tenure, his performance was a conflation of both macro interests of the political elite and the institutionalised systemic rot in the police. In essence demonstrating how the macro decision of replacing the police chief impacted on the reform process. Iteere did not apply to retain his job under the new title of the Inspector General, which was filled by David Kimaiyo through a competitive process. David Kimaiyo was sworn in as the first ever inspector general of police on December 24, 2012, only three months to the 2013 general elections. Kimaiyo’s immediate role was to ensure public confidence in the police is restored and that there is no repeat of the cycle of electoral related violence (ICG, 2013).

Kimaiyo’s appointment drew lots of excitement and expectations. The position of the Inspector General was a new phenomenon in Kenya with

221 Interview with CSO5

222 Interview with CSO5

the successful applicant being the first ever to enjoy security of tenure and independence under the new constitution. With this clout, it naturally followed that the recruitment process of the office holder would generate lots of debate.

First, the PRWG though lauded the process, opposed the appointment of Kimaiyo over claims he needed to be investigated over his role in the 2007 post-election violence as director of police operations and circumstances under which he was transferred to the Ministry of Gender (KHRC, 2012). Secondly, a section of the Kenyan society, particularly those affiliated to president Kibaki felt the timing for the appointment was not ideal as rushing with the appointment would be ‘a threat to national security’ ahead of the 2013 general elections.²²³ However, the newly established NPSC was determined to ensure that the country goes to the polls under a new inspector general of police despite opposition from sections of the civil society groups that such appointment would be a threat to national security during electioneering period. Thirdly, resistance to a civilian inspector general from the top police command generated a lot of debate and still remained alive even after the process was completed. Some members of the public claimed that the choice of uniformed police officers as the IG was predetermined. For example a chief executive officer (CEO) of a private security company who applied for the IG position noted the NPSC wanted uniformed officers due to resistance to a civilian inspector general by the top police command and so did not shortlist civilian applicants.²²⁴

The NPSC however denied this claim, though acknowledged that police resistance may have dissuaded qualified civilians from applying for the IG position. ‘It’s like those who were really the cream kept away from it so we ended up with a police officer.’²²⁵ Probed why the commission did not find it necessary to re-advertise the vacancy for the inspector general, the key

223 Investigations however reveal that those calling for delays did not trust the NPSC to nominate an inspector general sympathetic to their cause. This issue is revisited in chapter five

224 Interview with K-Int6

225 Interview with K-Int1

informant noted NPSC was determined to have the inspector general oversee security arrangements for the 2013 general elections. This move was important as it was the first step to determining police readiness for the reform process after the police poor show in the 2007 elections. Apart from the inspector general position, the recruitment of the two deputy inspector general positions and the director of the criminal investigations remained a contested issue from amongst the political elite. The controversies mainly relate to the prevailing politics of coalition government and are developed in Chapter 5.

The police command remains a subject of interest for different stakeholders in the reform process, the argument being that the slow pace of reform is due to the inability of the police command to spearhead reforms. For example, a key informant working closely with the police observed that ‘these people are not able to get their act together. The problem lies with their strategy. They don’t seem to have a strategy’.²²⁶ Yet another respondent noted that police leadership ‘is about instilling certain ethos, certain accountability methods in an institution and building a completely different institution with a different culture’,²²⁷ which it is claimed is missing under current police command. Giving examples of the reforms in the judiciary and the KWS under Dr.Willy Mutunga and Julius Kipng’etich respectively, some respondents argued that recruitment of the inspector general from amongst the serving police officers meant a lost opportunity in the police reform process as reforms come from without.

They observed, ‘Mutunga has done what he has done simply because he came from outside. If he was one of them, I am sure he would not have achieved what he has achieved today,’²²⁸ and that within one year of office, Kipng’etich transformed KWS into ‘one of the best competent, capable agencies.’²²⁹ Where there are other institutions for example the judiciary and the KWS that have done relatively well in the reform process, they become the yardsticks upon which the police reform

226 Interview with K-Int2

227 Interview with CSO2

228 Interview with K-Int6

229Interview with CSO2. The exit of Kipng’etich however saw an increase in incidents of poaching which is currently subject of debates in wildlife preservation circles.

process is determined. This however ignores unique characteristics of the institutions. For example, the level of political interference and the institutional culture at the macro and micro levels within the police represent divergent trajectories that should be considered in any form of comparison.

Whatever the debates about police command, there was overwhelming evidence that stakeholders did not have confidence in police leadership to steer the reform process. Though the process of recruitment of police leadership was competitive, there were perceptions that it failed to get the right people for the jobs. These sentiments perhaps contributed significantly to the changing of the law that gave top security chiefs security of tenure so that in the event of ineptitude then they could be removed easily from office. The Security Laws Amendment Act of 2014 (GoK, 2014) achieved this, effectively giving back the executive the right to hire and fire the Inspector General thus returning the country to where it was before the post 2007 police reform.