Security and Security Sector under Moi Regime 1978 to 2002

President Moi took over from Jomo Kenyatta (1964-1978), when Kenyatta died in August 1978. Moi was vice president for twelve years (1966– 1978). President Moi’s grip on Kenya’s police force started way before he became the president. At Independence, in 1964, he was appointed Minister for Home Affairs and was in charge of the police. On appointment

as the vice president, he retained Home Affairs Ministry. Cumulatively, Moi ‘was exposed to the structure and functions of the police force for fourteen years before he became president (Adar and Munyae, 2001, p.6). This exposure to Kenya’s security apparatus provides the foundation for which the state of security and security sector in Kenya is presently understood.

During the prolonged Moi regime (1978-2002), the Kenya police force was infamous for all the wrong reasons. ‘Throughout the 1980s to 1990s the security forces, particularly the police, were used to suppress any criticism of his regime’ (Adar and Munyae, 2001, p.2) and were instrumental in cases of human rights violations, including politically motivated disappearances and targeted killing of many perceived opponents (Omeje and Githigaro, 2012, p.65). Cronyism and ethnicity pervaded the entire police spectrum while corruption was the order of the day. The police detained without trial opposition groups while anti-Moi media houses were under police surveillance.

Moi’s first cabinet reshuffle was meant to gain control of the security forces and the civil service which were dominated by the Kiambu Mafia50 (Adar and Munyae, 2001). In the reshuffle, Moi decided ‘to remove control of the police and the provincial administration from Mbiyu Koinange’ (Hornsby, 2012, p.331), and other senior police officers whose loyalty was doubtful. The purge also involved senior military officers from the Kikuyu community who were retired to pave way for loyalists and members of Moi’s Kalenjin community51

. Thus, the changes in the security sector that emerged during the formative stages of Moi rule was that of de-

50

An elite group from President Kenyatta’s home which dominated the political realm during Kenyatta’s reign and whose objective was to undermine Moi’s leadership.

51

An example in this case is that of meteoric rise of Lt-Col John Sawe in 1979 who was promoted to deputy army commander, creating a curious situation whereby a colonel commanded brigadiers. By the end of the year, the brigadiers under Sawe were retired and Sawe promoted to brigadier to head the army. (Hornsby, 2012, pp., p.335-336).

kikuyunisation to kalenjinisation52- in this case, using the ethnic card to secure Moi’s hold on to power.

To further ensure his grip on power, Moi systematically disregarded separation of power doctrine enshrined in Kenya’s constitution by deliberately usurping the functions of the other institutions of governance including legislature and the judiciary (Adar and Munyae, 2001). This marked the beginning of Moi’s authoritarian rule. Through a Constitution of Kenya Amendment Act, Number 7 of 1982, Moi introduced Section 2(A) transforming the country into a de-jure one-party state, reinstated the Chief’s Authority Act, the Public Order Act, the Preservation of Public Security Act, the Public Order Act, and the Penal Codes which suspended individual rights guaranteed by the constitution. The right to obtain information from the Office of the President privilege by parliament was also revoked. Additionally, the provincial administrators who are civil servants were directed to get involved in the internal affairs of ruling party KANU. They were to review and clear party meetings throughout the country and to isolate dissenters. These developments legitimised internal security organs, notably the police and the provincial administration to be involved in the worst of all human rights abuses under Moi regime.

In the Judiciary, cases in which the executive had interest had to be in favour of Moi. Judges who did not favour the wish of the president were either transferred or resigned owing to the 1986 and 1988 constitutional amendment that provided for the removal of the security and tenure of the Attorney General, the Controller and Auditor General, the judges of the High Court and the Court of Appeal (Adar and Munyae, 2001).

The advent of multi-party politics perhaps signifies the beginning of reforms in Kenya’s public and security system involving the police. Due to internal and external pressure for openness and competitiveness in

52 _{De-kikuyuinisation and Kalenjinisation as used in this context refer to Moi’s deliberate} move to restructure the civil service and the state-owned enterprises, removing members of Kikuyu community who previously dominated these sectors during Kenyatta's regime and replacing them with members of his Kalenjin community respectively (Adar & Munyae, 2001).

politics, Moi grudgingly gave in to demands and repealed section 2(A) of the constitution thus giving way to multiparty elections in 1992. Moi argued that multiparty politics would ‘cause chaos in the country because Kenya was not "cohesive enough"’ (Adar and Munyae, 2001, p.6). This move had an impact on the security landscape in the country. It ‘brought with it the dissolution of the state monopoly of violence by heralding the emergence of ethnic militias’ (Omeje and Githigaro, 2012, p.66). Independent investigations during the time revealed that the police worked alongside and mobilised militia as forms of extra-state violence in areas where KANU faced opposition.

Whilst pressure on Moi yielded some positive results through the introduction of political pluralism and setting of presidential term limit, literature on reforms during Moi’s regime provide evidence that they were not sufficient to guarantee security to the Kenyan people. Every reform initiative was countered by deliberate effort to consolidate control of the security sector by the regime.

2.6.2 Kibaki’s Reform Agenda and the Security Sector - 2002 to