3.1
A complex field
Above-mentioned quotes from the field well illustrate the complex arena in which development partners enter when they engage in support to decentralisation and local governance. This arenais characterised by:
• High political intensity and sensitivity.Decentralisation reforms are primarily politically motivated and deal with the redistribution of power and access to resources and the shifting of lines of accountability. This implies quite a level of unpredictability. Implementation may accelerate at one stage only to slow or come to a standstill at another, for example, when a new government comes in with different priorities. • A multitude of actors and stakeholders.At both the
central and local level, actors and stakeholders have different motives, expectations and often competing or conflicting interests. There are also many ‘disconnects’ that can complicate a reform process. For instance, in most countries development and revenue budgets are drawn up in different ministries, and central planning processes are seldom properly aligned with local-level planning initiatives.
• Question of commitment and/or capacity to reform at the central level.This often leads to hesitant and incomplete decentralisation processes.
• Different levels of decentralisation.Often a variety of decentralised entities are involved in the reform process (regions, provinces, municipalities), thus complicating the task of redistributing roles and responsibilities in an efficient and coherent manner.
• A wide range of complex institutional and technical issues to be sorted out.Examples here are when and how to decentralise a particular local public service or sector. The assignment of specific services to local governments is likely to differ from sector to sector. For instance, health care is a labour-intensive social service whereas rural roads require infrastructure investments and maintenance.21
• Insufficient capacity to take on new responsibilities.
Generally there is little capacity at the local level to take on the new responsibilities.
• Confusion on new roles and responsibilities.It is not always clear what parts the different actors are to play ‘after the arrival of decentralisation’ (e.g. the division of
roles between local governments, civil society and traditional authorities).
• Limited legitimacy of the new local governments.Levels of trust in (local) state agencies are often low in third countries. Legal reforms installing new decentralised authorities are not sufficient to restore confidence. The challenge is to show that local governments can deliver (better) public goods and services.
• Strong presence of development partners.Development partners often play an important role in terms of policy orientation or funding, yet this is seldom done in a coordinated and coherent way.
• An unpredictable and dynamic process.Whatever the motives behind decentralisation, once started, the process takes on a life of its own, creating constituencies and opponents and evolving in unpredictable ways.
• Need for long-term donor engagement but with uncertain impact.Decentralisation is a long-term endeavour, characterised by incremental reforms with uncertain results. This complicates the life of development partners under pressure to show ‘quick results’. Supporting decentralisation and local governance is by definition a ‘political job’. It is a jump into the unknown and a long trip on a bumpy road. Conflictsare likely to be a constant bedfellow for those walking along this path. The sources of potential conflictsare manifold.
➤Local elections are the key to legitimacy of local governments.Yet such elections are not a self-evident exercise in countries with a fragile or emerging democratic culture. Furthermore, newly elected local bodies must find their place and earn their legitimacy alongside existing forms of authority (e.g. traditional chiefs) (Box 10).
➤Effective local governments are seldom created from the top.It is dangerous to assume that local governments can be created by a few central decisions to transfer functions and authority over resources - and that municipalities should just wait for this to happen. Historically local government has tended to develop as those in the localities have taken action to demonstrate their determination and ability to set their own
priorities. This implies a tradition or acceptance of challenging the centre – a set of conditions that are often lacking.
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21This will also affect the choice of intergovernmental arrangements to organise ‘service provision’ and ‘service production’ (in view of ‘objective’ criteria, such as economies of scale, but also other factors such as bureaucratic politics, local-level capacity constraints and particular production challenges associated with each service).
➤Decentralisation implies an overall rethinking of inter-governmental relationsand new demarcation lines with regard to roles and responsibilities between the different layers of government. One of the most important lessons of successful decentralisation programmes is that democratic decentralisation (devolution) involves a redefinition of central and local government tasks and resources. This cannot be achieved without effective intergovernmental relations. Yet this is particularly challenging in countries where decentralisation is seen as a ‘zero-sum’ power game in which the centre stands to lose rather than as a ‘positive-sum’ power game in which all players win over time.
➤Decentralisation is due to fundamentally affect the “accountability chain”in development processes (see section 3.2 below). This includes checking ‘where the money goes’ that is channelled to the local level. Does it really reach the ultimate beneficiaries? Public expenditure tracking surveys can be a most useful tool to monitor budget execution22.
➤Decentralisation involves building an active citizenship.The process of decentralisation responds to the aspiration to have a greater say in the
management of local affairs. This often requires a ‘bottom-up’ struggle (i) to alter existing power relations; (ii) to get rid of the habit to use local governments as a mechanism for gathering votes; (iii) to empower communities; and (iv) to construct and nurture citizenship. Highly centralised governments are likely to resist the emergence of citizen movements claiming for genuine democratic space at local level.
➤Competition for donor funding.Donor choices of geographic focus, partners and institutional ‘entry points’ may introduce biases or tilt power structures in favour of one actor or another. Competition is likely to increase as local governments gain momentum and credibility. This tension is already noticeable between
local governments and non-governmental organisations in the search for local development funds. Increasingly competition also takes place between central and local governments (e.g. for sectoral funds).
Table 3 (page 30) sets out some of the main tensions and competing/conflicting interests that are likely to occur in the implementation of processes aimed at improving governance and service delivery through democratic participation and community involvement.23In practice, the art of supporting decentralisation will be to engage in this arena and contribute to managing these tensions and conflict of interests.
3.2
Decentralisation and changing
lines of accountability
The scope of this Reference Document does not allow to elaborate further on the different possible lines of conflict in the decentralisation arena, as explained in table 3 (page 30). Nonetheless, it seems worthwhile to focus a bit more attention on changes brought about in the ‘accountability chain’ as a result of decentralisation.
Accountability lies at the heart of many of the potential benefits expected from decentralisation (e.g. citizen participation in local affairs, improved service delivery, transparency). Furthermore, it should offer protection against ‘elite capture’ by local power-holders. This risk can be contained by developing effective self-governance structures at the community level. Civil society has a critical role to play in establishing the necessary conditions and mechanisms for ensuring ‘downward accountability’ of local authorities towards their constituencies.
The ‘open-systems’ approach is particularly useful for capturing the different dimensions of accountability.
29 The institutional design of earlier decentralisation programmes in Africa often deliberately ignored the competencies
and powers of traditional authorities. Many of the current programmes opt for a more inclusive approach that takes into account the social legitimacy and de facto power of these institutions. Their role in conflict settlement and con- sensus-building on culturally sensitive issues is also increasingly acknowledged, as well as their capacity to mobilise local people for development projects. Moreover, traditional authorities are often linchpins of local solidarity networks and can therefore play an important role as informants on poverty within local communities.
Involving traditional authorities brings specific strategic and operational challenges. Donor-supported interventions need to (i) acquire knowledge of the powers and roles of these actors in local politics and in social and economic activity, (ii) strike a balance between different forms of legitimacy (elected and traditional) and (iii) avoid forms of assistance that reinforce or restore conservative approaches to exercising traditional power at the local level.