Policy Pathways

In this section I consider the process of policy reform and examine further factors that helped shape these processes and the pathways adopted in policy. The policy space created by external donors, specifically bilateral donors and TNCOs in Tanzania at this time has been discussed as a function of both the wider discursive shift towards CBNRM and the rational option that alignment with these new priorities provided for the Tanzanian state in a context of neoliberal change and conservation challenges. The setting of the CBNRM agenda is the outcome of a combination of these factors, therefore. However, the distinct differences between the CBNRM policies in the forestry and wildlife sectors require further examination.

Nelson et al. (2007) argue that the role of external organisations, described above, is tempered by the interests of the policy community, where the political economy of different resources and the incentives these provide for bureaucrats, drive policy processes. In the following section, I discuss these arguments with respect to the different policy pathways adopted in the forestry and wildlife sectors in Tanzania during the late 1990s.

5.4.1 The Politics of Devolution: Political Economies of Natural Resources In their outline of policy networks, Marsh & Rhodes (1992) described the relationship between the wider policy network and the policy community as hierarchical. The moderation of external influences in policy processes can thus take place according to the interests and beliefs of the policy community, and Nelson & Blomley (2010) state that in Tanzania these interests differ between the forest and wildlife sector according to the political economy of natural resources. The politics of power devolution (see 2.1.1) with regards to Tanzanian CBNRM are distinct between these two sectors, based upon the perceived value of forest and wildlife resources and the systems of power and benefit that surround them. Nelson &

141 Blomley (2010) discuss these roles in terms of ‘hidden economies’ (or informal systems of power and benefit; see 2.1.3) of these natural resources, which provides the context for these power struggles.

Tanzania’s centralized tourist hunting concession system (see 3.3.2), in the hands of the Wildlife Division since 1998, has witnessed a ten-fold growth in value of animal resources, and the Wildlife Division is now responsible for the maintenance of Africa’s largest tourist hunting land area (Nelson and Blomley, 2010). Wildlife is big business in Tanzania, therefore, and these resources have become highly politicised. Within a system of power that privileges those who have access and control over these resources (see 2.1.3), wildlife resources were described by one District Officer as “hotcakes” because of the large amounts of money involved (Interview P28). Whilst the objective of my research was not to carry out an in-depth analysis of the hunting system in Tanzania, as this has already been discussed by several researchers (see Siege, 2001; Baldus and Cauldwell, 2004; Leader-Williams et al., 2009), I do believe that the hidden economy of wildlife hunting has played an important role in shaping the policy pathway and the prescribed governance system of WMAs. The current hunting system is widely regarded as opaque and controlled by rent-seeking behaviour, which provides a clear disincentive for the devolution of power over these natural resources and authority to manage hunting investments within hunting blocks, as described in 5.2.4 (Nelson and Blomley, 2010). The hidden economy of wildlife hunting is dominated by informal networks of exchange and power in which a centralised revenue system has kept prices artificially low through the lack of an auction or tendering system, which has resulted in administratively derived rents and facilitated rent-seeking, patronage, corruption and bribery amongst the influential bureaucrats in charge of the system (Nelson and Agrawal, 2008;

Leader-Williams et al., 2009). Baldus & Cauldwell (2004: 1) summarised the threat posed by the devolution of power over wildlife hunting in Tanzania for the Wildlife Division whose staff preside over “a [neopatrimonial] command system of control that favours a select group of hunting outfitters with reduced income generation and the exclusion of rural communities”.

In direct contrast to the wildlife sector, the political economy of forestry resources in Tanzania incentivised the implementation of CBFM (Nelson and Blomley, 2010).

Tanzania’s history of reserving forests, for high-value timber extraction and watershed conservation especially (see Lovett, 2003; Hurst, 2004), encouraged the adoption of CBFM, which, through the creation of VLFRs would, at very little cost, bring large areas of land,

142 previously unreserved, under the PA status (Nelson and Blomley, 2010). In contrast to the wildlife sector, the initiation of CBFM did not involve the devolution of power over PAs formerly under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Natural Resources & Tourism⁵⁶ (Wily, 2000). The low economic value of most of the miombo woodlands upon which CBFM has been implemented also served to limit the perceived loss of potential income for the Forestry and Beekeeping Division through the gazetting of VLFRs (Nelson and Blomley, 2010).

These political economies of natural resources operating in Tanzania produced distinctly different ministerial-level divisions and policy communities in the wildlife and forestry sectors. A former development agency staff member described these differences as “two different worlds, with the Forestry and Beekeeping Division being poor but open, and the Wildlife Division being rich but more closed and rigid” (Interview P1). The respondent went on to discuss how the politicisation of wildlife resources entails much more serious and high consequences because of the large amounts of money involved and the close connections with rich hunting groups, whereas forest resources are perceived as important to wood and energy supplies, but not involving the large amounts of money and high value resources that the wildlife sector deals with (Interview P1).

The differential politicisation of natural resources between the two sectors and the long history of sectoral policies has also produced little communication between the sectors. Staff working on the MBOMIPA project described the difficulty in dealing with forestry issues when their affiliation was with the Wildlife Division, who “just did not deal with forestry issues” (Interview P74). This highly separate nature of wildlife and forestry sectors at the national level creates separate bureaucratic systems to deal with forestry and wildlife issues, resulting in the same divisions being replicated at local levels, where members of the VNRC in Kiwere discussed their lack of opportunities to increase understanding of wildlife issues, due to their connection to the Forestry and Beekeeping Division, and the forestry-only focus of training they had received. They also argued that legislation in the two sectors did not fit together (Interviews P34, P42).

