Subjective elements in universalization

There are, then, different kinds or stages of universalization. In each of them a moral judgement is taken to carry with it a similar view about any relevantly similar case. But the first stage rules out as irrelevant only the numerical difference be-tween one individual and another; the second stage rules out generic differences which one is tempted to regard as morally relevant only because of one's particular mental or physical qualities or condition, one's social status or resources; the third stage rules out differences which answer to particular tastes, preferences, values, and ideals. It is at most the first stage, the ruling out of purely numerical differences as morally irrelevant, that is built into the meaning of moral language: the cor-responding logical thesis about the second stage is more con-troversial, while that about the third stage would be plainly

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false. On the other hand, it is only if we accept all three stages that we are committed to a view or to any approxi-mation to utilitarianism. A n d at every stage what I have called the substantive practical principle is distinct from and inde-pendent of the corresponding logical thesis, whether the latter would be true or false.

Suppose that a logical thesis is true, say that of our first stage.

Then one cannot express, in moral judgements which the key terms are used with their full standard moral force, pre-scriptions or guides to action, bearing both upon oneself and upon others, which do not display a willingness to contented w i t h so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself. Thinking in standard moral terms, seriously prescriptive and genuinely universalizable in this first way, carries such a willingness with it. But the (supposed) truth of this logical thesis does not compel anyone to think this way, even under penalty of illogicality. For one can with complete consistency refrain from using moral language at all, or again one can use moral terms with only part and not the whole of their standard moral force. The fact that the word as used in nineteenth-century physics, had as part of its meaning particle of did not in itself, even in the nine-teenth century, compel anyone to believe that there are indi-visible material particles. One could either refrain from using the term in affirmative statements or, as physicists have subsequently done, use the term with other parts of its meaning only, dropping the requirement of indivisibility. A logical or semantic truth is no real constraint on belief; nor, analogously, can one be any real constraint upon action or prescription or evaluation or choice of policy.

We can apply here the notion, used in Chapter 3, of speaking within an institution. We may take morality itself, or the moral use of language, as the institution in question. Speaking within i t , one logically cannot (on our supposition) endorse a pre-scription that would resist first stage universalization. But this does not give universalizable maxims any intrinsic, objective, superiority to ones. The institution of 98

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morality itself is not thus given any intrinsic authority, nor is the principle that we should use only universalizable maxims to guide conduct thus enabled to command rational assent.

ing out the universalizability requirement within the institution of morality is analogous to Searle's deriving of an from an within the institution of promising, and is no more authoritatively prescriptive than that.

It is sometimes suggested that it belongs to the meaning of moral that they are final, overriding guides to choices of action; if it also is part of their meaning that they are universalizable at least in our first way, these two together seem to make it logically incumbent on anyone to use universalizable maxims as overriding guides to conduct. But if this holds at all, it holds only within the institution of morality. No-one is thereby constrained to adhere to that institution or to let it control his practical thinking. Such double definition is too easy a way of apparently settling substantive questions in any field whatever. It is a basic principle of general logic that you cannot get something for nothing, and this cannot be overruled or evaded by any special logic of morality.

The truth of one of our logical theses, then, does not in any way compel acceptance of the corresponding substantive prac-tical principle. But equally if the logical thesis for some stage of universalization is false, as that of the third stage seems to be, someone may still coherently let his conduct be guided (only) by maxims which are universalizable in this way. Whatever the truth-value of the logical thesis, an independent decision for or against the Corresponding substantive practical principle is still required. It is not only that the singular prescriptions which enter into an argument in terms of universalization represent decisions: the same is true of the general, formal, practical prin-ciple by whose application they are universalized or extended to relevantly similar cases.

The universalizability of moral judgements, then, does not any rational constraint on choices of action or de-fensible patterns of behaviour. A n d it would be little more than

verbal point that an action-guiding system of thought which

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violates first stage universalizability, at least, cannot count as a morality, that if and similar are used in such a system, it will not be i n a fully moral sense. Universalizability, then, poses no threat, not even a threat of limitation, to the moral scepticism or subjectivism advanced in Chapter

This may be seen more clearly if we look at an example of the reasoning by which moral judgements are checked or controlled at each stage of and note the various points at which subjective elements enter, at which there is an appeal to something that has the logical status of a decision.

