Although early social learning theorists tried to explain imitative behavior from the perspective of instrumental conditioning, they encountered several difficulties in doing so. One problem is that entirely new behaviors can be acquired simply by watching others perform them (Bandura, 1977, 1986; T. L. Rosenthal, Alford, & Rasp, 1972). In instrumental conditioning, however, new behav- iors typically start only from existing behaviors that are gradually shaped and modified over time.
A second difficulty is the phenomenon of delayed imitation : Some behaviors that are learned through observing others don’t appear until a later time. In Chapter 4 , we diagrammed the relationship of antecedent stimulus, response, and reinforcement like this:
(S+) R → S Rf
These three things follow one right after the other, with the response occurring in the presence of the discriminative stimulus. Yet as Bandura (1977) has pointed out, the response and resulting reinforcement don’t always appear immediately after the discriminative stimulus; instead, they may occur days or weeks later. For such delayed imitation to be possible, learning must actually take place when the discriminative stimulus is presented, despite the absence of reinforcement at that time.
Still a third problem lies in the powerful effect of vicarious reinforcement: Individuals some- times exhibit behaviors for which they themselves are never reinforced.
To address the shortcomings of a strict behaviorist analysis of imitation, social cognitive theorists have suggested that consequences often have indirect rather than direct effects on learn-
ing (e.g., Bandura, 1977, 1986; T. L. Rosenthal & Zimmerman, 1978). Such effects require that we add cognitive factors to the picture, as we’ll do now.
"Build a Magnificent Body in Twelve Minutes."
Reinforcement of the model affects the observer’s behavior as well.
The cognitive side of social cognitive theory is evident in several of its central ideas:
◆ Learning involves a mental (rather than behavioral) change. Social cognitive theorists make a
distinction between learning through observation (a phenomenon called vicarious acquisition )
and the actual performance of what has been learned (Bandura, 1977, 1986; T. L. Rosenthal &
Zimmerman, 1978). In support of this distinction, Bandura has pointed out that people can often verbally describe a behavior they’ve observed but haven’t imitated—hence, they’ve learned something new even though their own behavior hasn’t changed (Bandura, 1965a). Also, people who observe a model perform a behavior may exhibit that behavior only at some later time when they have a reason for doing so. For example, I previously described a study by Bandura (1965b) in which children watched a film of a model acting aggressively toward an inflated punching doll. As you may recall, the consequences of the aggression to the model (reinforcement, punish- ment, or no consequence) influenced the extent to which children themselves engaged in aggres- sive acts toward the doll. Later in the study, however, all of the children were promised rewards (stickers and fruit juice) if they could imitate the model’s behavior. At that point, differences among the three groups of children disappeared. Clearly they had all learned the model’s behav-
ior equally well; the consequences to the model apparently affected their earlier performance but not their learning.
◆ Certain cognitive processes are essential for learning to occur. Social cognitive theorists
describe specific mental processes that occur when people are learning from a model. Among these are paying attention to what the model is doing, mentally rehearsing aspects of the model’s
performance, and forming mental representations ( memory codes) of what the model has done.
I’ll illustrate each of these ideas later in the chapter in the section on modeling.
◆ Learners must be aware of existing response–consequence contingencies. According to social
cognitive theorists, reinforcement and punishment have little effect on learning and behavior unless people have mental awareness of the response–reinforcement and response–punishment
contingencies that are operating (Bandura, 1977, 1986; Spielberger & DeNike, 1966). Reinforcement increases the likelihood of a response only when a learner realizes which particu- lar response has led to the reinforcement. Similarly, a learner must know what particular behav- ior is being punished before that behavior is likely to decrease. Consider a situation in which a student receives an F on a writing assignment, with comments such as “Poorly written” and “Disorganized” scribbled in the margins. For many students, such feedback is insufficient to bring about an improvement in writing because, among other things, it doesn’t identify the spe- cific parts of the assignment that are poorly written and disorganized.
◆ Learners form expectations for future response–consequence contingencies. Social cognitive
theorists suggest that people are most likely to perform behaviors for which they expect a payoff (i.e., reinforcement). For example, I learned many years ago that the capital of Alaska is Juneau. Yet I’ve never had a reason to demonstrate this knowledge because I’ve never been tested on the capital of Alaska, nor have I ever been in Alaska desperately seeking the state capital. Now, of course, I have a reason: I’m hoping you’ll be impressed by the fact that I know the capital of at least one of the 50 states.
