Prevalent factors in e-campaigning research

As noted, it is found that political parties’ or candidates’ e-campaigning utilisation varies markedly within elections or across democracies, despite the underlying technologies and applications being largely similar (e.g., Anstead & Chadwick, 2009; Margolis et al., 2003; Small, 2008; Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). It is also found that the potential of e-campaigning has not been fully exploited (e.g., Bentivegna, 2008; Gibson & Cantijoch, 2011; Gibson & McAllister, 2008; Karlsson et al., 2013).

This has prompted a new wave of e-campaigning research that pertains to

explaining political parties’ or candidates’ e-campaigning utilisation by uncovering factors that influence e-campaigning utilisation. Four factors are commonly noted: election type, electoral regulations, voters’ technology access, and the availability of campaign resources.

2.4.1.1 Election type

Generally, two distinctive types of election can be identified in representative democracies, namely party-led and candidate-led (Anstead & Chadwick, 2009;

Carlson & Strandberg, 2007; Ward, Owen, et al., 2008; Wlezien, 2010).

An election is considered party-led when it is dominated by political parties (Anstead & Chadwick, 2009; Ward, Owen, et al., 2008; Wlezien, 2010). More specifically, in a party-led election, voters choose parties to form a government;

‘parties control the main material of the campaign – manifestos, the campaign staff and organisation, the use of media, campaign events, and voter targeting and mobilisation. Things there are highly centralised.’ (Wlezien, 2010, p. 101) A candidate-led election is the opposite of a party-led election. It revolves around individual political candidates, the influence or assistance from political parties is highly limited (Anstead & Chadwick, 2009; Carlson & Strandberg, 2007; Ward, Owen, et al., 2008; Wlezien, 2010).

Accordingly, general elections in countries such as the UK, Australia, and New Zealand are party-led, and federal elections in countries such as the US and Chile are candidate-led.

From cross-national comparisons, it is widely noticed that campaign teams’ e-campaigning utilisation varies according to election type (e.g., Anstead &

Chadwick, 2009; Gibson & Ward, 2012; Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). More specifically, it appears that in candidate-led elections, especially US primary and presidential elections, campaign teams tend to embrace diverse campaign practices in their e-campaigning, such as voter interaction and engagement, support mobilisation, targeted campaigning, and resource generation; in party-led elections, however, campaign teams tend to chiefly focus on information dissemination, irrespective

of the advancement and potential of technologies. Accordingly, it is theorised that election type influences campaign teams’ e-campaigning utilisation.

This thesis is supported and further elaborated by Anstead and Chadwick (2009) with general elections in the UK and presidential elections in the US, including primary elections, as examples of party-led and candidate-led elections respectively.

As Anstead and Chadwick (2009) explain, although it is common for a political candidate to be affiliated with a political party in a candidate-led election, such party affiliation is usually weak; therefore, the influence or assistance from the candidate’s party during the election is limited. This means that in a candidate-led election, it is the candidates who are solely responsible for raising their profiles, establishing their campaign networks both within their own parties, referred to as vertical communication networks, and with voters, referred to as horizontal communication networks, and garnering voter support. Furthermore, a lack of permanent membership incentivises candidates to aggressively recruit and solicit resources in order to sustain their campaigning. Such circumstances catalyse innovative, expansive, and extensive Internet campaigning because the technology is perceived by candidates as a powerful tool, enabling them to rapidly increase the exposure of their profiles, establish both vertical and horizontal communication networks, connect with the grass roots and garner support, and generate resources for election campaigning.

In stark contrast to individual candidates in candidate-led elections, political parties in party-led elections often possess a long-established public profile, communication networks, loyalists, and stable resources, particularly through permanent membership (Anstead & Chadwick, 2009). These serve as anti-catalysts for embracing any new form of election campaigning innovatively, expansively, and extensively.

In short, candidate-led elections tend to propel while party-led elections discourage e-campaigning utilisation. It can therefore be inferred that the impact of election type on e-campaigning utilisation consists of two facets: positive and

negative. It is worth noting that election type as a factor influencing e-campaigning utilisation is only theoretical; that is, it has not been empirically investigated.

2.4.1.2 Electoral regulations

Electoral regulations are widely considered as a major factor affecting campaign teams’ intention to conduct e-campaigning (e.g., Anstead, 2008; Anstead &

Chadwick, 2008; Kluver, 2008; Tkach-Kawasaki, 2007; Ward, Owen, et al., 2008).

For instance, it is held that voting in federal elections is mandatory under Australian electoral law, which consequently diminishes Australian campaign teams’ incentive to embrace support mobilisation in their e-campaigning (Gibson, Lusoli, & Ward, 2008; Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). The following further illustrates the thesis that e-campaigning utilisation is shaped by electoral regulations.

