Research paradigm

Denzin and Lincoln (2005, p. 22) assert that ‘all research is interpretive’, irrespective of the research approach, method, and data because ultimately, inferences or conclusions drawn by researchers are distilled through their interpretation. This interpretation is governed by a collection of premises pertaining to ontology – the nature of existence or the world at large, epistemology – the nature of knowledge and the relationship between the knower and the known, and methodology – the practical means and procedures for discovering the known (Creswell, 2002; Guba & Lincoln, 2005; McKenzie, Powell, & Usher, 1997; Nachmias & Nachmias, 1976; Silverman, 2000). Collectively, those premises are referred to as a research paradigm (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003; Guba & Lincoln, 2005; McKenzie, et al., 1997). Both epistemology and methodology are concerned with the acquisition of knowledge. The notable distinction between the two is the

level at which each is situated – the former resides at an abstract level and the latter at a specific, practical level (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003).

According to Denzin and Lincoln (2005), research paradigms are located at an abstract level, they are not always visible to, and are often taken for granted by, researchers. Yet, the scholars stress that it is salient and logical to first address this in any research design, because researchers are ‘bound within a net of epistemological and ontological premises which – regardless of ultimate truth or falsity – become partially self-validating’ (Bateson, as cited in Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 22).

3.3.1 Prevalent research paradigms

In general, four paradigms are distinguished and promulgated: positivism, postpositivism, constructivism – also known as interpretivism, and critical theory (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003; Guba & Lincoln, 2005; McKenzie, et al., 1997).

3.3.1.1 Positivism

Stemming from the natural sciences, positivism operates under the dominance of a naïve realist ontology and an objective epistemology, and, as a consequence, solely relies on laboratory experiment and manipulation or quantitative survey as the research method to verify knowledge (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005).

More specifically, positivism claims that the world exists independently of the knower and social practices, and is deterministic – the world is governed by absolute, indiscriminating, and logical truth in relation to cause and effect (A. S.

Lee, 1991). In positivism, the purpose of inquiry is to establish and, more importantly, verify theories or hypotheses about the fundamental structure of the world, in other words, truth, through scientifically structured methods so that the world can be apprehended, controlled, and predicted (Guba & Lincoln, 2005;

McKenzie, et al., 1997). In order to obtain universal truth, positivism reinforces that researchers must be unimpassioned so that the research is not impaired by any forms of subjectivity, such as their values and any sensory experiences that are irrational. Furthermore, positivism holds that knowledge exists only if it is directly quantifiable (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; McKenzie, et al., 1997).

Consequently, positivism in research design primarily focuses on scientific, mechanical methods for gathering and analysing data (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005;

Guba & Lincoln, 2005; McKenzie, et al., 1997).

3.3.1.2 Postpositivism

Although positivism has dominated scientific inquiry for a considerable period of time, its fundamental discourse has attracted criticism, particularly against the naïve realist ontology and the limited focus of methods for collecting and analysing empirical evidence (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Guba & Lincoln, 2005; McKenzie, et al., 1997). In response, positivism has received minor revisions, referred to as postpositivism (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). It is worth noting that due to the close relationship between positivism and postpositivism, some scholars treat the two paradigms as one (e.g., A. S. Lee, 1991; Myers, 1997; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991).

The main characteristics differentiating postpositivism from positivism lie within the modified ontological and methodological premises. More specifically, postpositivism holds a critical realist ontology and an objective epistemology, and employs laboratory experiment and manipulation or quantitative survey as the primary research method; on occasions, postpositivism may accept qualitative methods, but only with demonstrable scientific rigour and, more importantly, for data triangulation (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Guba & Lincoln, 2005). That is, while still maintaining that the world is deterministic, postpositivism accepts that the universal laws governing the world can only be apprehended imperfectly and probabilistically (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). To that end, all theories or hypotheses about the fundamental structure of the world are inevitably subject to falsification.

Therefore, researchers must be critical about the certainty of their knowledge – the central discourse of critical realism (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Guba & Lincoln, 2005). In postpositivism, the aim of inquiry is to falsify the established hypotheses or theories about truth. In addition, postpositivism acknowledges that no observation or measurement is completely free from errors. Consequently, it vigorously suggests that researchers employ multiple observations and measurements, and, on some occasions, non-quantitative methods to triangulate

the collected empirical evidence and reduce errors that could jeopardise inferences or conclusions (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Guba & Lincoln, 2005).

3.3.1.3 Constructivism

As noted, some scholars treat positivism and postpositivism as a single paradigm.

Constructivism, by contrast, is considered by Denzin and Lincoln (2005, p. 22) as working ‘against and alongside (and some within)’ positivism and postpositivism.

