Prototypical usage

Verhagen & Kemmer (1997) argue, on the basis of empirical data, that the categorizations made by doen and laten coincide with a number of cross-linguistically alleged conceptual models structuring the human understanding of causality. In the first place, the conceptual model of Force dynamics is relevant in the categories of direct and indirect causation. In the distinctions made by Dutch causal verbs however, the focus of attention ‘moves’ from ‘intrinsic force dynamics’

of the core participants involved in the causal process to the degree of ‘control’ (or lack of control) these participants are assumed to have in bringing about the causal

effect: if the causer is construed as controlling the process completely, the causal relation is marked with doen as an instance of ‘direct causation’. If, on the other hand, the causer shares control with a second force in the causal process (which, as a consequence, is construed as having a certain degree of ‘autonomy’ in the process), the causal relation is marked with laten as an instance of indirect causation.

A second conceptual model that is reflected in the meaning and use of Dutch doen and laten is the distinction between the animate world of sentient beings and the physical world of ‘things’, which will be referred to here (following

Verhagen & Kemmer 1992: 7) as the conceptual model of Naïve dualism. The way this model is manifest in language can be schematized as follows:

Figure 3.3. Schematization of distinction between the animate and the inanimate world, present in causation types (Croft 1991, based on Talmy 1976; in: Verhagen &

Kemmer 1997: 71).

According to this schema, causative events are distinguished along two dimensions:

the distinction between the mental world of animate beings vs. the physical world of inanimate entities (the model of Naïve dualism itself) on the one hand, and the

‘initiator’ and the ‘endpoint’ of a causal event on the other (specifying how this model is relevant in the linguistic expression of causal relations). In analytic causative constructions, the initiator of the event always coincides with the causer.

According to the analysis presented in Figure 3.3, the endpoint of the causal event on the other hand varies in analytical causatives: in constructions with an intransitive effected predicate (IC) it is the causee, but in constructions with a transitive effected predicate (TC) it is the affectee that counts as the endpoint in the energy flow (Verhagen & Kemmer 1997: 71; but see discussion in Section 3.4.3).

The asymmetry between the animate and the physical world is symbolized in Figure 3.3 with bent vs. straight arrows. The first indicate indirect causation and

the latter indicate direct causation. In a naïve dualist model, physical entities are taken to act directly on other things (Verhagen & Kemmer 1997: 71). Hence, causal processes that have an inanimate initiator are taken to be instances of direct

causation. Figure 3.3 suggests that there are two interaction types that are standardly conceptualized as direct causation: ‘physical causation’ (which denotes interactions between inanimate initiators and endpoints) and ‘affective causation’ (which denotes interactions between inanimate initiators and animate endpoints). ‘Inducive

causation’ (interactions between animate initiators and endpoints), on the other hand, is typically understood as indirect causation: Animates can only act on other animates via the intervening physical world (Verhagen & Kemmer 1997: 71). Least clear is ‘volitional causation’ (interaction between an animate causer and an inanimate endpoint). As indicated by the ‘slight’ bend of the arrow symbolizing this kind of interaction, this causation type is neither inherently direct nor indirect. Their exact interpretation (and linguistic marking) is dependent on circumstantial factors (Verhagen & Kemmer 1997: 72).

A third model that is shown to be relevant is D’Andrade’s Folk model of the mind (1987). This model specifies the way the concept of ‘animacy’ is dealt with in categorizations of doen and laten: categorization does not always entirely

coincide with inherent ‘animacy’, but with aspects of ‘controllability’ of mental processes caused in animate causees. The Folk model of the mind describes how, according to our pre-scientific, folk understanding, “the mind relates to the physical world, and how events in the mind may be caused” (Verhagen & Kemmer 1997:

72). Some of them are conceptualized as ‘controllable’ (mainly beliefs, intentions and resolutions); others are not (feelings, desires and especially perception). For a more elaborate discussion of this model, see Chapter 7.

Operationalization

The evidence accumulated by Verhagen & Kemmer (1992; 1997) and Kemmer &

Verhagen (1994) suggests that the proposed parallel between the semantic categories indirect causation and direct causation and the conceptual understanding of causal relations is plausible. Therefore, in the present study it will be assumed that the categories of direct and indirect causation reflect conceptual categories relevant for understanding causality. In accord with the usage-based approach to meaning adopted in this study (cf. discussion in Section 2.3.4), the semantic categories will be operationalized in terms of usage-schemas (cf. discussion in Section 2.4.2).