Anstead (2008) indicates that online fundraising during a federal election is generally more aggressive and innovative in the US than in the UK, which can be explained by electoral regulations. More specifically, US electoral regulations reject institutional campaign donations; that is, political parties or candidates are forbidden from soliciting financial contributions for election campaigning from corporations, banks, or unions. It is lawful for political parties or candidates to appeal to individuals for campaign donations; however, tight limits are imposed on each individual donation and the total amount of electoral donations made by an individual per annum. Candidates are permitted to spend their personal wealth on their own election campaigning, there is a legal limit, however. Spending on election campaigning is unrestricted, provided that it is outside of public financing of presidential campaigns. Anstead (2008, p. 286) argues that these circumstances collectively propel parties or candidates in the US to aggressively and creatively exploit various technologies and applications, especially those that are Internet-based, in order to rapidly appeal to ‘vast numbers of contributors, each donating comparatively small sums of money’. In the UK, by contrast, electoral regulations accept institutional campaign donations. Neither institutional nor individual donations are capped, although anonymous donations are restricted. Further, strict spending caps are imposed on election campaigning. Such circumstances, Anstead suggests, collectively prompt British political parties to approach a small

number of institutional donors for a large campaign contribution from each, thereby negating any incentive for energetic and innovative online campaign fundraising. Ward, Owen, et al. (2008, p. 267) concur with Anstead and further stress that the imposition of campaign expenditure limits forces political parties or candidates ‘to choose between traditional and new modes of campaigning in the allocation of resources’ and e-campaigning often ranks ‘relatively low in the priority list’.

The provision of free exposure on traditional media for election campaigning forms another aspect to theorise the causality between electoral legislation and e-campaigning utilisation. More specifically, Ward, Owen, et al. (2008) argue that electoral regulations in countries such as Australia, Chile, and most European nations provide political parties or candidates with a certain amount of publicly-funded exposure on traditional media such as television and radio for election campaigning. Accordingly, to those parties or candidates, ‘the Internet becomes less essential as a tool … when [they] can rely on free traditional broadcast media’

for election campaigning (Ward, Owen, et al., 2008, p. 267). In the US, according to Ward, Owen, et al., electoral regulations demand impartiality from traditional broadcast media when offering to sell time for election campaigning. However, traditional media in the US is not required to allocate free slots for election campaigning to political parties or candidates. Consequently, Ward, Owen, et al.

(2008, p. 267) contend, ‘candidates seek methods to reach voters that will reduce the financial cost; hence the attractiveness of the Internet as such an alternative.’

In all, it is argued that electoral regulations can incentivise as well as diminish e-campaigning utilisation. This suggests that the impact of electoral regulations is twofold: positive and negative. Also note that electoral regulations as a factor influencing e-campaigning utilisation is only theoretical; that is, it has not yet been empirically investigated.

2.4.1.3 Voters’ technology access

It is commonly perceived that e-campaigning utilisation is dependent on voters’

access to e-campaigning technologies and applications, particularly those that are Internet-related (e.g., Dader, 2008; Hameed, 2007; D. T. Hill, 2008; Ward, Owen, et

al., 2008; Wlezien, 2014). As Ward, Owen, et al. (2008, p. 264) put it, ‘The logic is clear: parties and candidates are reluctant to invest in a medium that has limited reach.’ The following further illustrates this factor.

It is noted that e-campaigning utilisation is highly constrained in countries where the diffusion of PC, the Internet, or broadband Internet is low. For instance, in Indonesia, the infrastructure and diffusion of ICTs is very poor (D. T. Hill, 2008):

in mid-2000, the entire country had 7.5 million telephone connections shared by a population of 210 million. Of those telephone connections, 3 million were within the capital. In addition, Internet access in the country is described as costly, slow, and unreliable. Furthermore, the ratio of PC ownership to the country’s inhabitants was roughly 1 to 100, indicating an extremely low level of PC ownership. Consequently, although e-campaigning has been long and widely adopted in Indonesia, practices beyond information dissemination are barely present (Hameed, 2007; D. T. Hill, 2008).

E-campaigning utilisation is also restricted in countries such as Spain and Italy where ICT access is moderate (Bentivegna, 2008; Dader, 2008). Chile is a notable exception. More specifically, ICT access in Chile is not only comparable to that in Spain and Italy but also highly unequal among voters (Boas, 2008); however, e-campaigning utilisation in Chile is comparably expansive and extensive (Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). This, according to Ward, Owen, et al., is due to federal elections in Chile being candidate-led. It can be inferred that the impact of voters’

technology access can be moderated by another factor, election type in this instance.