Developed in 1967, constructivism holds a relativist ontology, a subjective epistemology, and a naturalistic set of interpretive, hermeneutical, and dialectical methodological procedures (Creswell, 2002; Guba & Lincoln, 2005).

More specifically, constructivism repudiates the ontological claims held by both positivism and postpositivism about the nature of existence of the world. It contends that the known does not exist externally or independently (Denzin &

Lincoln, 2005; Guba & Lincoln, 2005). Rather, it represents the construction of multiple realities as perceived by individuals, based on their unique values, backgrounds, and experiences, and, consequently, absolute, universal truth is absent (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Guba & Lincoln, 2005). In other words, knowledge resides within each individual in society and is subjective in nature. In order to gain a further understanding of the known, the aim of inquiry in constructivism is to observe and interact with various members of society involved in the phenomenon being investigated, and interpret their views (Creswell, 2002). In addition, constructivism vehemently encourages the research to be conducted in a natural setting (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Guba & Lincoln, 2005). Further, constructivism rejects the advocacy maintained by both positivism and postpositivism that researchers must be unimpassioned when conducting the research. In stark contrast, constructivism recognises the subjectivity inherent in researchers and promotes that researchers should equally appreciate the subjectivity of research participants (Creswell, 2002; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005;

Guba & Lincoln, 2005). As mentioned, constructivism is also referred to as interpretivism by some scholars (Creswell, 2002), especially those from the IS discipline (e.g., A. S. Lee, 1991; Myers, 1997; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). This reference, however, is not widely accepted by scholars of social science or

pedagogy, as it only reflects the epistemological and methodological premises of constructivism (e.g., Creswell, 2002; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Guba & Lincoln, 2005).

3.3.1.4 Critical theory

First defined by Horkheimer, the Frankfurt School theorist, with inspiration from other scholars, critical theory in essence assumes a historical realist ontology, a subjective epistemology, and dialogic, dialectical research methods (Guba &

Lincoln, 2005; Kincheloe & McLaren, 2005).

More specifically, the paradigm believes in an independent existence of reality.

However, the reality is virtual – compared to the ‘real’ reality held by both positivism and postpositivism – and is moulded by social, political, cultural, economic, ethnic, and gender values (Guba & Lincoln, 2005). Critical theory is underpinned by several unique assumptions; notably, ‘all thought is fundamentally mediated by power relations that are socially and historically constituted’ (Kincheloe & McLaren, 2005, p. 304), and ‘facts can never be isolated from the domain of values or removed from some form of ideological inscription’

(Kincheloe & McLaren, 2005, p. 304). This paradigm further contends that researchers need to be critical about existing thought and knowledge because

‘mainstream research practices are generally, although most unwittingly, implicated in the reproduction of systems of class, race, and gender oppression (Kincheloe & Steinberg, 1997)’ (Kincheloe & McLaren, 2005, p. 304). As a result, critical theory is not satisfied with the mere accumulation of knowledge, the main aim of inquiry in this paradigm is to critique and rectify ‘the injustices found in the field site or constructed in the very act of research itself’ (Kincheloe & McLaren, 2005, p. 305). Consequently, in critical theory, knowledge is increased by historical revisionism and generalisation by similarity (Guba & Lincoln, 2005).

Due to its epistemological nature, critical theory solely employs qualitative methods for collecting, analysing, and communicating empirical evidence (Guba &

Lincoln, 2005). It is worth noting that critical theory primarily gains support from studies of culture, anthropology, politics, and history (Guba & Lincoln, 2005;

Kincheloe & McLaren, 2005).

3.3.2 The research paradigm endorsed in this study

The four prevalent paradigms differ from each other, most notably their embedded premises, assumptions about the nature of knowledge, and inquiry aims. Considering that and the context of this study, constructivism is endorsed as the research paradigm.

Specifically, this study posits that the e-campaigning phenomenon is not deterministic; in other words, it is not governed by a single set of absolute, universal laws. Rather, e-campaigning is a complex social phenomenon that consists of multiple realities and contexts. The social phenomenon can be inquired in its natural setting only, without any manipulation and intrusion by the researcher. Further, the associated knowledge and understanding resides within individuals who are involved in the phenomenon. Thus, empirical knowledge and understanding relating to e-campaigning is acquired, developed, accumulated, and reconstructed from the researcher interacting with multiple participants in the phenomenon, gathering their underlying assumptions, values, beliefs, and experiences as empirical evidence, and interpreting the evidence through the researcher’s subjectivity. Meanings derived from this study are therefore subjective, contextual, and socially negotiated, and when joined with others they form a panoramic perspective of the e-campaigning phenomenon.