The result of these different political-economic and historical forces on the policy pathways adopted in the development of CBNRM in Tanzania is tangible. In the following section I

56 Land under forestry reserves has usually been channelled into Joint Forest Management agreements instead of CBFM. I have not discussed Joint Forest Management as its level of community authority and participation cannot be classified as CBNRM

143 discuss how the politicisation of natural resources is linked to the ways government officials have resisted the introduction of CBNRM and the power devolution that this entails.

5.4.2 The Politics of Devolution: Resistance and Recentralisation

A former ministerial staff member stated that support from Wildlife Division staff for CBNRM varied widely and that “some people using forests for illegal gains saw the transfer of forests to another organ as very threatening and destabilizing. There was some resistance from forest officials” (Interview P28). Such resistance on the part of ministerial staff was explained by one former donor-funded project staff member as directly due to the financial resources available to ministerial staff who, especially in the case of the Wildlife Division, were in receipt of lower wages compared to those working for the Tanzania National Parks Authority (TANAPA), which motivated corruption and illegal means of supplementing income (Interview P77). Ministerial resistance was also found in scepticism of the CBNRM approach. This was explained in terms of the shift in attitude and approach that it required, particularly the shift in role for ministerial staff from one of ‘enforcers controlling local populations’ to one ‘working with them as colleagues’. A former ministerial staff member described serious doubts during the period of policy formulation and implementation regarding the impact upon wildlife and forestry resources, but also about the capacity of local communities to manage such resources, and the advisability of letting them try, particularly because of the large amounts of money involved (Interview P2). The paradigm shift to CBNRM was uncomfortable for many of the Wildlife Division staff who, a former staff member explained, were generally “trained as biologists and ecologists and do not have the skills to deal with managing people in this way, only chasing and arresting them as poachers” (Interview P80).

Instances of both ‘foot-dragging’ resistance to devolution (see Scott, 1985) and recentralisation were also highlighted by interview respondents with respect to both sectors.

Respondents from within the Forestry and Beekeeping and Wildlife Divisions reported that whilst the ministry talked about and promoted a discourse of decentralisation and devolution, for many individuals, commitment to it was lacking (Interview P2) and “whilst they officially praised it, [they] tried to sabotage the whole operation. They would continue to act as enforcers, arresting people and wielding their power in the villages” (Interview P80). In the forestry sector, where devolution of power is rapid in comparison to the wildlife sector (see 5.2.5), the political economy of natural resources was seen as a driving factor in the type and

144 speed of devolution processes by interviewees. Under the umbrella of Participatory Forest Management, large variations in the time taken to complete the gazettement process both for CBFM and for Joint Forest Management are related to the value of timber resources within the proposed area, which acts as a disincentive to devolution, encouraging ministerial or district level resistance (Mustalahti, 2007; Mustalahti and Lund, 2009). University researchers reported that in the forestry sector district authorities can be reluctant to relinquish control over forests, or in some cases, especially once revenue begins to accumulate from CBFM projects, can be keen to manipulate the projects to increase the role of the district (Interviews P2, P7; see also 6.3.2.1). In such cases, they reported that the prescribed governance system for revenue collection and taxation may be avoided (see 7.2).

This is supported by the review of Participatory Forest Management in Tanzania carried out by Blomley & Iddi (2009: 42), which found that “some District Councils have either deliberately or accidentally misinterpreted the Forestry and Beekeeping Division Forest Harvesting Guidelines and as a result were placing additional burdens, barriers or costs to villages regarding harvesting”. One respondent went on to describe a particular example of the district authorities in Suledo orchestrating authority over the sale of forest products from the VLFR, despite having no legal right to do so, as legislation stipulates that this is controlled by the management plan for the VLFR and overseen by the VNRC at the village level (Interview P2).

The economic value of natural resources is clearly an important factor in the political process of devolved environmental management. Alongside the hidden economies surrounding wildlife resources, these indicate important political-economic forces that have shaped the devolution of power and the prescribed governance system set out for WMAs. This is particularly clear in the retention of ministerial roles and authority, for example over the financial arrangements for hunting block concessions (Baldus and Cauldwell, 2004), and the bureaucratic obstacles in the path of power devolution, for example through the implementation of a highly complex and lengthy application procedure for gazettement of a WMA (see also 5.2.5, Igoe and Croucher, 2007; Nelson, 2007). In comparison, the different political-economic forces shaping the policy pathways and prescribed governance system in CBFM result in an application system that is simpler and shorter to complete and a form of power devolution that is less restricted by ministerial level involvement. There are however similar forces operating in the forestry sector with regards to valuable timber resources,

145 which due to their value are often channelled into Joint Forest Management arrangements, or the process of VLFR gazettement slows down considerably (see also Mustalahti, 2007).

The value of natural resources also plays a key role in their re-politicisation under CBNRM.

The politics described above being played out at the national and district levels were quickly joined by similar conflicts at the local level where new perceptions of the value of natural resources initiated new struggles over the positions of power within the governance systems for both MBOMIPA WMA and Kiwere VLFR and the responsibility for managing revenues from the projects. This was supported by an academic researcher, who described how

“Conflicts are seen in projects where the resource is large and producing tangible revenues.

Where the resource is insignificant, there is very little conflict” (Interview P7). In section 6.3 I discuss these conflicts, and their role in the creation of the performed governance system, as scalar struggles.

Finally, the ongoing nature of these struggles and the continual re-politicisation of natural resources has been shown more recently in Tanzania in response to the emergence of Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) at both the policy scale and project level. These new power struggles over the politicised environment (Bryant and Bailey, 1997) were discussed by an interview respondent as “a war going on inside the MNRT because all of the departments want control of the resources that will be under REDD and all want to have their say in its development”, resulting in the different divisions within the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism all vying for control and prominence within REDD policy processes and reform (Interview P3).