More generally, when learners are reinforced or punished for certain behaviors, they’re likely to form outcome expectations —hypotheses about the results that future actions are likely to bring—and behave in ways that will maximize desired consequences (Bandura, 1977, 1986,
Cognitive Factors in Social Learning
1989, 1997; T. L. Rosenthal & Zimmerman, 1978). Learners may also form outcome expectations by seeing others reinforced or punished for certain behaviors, and they behave accordingly—a fact
that can explain the effectiveness of vicarious reinforcement and punishment.
You should notice a critical difference here between the role of reinforcement in instrumen- tal conditioning and in social cognitive theory. In instrumental conditioning, reinforcement influences learning of the behavior it follows. In social cognitive theory, however, an expectation
of possible future reinforcement—an incentive —influences the learning of a behavior it precedes
(Bandura, 1977, 1986).
◆ Learners also form beliefs about their ability to perform various behaviors. Not only do people
form expectations about the likely outcomes of various behaviors but they also form efficacy
expectations —beliefs about whether they themselves can execute particular behaviors success-
fully (Bandura, 1997; Schunk & Pajares, 2004). For example, imagine yourself in a class in which the instructor has clearly described the criteria for an A. But imagine, too, that you don’t believe you have the knowledge and skills to meet the criteria. Even though you know what it takes for a high grade, you don’t have what it takes (not in your own eyes, at least), and so you
can’t achieve an A no matter what you do. We’ll examine the nature and effects of efficacy expec- tations, commonly known as self-efficacy, later in the chapter.
◆ Outcome and efficacy expectations influence cognitive processes that underlie learning. The extent
to which learners actively engage in cognitive processes essential for learning (paying attention, forming memory codes, etc.) depends on their beliefs about the likelihood that learning something will lead to reinforcement. For example, I’ve learned the hard way that when I tell my students they won’t be held responsible for certain information, I’m making a BIG MISTAKE. All I have to do is say something like, “Now I want you to listen carefully to what I have to say for the next five min- utes, but it won’t be on the next test,” and students put down their pens and settle back in their seats;
if I’m teaching an early morning class, a few in the back row may start to nod off. People are less likely to pay attention to something when they don’t anticipate a payoff for learning it.
◆ The nonoccurrence of expected consequences is an influential consequence in and of itself. In the
social cognitive view, the nonoccurrence of expected reinforcement can be punishing and the non- occurrence of expected punishment can be reinforcing (Bandura, 1977, 1986). Both of these principles involve situations in which outcome expectations aren’t being met. For example, once again imagine yourself as a student in a class in which the teacher has described the criteria necessary to earn an A. But this time imagine that you think you do have what it takes to get the A.
You work hard and meet the specified criteria, but at the last minute your teacher adds an additional requirement: a 20-page research paper. You’re probably angry and frustrated—in a sense, you feel punished—because you’ve expected reinforcement based on work you’ve already completed and that reinforcement is now being withheld. Unexpected outcomes and non outcomes often evoke
stronger emotional responses than expected ones do (e.g., Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 1997). The nonoccurrence of expected consequences can be just as influential when observed for a model rather than for oneself (Bandura, 1973, 1977, 1986). For example, in a study by Walters and Parke (1964), children in three experimental groups watched a film in which a woman told a boy not to play with a number of toys in front of him but instead to read a book she’d given him. Yet as soon as the woman left the room, the boy began to play with the toys. At this point, the film depicted one of three consequences for the boy—that is, for the model—as follows:
1. Reward. The woman returned, handed the boy some toys, and played affectionately
2. Punishment. The woman returned, snatched away the toys the boy was playing with,
shook him vigorously, and sat him back down with the book. 3. No consequence. The woman didn’t return to the room.
A fourth (control) group didn’t see the film. Subsequently each of the children in the study was taken to a room full of toys, told not to touch them, given a book to read, and left alone for 15 minutes. Children in the no-consequence group played with the toys—thus disobeying their instructions—just as much as those in the reward group did. Children in the punishment group were more obedient, but the most obedient children were those in the control group, which hadn’t seen a disobedient model at all.
When people see others misbehave without negative consequences, they’re more likely to misbehave themselves. For example, when my daughter Tina was in elementary school, she came home almost daily with complaints about who had gotten away with what on the play- ground that day. If playground supervisors ignore transgressions day after day, their laissez-faire attitude not only allows the misbehaviors to continue but may actually cause them to increase. In the same way, I suspect that people who see others quite literally get away with murder may be more likely to engage in criminal activities themselves.