Following Verhagen & Kemmer (1997; Kemmer & Verhagen 1994) and Talmy (1988; 2000), it is assumed that relevant factors in such a usage schema must be the core-participants in the causal event (causer, causee, affectee) and the nature of the interaction between these participants. Thus, a plausible meaning representation of doen and laten in terms of a usage-schema would be the definitions presented in Figure 3.2, presented in Section 3.2.

However, this characterization needs some further specification on the level of

‘core participants’ in order to operationalize it for analysis. The ‘initiator’ is always the ‘causer’ of the causal event. But what about the ‘other force’ that plays an intermediate role in the process conceptualized as indirect causation? The definitions of usage contexts in terms of directness and animacy configurations are stated with reference to two core-participants. But as was already mentioned in Section 2.1,

depending on the type of effected predicate, there may as well be three core-participants playing a role in the conceptualization and categorization of the causal process in analytic causative constructions. Analytic causative constructions with an intransitive effected predicate (IC; cf. (21) below) ‘only’ contain a causer and a causee. Constructions with a transitive effected predicate (TC; cf. (22) and (23) below), on the other hand, contain (at least schematically) three participants: apart from the causer and causee they contain an affectee - as the participant that is

‘affected’ by the causal event without playing an active role in the coming about of causality; the participant that is the final endpoint of the energy flow in the causative event (Verhagen & Kemmer 1997: 63).

(21) [De agent]CR liet [hen]CE passeren.

The officer let them pass.

(22) [Ze]CR liet [de agent]CE [haar rijbewijs]A zien.

She showed (‘let see’) the officer her license.

(23) [Ze]CR liet [ø]CE [haar rijbewijs]A zien.

She showed(‘let see’) ø her license.

This variation in the type of effected predicate makes “a difference in the overall semantics of the causal event, in general because they involve two different configurations of participants” (Verhagen & Kemmer 1997: 62). Apart from the variation in number of participants, there may also be variation in the construal of the specific role the participants plays – notably the participant in the role of causee.

Kemmer & Verhagen (1994) observe that the exact identity and behavior of the causee varies systematically according to whether they occur in an IC or in a TC.

In an IC, the ‘intermediate factor’ in indirect causation is to be associated with (an action of) the causee. For example, the ‘passing’ in (21) only occurs thanks to some initiative on behalf of the causee ‘them’. In many TC it seems to make sense to conceptualize the causee as the intermediate factor in the same vein, cf. (22) and (23): the ‘seeing’ occurs only because of an activity of the causee – ‘the police officer’ in (22), or a more schematic one in (23)). However, in transitive causatives (TC), Kemmer & Verhagen (1994) argue, the causee conceptually occupies a more peripheral position. This difference is related to differences in the respective grammatical models that structure the interpretation of causal relations expressed in IC or in TC respectively. Kemmer & Verhagen (1994: 115) propose that the semantic roles of the core-participants in IC (causer and causee) correspond to the grammatical roles of subject and direct object in a simple transitive clause. The underlying model for TC, on the other hand, is proposed to be the ditransitive or instrumental simple clause (1994: 115). In TC, the affectee of the analytic causative construction corresponds to the direct object (patient role) of a ditransitive clause, whereas the causee rather takes the position of the indirect object (dative or

instrument role). Evidence for this proposal found in patterns of case marking of the causees in TC⁹ (Kemmer & Verhagen 1994: 123; Comrie 1976; 1981), and perhaps

9 Dutch TC marked with laten allow for the following markings of the causee (ordered from more to less integrated): zero marking (“Hij liet ø haar de brief lezen”) – Dative marking

also in the fact that causees are more frequently left implicit in TC-constructions than they are in IC-constructions.¹⁰

Unfortunately, Verhagen & Kemmer (1997; Kemmer & Verhagen 1994) do not concretely further work out this analysis for their implications on categorization patterns with doen and laten. The corpus analysis reported in Verhagen & Kemmer (1997) is based on a sample of fragments containing an explicit causee. Usage-contexts with implicit causee are excluded from the analysis. A drawback of this decision is that by doing so, only a small part of naturally occurring

TC-constructions is included in the analysis; 65% of the TC occurrences in the corpus used by Verhagen & Kemmer (1997) was without a causee.

