169 6.1 Introduction
The previous chapter outlined the prescribed governance systems in place within Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) projects in both the wildlife and forestry sectors in Tanzania. Through the processes of power devolution, the creation of formal institutional structures and their integration with informal institutions and local contexts of power (see 2.1.), configurations of power as set out in policy and as performed in reality are produced. According to the differences in these processes between the two sectors, as described in the previous chapter, these configurations of power are distinct between the wildlife and forestry cases studies. In the first section of this chapter, I outline these systems of power in both case study projects in further detail and discuss the scalar framings these involve. In section 6.2, I look into inequalities in the impacts of both Community-Based Forest Management (CBFM) and Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) for different groups, addressing the issue of elite capture and how it is related to the prescribed governance system and the topographies of power it legitimises. In section 6.3, I use a scalar perspective to consider the framings that are utilised in both CBFM and WMA projects and I draw on the literature from politics of scales (see 2.4.2) to examine how the compartmentalisation of space around power relations produces scales within the projects (see Brenner, 2001). I investigate how these scalar topographies of power are under constant negotiation, struggle and manipulation (Smith, 1990; Smith, 1992; Marston, 2000; Zulu, 2009), and the discursive strategies used by actors in the struggle for empowerment and benefits from CBNRM (Swyngedouw and Heynen, 2003; see also 2.4.2.1 and 2.5.2;
Campbell, 2007). Finally, in 6.4 I combine these power structures and scalar struggles together to outline the power structures in reality within both case studies
6.1.1 Devolution and Topographies of Power
As discussed in chapter 5, the initiation of CBNRM in Tanzania is intrinsically connected to the idea of devolution of power away from the national, ministerial levels and towards the village level. Between the WMA and CBFM systems, the principal governing institutions and fulcrum of power have been devolved in distinct ways, and the resulting prescribed governance structures to implement CBNRM policy demonstrate different strategies to achieve this. The devolution of power within both sectors is signalled by the advisory role afforded to the ministerial levels in both forestry and wildlife and the daily management responsibilities in both CBFM and WMAs being placed in the hands of individuals elected
170 from within participating communities (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2). Within the forestry sector, the prescribed governance structure for CBFM demonstrates a rapid devolution of power to the village level and is implemented through existing governance structures. Contrastingly, the governance system in WMAs demonstrates a more cautious devolution of power, which is centred at a new institutional level created through WMAs, which sits between the local and district government levels (see 5.2.5). As pointed out to me in an interview with a former employee of a conservation Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) in Tanzania (Interview P85), both systems represent a set of nested institutions, implemented not within traditional authority systems in Tanzania, which were gradually removed throughout the periods of colonialism and socialism in Tanzania (see Chapter 3), but within the bureaucratic national system of democratic government spanning the local, district, regional and national levels.
This devolution of power from central to local is accompanied by further shifts in power resulting from the CBNRM policies. These are witnessed in the changing powers, status and responsibilities of groups within the local and district levels. Within CBFM, this is most clearly visible through the changing relationship between the Village Natural Resources Committee (VNRC) and the Village Council, whereby the implementation of CBFM empowers the VNRC and hands responsibilities for potentially large sums of revenue to this committee, which forms part of the village government and is overseen by the Village Council, although the Village Council holds supervisory powers only over revenue collection (see 5.5.1). An academic researcher in Tanzania described how this concentration of power within the VNRC, and its nested relationship within the village government, has been a source of conflict in many communities implementing CBFM to date, particularly once revenue generation from CBFM becomes significant, increasing realisation of value and politicisation of resources within the community (see 5.4), and sometimes leading to power struggles between the Village Council and VNRC “as both want to have a say in resource use” (Interview P7). This has led in some cases to “the Village Council take[ing] over control of the project because they want to collect the money themselves” (Interview P7).
The interviewee also cited trust issues between the Village Council and the VNRC arising from a “lack of transparency and accountability. Both believe the other is up to something and cannot be trusted” (Interview P7).
Within WMAs, the devolution of power to AAs has not only altered the relationship between the ministry and the participating communities, but as one former project officer described:
“The creation of MBOMIPA marked a significant shift in local government, as power was
171 transferred away from the hunting groups” (Interview P73). These hunting groups, which formed part of the Hunting Association of Tanzania, and had previously used the Lunda-Mkwambi Game Control Area for hunting activities through the purchase of permits at the district offices, objected very vocally to the initiation of the restriction of resident hunting freedoms and the devolution of management rights to the community level within the Ruaha Ecosystem Wildlife Management Project (REWMP) and MBOMIPA project areas (Interviews P1, P74; see also Hartley, 1997).
As discussed in 5.2, the devolution of power to the local level, and the shifts that this entails, are focused around distinct institutions between the wildlife and forestry policy sectors. The institutional structure of CBFM reflects the devolution of power to an existing institution, the VNRC, nested within the Village Council structure. The embedded nature of the VNRC is indicated in Fig. 6.1 and was described by village respondents in the CBFM research village, who emphasized that “the VNRC is beneath the village government, therefore there is nothing the committee does without the knowledge of the village government” (Interview P43).
Committee members confirmed that the prescribed governance system meant they had to seek approval from the village government before using funds from the CBFM project, and if this permission was refused, they did not have the power to continue regardless (Interview P44).
Conversely, the WMA governance system involves the injection of an entirely new institution into the management system, and simultaneously includes the creation of a new level, located across the participating villages. The roles and responsibilities of the Village Council and district authorities with regards to the area gazetted as a WMA are significantly altered by the creation of this new institution (see Table 5.2), and a parallel governance system in created. Furthermore, the institutional structure within the prescribed governance system of WMAs is more cumbersome, more top-heavy and more intricate in terms of the relationships between different individuals and institutions. The devolution of management responsibilities to the Authorised Association (AA) level is accompanied by a multifarious web of relationships between the AA and other organisations within the prescribed governance structure. The power structure within the WMA governance system can be described as simultaneously more radial and more top-down. The governance structure is clearly more top-down in terms of the retention of power and management responsibilities at the ministerial level, especially regarding hunting quotas and financial systems, and in the
172 advisory and supervisory powers invested in the District Natural Resources Advisory Board and the Board of Trustees (see 5.5).
This could be described as an example of simultaneous decentralisation and recentralisation of power, a trend observed elsewhere in Africa (see Ribot et al., 2006), in which the devolution of power within such policies is limited wherever possible. This is apparent through the multiple ‘safety nets’ that surround WMAs’ governance system; for example, the revenue sharing arrangements discussed in 5.5.4 include the retention of powers at the regional and ministerial levels. Furthermore, the arrangements for signing of investment contracts between the AA and private investors include the selection of three favourable proposals by the AA, with advice provided by the Board of Trustees and potentially the NGO facilitator, which are then sent by the AA for inspection by both the District Natural Resources Advisory Board (DNRAB) and national levels (Wildlife Division), before contracts can be ratified (Interviews P86, P104, Focus Group P102). This is in direct contrast to the system in CBFM, whereby the VNRC hold the powers to allocate permits for resource harvesting (Interview P34, Focus Group P41). As discussed in section 1.1, recentralisation is an important part of the re-territorialisation of wildlife resources within a neoliberal form of statecraft (Igoe and Brockington, 2007). This re-territorialisation within a discourse of devolution takes place through the use of policy and power devolution as political technologies. As argued by Agrawal (2005), these technologies are a component of governmentality, producing new environmental localities and subjects within Tanzanian CBNRM, and represent the diffusion of state power over society (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005).
The power system operating within WMAs is outlined in Fig. 6.2.