Driving along a little-frequented road you pass another car with its wheels stuck in the ditch: the driver waves, apparently asking you either to help him yourself or to take a message to summon help. It is a nuisance, but you think you ought to stop.

Y o u have done a quick bit of first stage universalization, and have decided that you cannot endorse maxim that no-one has a duty to stop and help someone else in circumstances like these.

(Of course you might have reached this conclusion in some quite different way, but we are concerned with it only as a possible product of this sort of universalization.) One plainly subjective factor in your reasoning is your unwillingness to sub-scribe to the singular prescription in the possible case when you are in the ditch and someone else is passing. If you were too proud ever to ask help or were sure that you would never be such a fool as to get stuck you would not have reasoned in this way: the maxim that no-one is required to stop and help in these circumstances is one that you could then pre-scribe universally. But another subjective element is your resort to first stage universalization itself, your readiness to let your view about what you are to do be tested in this way. Even if this is implicit in your even asking yourself what you ought to do, it is a decision none the less. It is not the logic of alone that is operating here, but your acceptance of the corresponding substantive practical principle. Y o u are, as Hare has stressed, logically free to opt out of the moral language game; it is, then, logically speaking, a decision if you opt into it, even if,

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speaking, you have grown up in it and have never thought of thinking otherwise.

But suppose that this first stage of universalization fails to check you. Confident that you will never be such a fool as to get stuck in a ditch you are happy to endorse the maxim that anyone who passes someone who is stuck may drive on. But then you progress to the second stage: you put yourself in the other man's I f , per you were ever stuck you would feel that you ought to be helped. Trying to find a universalizable maxim, relevant to this situation, to which you could subscribe without relying on your well-above-average

common sense and practical skill, you find that it has to be not but and At this stage your moral con-clusion no longer rests on any desire that you should at some time be helped: that question does not arise. So far as desires that are contingent upon your actual qualities and expectable situations are concerned, you could endorse the universalized maxim that one may drive on. But your acceptance of the op-posite conclusion still rests on some more basic preferences, which you would have even if you were more of a fool you are but which you still have now. These constitute one sub-jective element in the reasoning towards the second stage con-clusion; but another subjective element is your adopting of second stage universalization itself (as well as the first stage).

Though this is a traditionally influential and widely accepted style of moral reasoning, it is, logically speaking, by a decision that you adopt the substantive practical principle of letting it control your actions.

But this second stage could still fail to check you. Y o u are too proud ever to seek help in such a difficulty; you think it so degrading that you hope that even if, overcome by a momen-tary weakness, you yourself were to ask someone for help, he would ignore your and you feel that the kind of man who would ask for help is too contemptible to deserve con-sideration.

But, perhaps, you progress to the third stage. Y o u reflect that not everyone shares your ideal of self-reliance. There are people

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who don't mind being dependent on others, who actually scribe to the servile principles of mutual aid. No doubt man whose car is in the ditch and who is now appealing to you is one of these. Y o u don't agree with his system of values, but you are willing to respect it, and to give some weight to interests which can arise only on his value-assumptions, not on yours. Trying to frame maxims which can be endorsed from all points of view, or which represent a compromise between radically different points of view, which would commend themselves to an impar-tially sympathetic spectator, you decide that after all you ought to stop and help. Y o u believe in self-reliance, but you are not a hard-core fanatic about it. Your moral conclusion, thus arrived at, now owes much less to any of your subjective preferences.

But as they have dropped out of the picture they have been replaced by another subjective element, your endorsement of the substantive practical principle of third stage univer-salization. This is not indeed any more subjective than your previous endorsement of the first and second stages, but it is more obviously subjective in that it is not incorporated, as they may be, into the meanings of moral terms or the traditionally accepted patterns of moral reasoning. It is not only logically possible to opt out of this third variety of moral language game;

it is quite common and conventional for people w i t h strong moral convictions to remain outside it, and it may well require a conscious decision to opt into it. Yet the logical status of the three substantive practical principles is the same.

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