As the present study aims at maximal generalizability of its findings, it was decided to include causee-less fragments as well. Yet, the question remains: how to deal with these cases? In itself, Kemmer & Verhagen’s (1994) proposal seems to imply that categorizations of IC-constructions are based on interactions between different types of core-participants (namely: causer and causee) than categorizations of TC-constructions (namely: causer and affectee)¹¹, or at least: that these

differences pertain to causee-less TC. This in turn implies that (22) is to be categorized as an instance of indirect inducive causation, whereas (23) is to be categorized as an instance of indirect volitional causation. It is an empirical question whether this (possible) difference is reflected in patterns of causality marking with doen and laten.

However, for lack of empirical evidence to the contrary, the present analysis will start from the assumption that there is no fundamental difference in the way causal relations in IC and TC are construed, or in the way causal relations in IC and causee-less TC are construed. Building on the findings of Verhagen & Kemmer (1997), it is assumed that all analytic causative constructions are conceptualized as interactions between the causer and the causee, explicitly present or not. Thus, the following usage-schema will be taken as a starting point for analysis:

Doen Laten Direct causation

The causer produces the effected event directly; there is no intervening energy source ‘downstream’

Indirect causation

Besides the causer, the causee is the most immediate source of energy in the effected event; the causee has some degree of ‘autonomy’ in the causal process

Figure 3.5. Usage-schemas for doen and laten: core-participants causer and causee.

(“Hij liet de brief aan iedereen lezen”) – Agentive/Instrumental marking (“Hij liet de brief door iemand lezen”) (Kemmer & Verhagen 1994: 136-137).

10 According to data from Verhagen & Kemmer (1997: 64): Only 9 out of 439 with IC, against 272 out of 416 with TC (cf. Degand (2001) for similar findings).

11 This is also what is suggested in the proposals of Talmy (1976) and Comrie (1991), who state that it is the interaction between the starting-point and the end-point of the energy flow (in force dynamic terms) that determine categorization of a causal relation.

In order to control for possible interference of this factor with the main aim of the analysis, two control steps have been built in. Firstly, in reconstructing the categorization processes in the corpus analysis, it will be investigated whether the causee is a plausible ‘intermediary factor’ or not. Secondly, Section 3.4.3 will take the affectee instead of the causee as a starting point for analysis of TC-constructions, and will investigate what difference this makes in overall patterns.

Verhagen & Kemmer’s (1997; Kemmer & Verhagen 1994) data suggests that prototypical usage of doen and laten can be defined more specifically in terms of

‘(in)animacy’. Following Verhagen & Kemmer’s proposal (building on Croft 1991 and Talmy 1976), this will result in four subcategories, related to doen and laten as follows:

Animacy configuration Prototypically marked with:

Physical causation

Inanimate CR – Inanimate CE Doen Affective causation

Inanimate CR – Animate CE Doen Volitional causation

Animate CR – Inanimate CE Doen or laten Inducive causation

Animate CR – Animate CE Laten

Figure 3.6. Prototypical usage of doen and laten (CR = causer; CE = causee).

According to Verhagen & Kemmer (1997: 72), causal processes with inanimate core participants (physical causation) and processes with an inanimate causer and an relevant animate ‘other participant’ (affective causation) are as a general rule categorized as ‘direct causation’. Causal processes with animate core participants (inducive causation) are normally categorized as indirect causation. If in a specific fragment usage of doen or laten does not conform to the general patterns established by Verhagen & Kemmer, other elements will be invoked to account for the

categorization found (e.g. the other conceptual models identified as relevant by Verhagen & Kemmer, or contextual factors). These will be explicitly argued. As causal processes with an animate causer and an inanimate relevant ‘other participant’ (volitional causation) do not show any pattern related to animacy, in these types other arguments will be used standardly¹².

