The rationale of universalization

The view I am here propounding can also be reached by reflecting on the three stages of universalization distinguished in Chapter 4. We may hope at the same time to explain why uni-versalization plays the part it does in characteristically moral reasoning, and why there are the difficulties noted in Chapter 4 for the logical theses about the universalizability of moral judgements.

I argued in Chapter 4 that it was the third stage of univer-salization that would to bring us anywhere near the utilitarian scheme in which particular ideals and values are

in and subordinated to a resultant general happiness.

But it was the first stage, at most, that could be presented as being required by the meaning of moral terms and the logic of moral statements, and it was only the second stage that, failing could be seen as being involved in a traditionally accepted and widely influential pattern of moral reasoning. The third stage can claim neither of these supports; but only i t , and not

T H E C O N T E N T O F E T H I C S

the two more defensible stages, would tell against the diversity of systems of values. But why are there these differences be-tween the three stages? Also, why is there the asymmetry noted in Chapter 4, that we can more easily recognize as moral the variety of asceticism which says cannot allow myself such indulgences, but I do not condemn them in others' than the corresponding variety of egoism which says is permissible for me, though not you in exactly similar circumstances'?

The first stage of universalization, the elimination of purely individual reference to persons, nations, and so on, and hence the denial of moral privilege for an individual moral speaker or for what he belongs to, seems necessary i f morality is to fulfil the sort of function discussed in Chapter 5. When Hobbes put forward his laws of nature as articles of peace, he reasonably required, in his second law, that a man should contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself. Naturally fairly selfish, and therefore in the circumstances competitive, individuals and groups just will not accept as principles of compromise and adjustment of conflicting claims any that give a totally unsupported prefer-ence to one individual or group. But this purpose it does not matter if a man is contented with less liberty against other men than he would allow others against himself. If the function of morality is to counter the bad effects of limited sympathies, it would be undermined by proper name egoism, but not by proper name asceticism. This asymmetry seems to figure in our ordi-nary moral thinking; it conflicts with a simple ascription of first

stage universalizability to moral terms as a logical feature; but is easily understood when we look beyond the proposed logical thesis to a practical function.

The second stage of universalization, the elimination of prin-ciples which differentially favour those who happen to have certain characteristics or certain positions, is supported by simi-lar considerations, but less strongly. As we saw in Chapter 4, this stage amounts to looking for and adopting principles which one would be prepared to endorse no matter what one's actual condition was. Such principles have obvious merits as those that

C O N S E Q U E N T I A L I S M A N D D E O N T O L O G Y

are to govern the adjustment of claims between fairly selfish competing individuals. On the other hand, the history of moral thought and practice make it all too plain that it is not a

condition for a working moral system that it should pass this test as we would apply it. Almost all actual societies have been and are, in various ways and in various degrees, in-egalitarian, and it is not surprising that they should have had inegalitarian moral codes which have no doubt contributed to their harmony and stability. Morality has sustained socially es-tablished privilege. Game theory models, as we saw in Chapter

5, can illustrate the acceptability, in some circumstances, of unequal agreements: an unequal agreement may be better for each party than no agreement at all. Such agreements, or the equivalent arrangements, may be advantageously maintained by such invisible chains as moral rules and principles provide.

Thus moral codes which seem to us to resist the second stage of universalization can grow up and survive: they serve a social function. But they can do so only because they seem to most members of the societies in which they are in force to pass this test. They are viable as moral codes only because most members of these societies do endorse them, whatever their actual condition may be. of rank or race or sex, and so on, are accepted as morally relevant grounds of privilege not only by those who enjoy these privileges but also by many who do not. But an unequal rule can also be used to defend an existing arrangement against attempts by some of the under-privileged to change it: the latter will naturally criticize the rule by appealing to arguments of the sort covered by this second stage of universalization - H o w would you like it if you were in this position? - such criticisms will be resisted i t is not surprising that this second stage has, as we found in Chapter 4, an equivocal status. It is supported by widely used and tra-ditionally influential patterns of moral argument, but it is not established as a logical constraint on the meanings of moral terms and statements.

The third stage of universalization is less strongly supported again by what we have identified as the object of morality. No 153

T H E C O N T E N T O F E T H I C S

doubt if everyone gave equal weight to all currently held ideals and values, and hence to all actual interests, conflicts would be very thoroughly resolved; but this is not necessary in order to counter the evils which it is the function of morality in the narrow sense to check, nor is it practicable. People do have specific and divergent ideals and values, and it is not possible genuinely to adhere to an ideal and at the same time to sub-ordinate it completely to some resultant of all ideals.

There is still force, however, in the argument that principles which are to govern the adjustment of conflicting claims, and so check the bad results of the confined generosity of mankind, had better be ones that can be endorsed from all points of view - not only no matter what one's actual condition is, but also no matter what one's actual ideals and values are. This may be too much to hope for. Some actual disagreements about values are so extreme that they react against any principles that are proposed for the adjustment of claims: it may be impossible to agree even about the procedures for reaching agreement. Those who subscribe wholeheartedly to some ideal may be unwilling to tolerate any constraint upon the methods by which they strive to achieve their goal. Nevertheless the realistic moral aim is to maintain or establish such constraints, not to reach or impose agreement about goals or ideals.