Ward, Owen, et al. (2008) argue that e-campaigning utilisation tends to be relatively advanced, expansive, and extensive in countries where ICT access is at the high end of the spectrum. Such countries include the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, the US, Canada, and Australia. Singapore is a notable exception. More specifically, Singapore ‘has an advanced technological infrastructure and a strong commitment from the government to increase the role of information technologies in the life of citizens’ (Kluver, 2008, p. 61). Despite that, Internet content and activities are extensively and tightly regulated in

Singapore, this in turn depresses e-campaigning utilisation (Kluver, 2008; Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). This also suggests that the impact of voters’ technology access can be moderated by another factor, electoral regulations in this instance.

In all, it is contended that voters’ technology access can motivate as well as dampen e-campaigning utilisation. This suggests that the impact of this factor consists of two sides: positive and negative. Further, it is suggested that the impact of voters’ technology access can be moderated by another factor. Also note that voters’ technology access as a factor influencing e-campaigning utilisation is theoretical; that is, this factor has not yet been empirically investigated.

2.4.1.4 Resource availability

It is widely accepted in e-campaigning research that the amount of campaign resources possessed by political parties or candidates serves as a prominent factor influencing their e-campaigning utilisation (e.g., Gibson & Ward, 2012; Lilleker &

Vedel, 2013; Margolis et al., 2003; Small, 2008; Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). As noted, those campaign resources typically pertain to money, time, and campaign staff.

There are two main theses in the literature relating to the impact of resource availability on e-campaigning utilisation: equalisation and normalisation.

The equalisation thesis was formed at the very early phase of e-campaigning research. A key part of it holds that political parties or candidates with limited campaign resources, typically minor parties or candidates, are more incentivised to embrace e-campaigning than their counterparts with vast campaign resources (Gibson & McAllister, 2014; Gibson & Ward, 2012; Small, 2008). More specifically, traditional campaigning, ranging from door-to-door canvassing to televised advertising, is immensely and increasingly costly, thus, it is almost an exclusive playing field for parties or candidates who possess vast campaign resources, parties or candidates with tiny resources, on the other hand, are frequently marginalised. In stark contrast, e-campaigning requires considerably lower start-up costs than its traditional counterpart and it is just as capable in many aspects, such as reaching a wide, diverse audience. Such circumstances especially motivate parties or candidates with limited campaign resources to embrace e-campaigning.

From comparing various parties’ and candidates’ campaign websites, early studies

tend to support the equalisation thesis (Gibson & McAllister, 2014; Gibson & Ward, 2012; Small, 2008).

Subsequent and antithetical to its counterpart, the normalisation thesis asserts that well-resourced political parties or candidates tend to outperform their under-resourced counterparts in e-campaigning (Gibson & McAllister, 2014; Gibson &

Ward, 2012; Margolis et al., 2003; Margolis, Resnick, & Wolfe, 1999; Small, 2008;

Strandberg, 2009). More specifically, as e-campaigning gains wider appreciation and evolves rapidly and constantly, its present form differs substantially from its initial one, becoming more diversified, expansive, extensive, professionalised, and sophisticated. Accordingly, e-campaigning is increasingly resource-hungry. Ward, Owen, et al. (2008) note that despite its relatively low entry costs, e-campaigning is demanding more money, more skills, and advanced applications. Those scholars continue to point out that ‘if parties or candidates can afford to employ specialist web staff, journalists to write website copy and staff to answer email and moderate online discussion they are more likely to produce more sophisticated online campaigns.’ (Ward, Owen, et al., 2008, p. 10) Thus, well-resourced parties or candidates tend to exhibit more extensive, expansive, professionalised, and sophisticated e-campaigning utilisation than their under-resourced counterparts.

On that note, it is asserted that major parties or candidates tend to outperform their minor counterparts in e-campaigning utilisation because of their inherent resource advantages, which mirrors traditional campaigning (Gibson & McAllister, 2014; Gibson & Ward, 2012; Margolis et al., 2003; Margolis et al., 1999; Small, 2008; Strandberg, 2009; Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). Based on comparing various political parties’ and candidates’ campaign websites or a few interviews with campaign teams, a number of studies, especially recent ones, support the normalisation thesis (Gibson & McAllister, 2014; Gibson & Ward, 2012; Margolis et al., 2003; Small, 2008; Strandberg, 2009).

According to Small (2008), some political scientists suggest that the equalisation thesis tends to be visible in party-led elections while the normalisation thesis in candidate-led elections. This suggestion is not observed in Small’s empirical study of political parties’ e-campaigning utilisation in a Canadian general election, which is party-led.

In short, resource availability affects e-campaigning utilisation. There are two rival theses in the literature concerning the impact of this factor. Notwithstanding this, it can be inferred that the impact of resource availability consists of two facets:

positive and negative; that is, resource availability can motivate as well as undermine e-campaigning utilisation.