The distinction between animate and inanimate elements is made as follows: ‘animate beings’ are taken to be ‘thinking entities’ in the Cartesian sense (‘res cogitans’), having the property of either being a ‘subject of consciousness’ (of feeling, cognition and perception) or a ‘subject of action’ (an agent) (Lyons 1995:

337). Whether a participant is ‘animate’ or ‘inanimate’ is established making use of

12 Cf. Verhagen & Kemmer, who state that “volitional causation is, in terms of categorization as direct or indirect, the most complex, i.e.neither prototypically direct nor prototypically indirect: thus it comes as no particular surprise that quite a number of examples of both doen and laten are found in this subclass […] other factors will more often be decisive here than in other subclasses (1997: 72).

both linguistic indications (inherent semantics) and contextual factors. Examples of the latter situation are fragments where an animate being is not involved in the causal relation for his or her ‘sentient’ aspect but, instead, for its ‘physical aspect’ ( cf. (24)). Conversely, inherently inanimate entities may metonymically be

conceptualized as animate beings, capable of feelings, perception and action (cf.

(25))

(24) (Over tennisser Peter Wessels) Vorig seizoen trapte zijn lichaam echter op de noodrem. Een virus en oververmoeidheid deden hem van de 82e plaats op de wereldranglijst weer buiten de tophonderd duikelen¹³ (por200267)¹⁴

(About tennis player Peter Wessels) Last season his body slammed on the brakes. A virus and exhaustion made him degrade/fall from 82^nd place on the world ranking list out of the top hundred.

(25) Volkswagen blijft de grootste Europese automobielbouwer, hoewel het aantal verkochte eenheden met 2,9 procent daalde tot 2,75 miljoen. De VW-merken Seat en vooral Skoda wisten echter hun verkopen te doen stijgen (ac170105).

Volkswagen remains the largest European car manufacturer, although the number of sold units fell from 2.9 percent to 2.74 percent. However, VW brands Seat, and especially Skoda, were able to make their sales rise.

If the causee is left unexpressed, its animacy was reconstructed on the grounds of the effected predicate: taking an animate or an inanimate subject. An example is (26):

(26) We hebben [ø] ons huis laten verbouwen.

We had [ø] our house redecorated.

13 A specific sub-type is formed by expressions containing figurative language. An example from the corpus investigated: “Op de Maastrichtse antiekbeurs Tefaf komt dit weekeinde een veertiende-eeuws manuscript in de verkoop, dat musicologen het water in de mond doet lopen.” (rec030359) This weekend at the antique dealer’s exhibition ‘Tefaf’ in Maastricht a 14^th century manuscript which makes musicologists’ mouths water will be sold. Fragments containing figurative language will be analyzed from the perspective of the literal energy flow depicted. Thus, in the example just cited, the Dutch equivalent of the expression also known in English ‘the 14^th manuscript makes musicologists’ mouths water’, referring to the situation that the musicologists referred to take a lively interest in the manuscript, is analyzed as an interaction in which the 14^th century manuscript acts as a causer that directly causes ‘the water’ as a causee, to (literally translated) ‘pour into the mouths’ of the musicologists.

14 Examples taken from the corpora analyzed are followed by their ‘administrative code’:

digits 1-4 indicate ddmm, and the last two positions indicate the ranking number in the selection process. Numbers over 50 indicate cases replacing ‘doubles’. The letter code indicates text type (cf. Appendix 3-1) Thus: fragment por200267 was taken from a portrait article published Februari 20^th and it was selected in order to replace an xth occurrence of a lexicalized expression marked with doen.

The effected predicate of (26) is a verb denoting an action. Actions take animate subjects (agents), therefore: the causee must be animate.

The relation between semantic and conceptual categories will be tested in two directions, from a semasiological perspective (testing whether usage-categories of doen and laten can be adequately described in terms of the conceptual categories direct and indirect causation respectively) and from an onomasiological perspective (testing whether the conceptual category of direct causation is typically expressed with doen, and whether the conceptual category of indirect causation is typically expressed with laten, as the hypothesis predicts – see Section 2.4.3). This results in the following hypotheses on prototypical usage of doen and laten:

Semasiological hypothesis

Doen is prototypically used in causal relations with inanimate core-participants; laten is prototypically used in causal relations with animate core-participants.

Onomasiological hypothesis

Causal relations with inanimate core-participants are prototypically expressed with doen; causal relations with animate core-participants are prototypically expressed with laten.

These hypotheses will be tested quantitatively. In line with the assumptions presented in Chapter 2, degree of prototypicality of a usage-context is

operationalized in terms of usage-frequency: the more frequent a specific context is, the more prototypical it is taken to be.