Redefining Security: What’s at Stake?

By the late 1980s Realism ’s view o f security and the practices it generated were becoming increasingly untenable (Stephenson 1988). According to Stoett, the end o f the cold war in 1989 lifted the “perceptual fog” which obscured certain

understandings o f contemporary security issues (Stoett 1995: 19). The fall o f the Berlin wall ushered in a new round o f identification o f ‘new ’ security issues, including pre-existing ‘dangers’ (mostly to U.S. interests) such as: the strength o f the Japanese and German economies (economic security); global environmental change (environmental security); an array o f difficulties associated with the ‘Third W orld’; and energy availability (energy security). Other security issues which are identified include: drug use at home and drug trafficking (the ‘w ar’ on drugs);17 failed states which may behave aggressively inwardly and outwardly;

transboundary crime; hostage taking; terrorism;, ethno-political conflicts;18 the m igration o f diseases and people across national borders;19 and the threat posed by large groups o f people who subscribe to a different religious orientation that that o f the Judao-Christian W est (Islam gets much attention) (after Campbell 1992, Dalby 1997a). These new threats are still, for the most part:

17 Lee (1995) gives a brief introduction to this issue.

18

Glut(1995) offers an insightful and peace-promoting discussion of ethnic tension as a

source of conflict.

19

Chow (1996) gives a brief introduction to this issue.

_0 O’Neill (1996) seems to think that global warfare and regional scale warfare is still likely, the usual enemies of Russia, China and radical Islam are cited as being possible protagonists. Dupont (1996) also offers a Realist account of many of these ‘new’ security issues.

Represented in ways that do not depart dramatically from those dominant during the cold war .... these challenges are represented as dangers located in an external and anarchic environment which threaten the security of an internal and domestic society, often via recourse to violence (Campbell

1992: 7).

It is not surprising then, that according to a U.S. defence expert “the world remains a highly uncertain place with increasingly complex and dangerous national

security threats” (Holmes 1997: 1). The discourse of danger in these new security issues is thus clear, as Rosenau is wont to put it, we still live in a ‘turbulent world’ (Rosenau 1995a). Holmes gives an insight into the logical response of Realists to these new threats and turbulent times:

To be prepared to fight and win our nation’s wars, to be capable of a range of challenging contingency operations and to be ready to assist our friends and allies in the Third World in establishing a secure, stable environment, we must continuously develop new tactics and equipment that address the new age warfare we will face in the 20th century (Holmes 1997: 6) The most important critique of expanded conceptions of security, of which

environmental considerations are part, concerns this militarised response. Security, as Deudney (1990) and Dalby (1991, 1994b) note, carries with it an array of sentiments and a narrow problem-solving mindset that possibly (Dalby), or does (Deudney), make it an inappropriate concept for addressing these issues. These critiques speak to the prevailing Realist conception of security which is, in Dalby’s words, “mired in ideological straightjackets” (199T. 29). So the Western response to the current era of world politics is “characterised by the representation of novel challenges in terms of traditional analytics, and the varied attempts to replace one enemy with (an)other” (Campbell 1992: 8). This holds true for environmental security as well:

In thinking about the new horse of environmental degradation, it is really the old gibbons heart of national security that many of the new securitarians want to preserve. They alter, dilute, and extend the meaning of security beyond any classical recognition, but they never give up on its original idea which embodies conflict and violence. This is because the idea carries them to the heart of existential anguish and moral peril, fears without which their message would not merit such an anxious hearing by politicians, the military, or the mass media (Smil 1997: 108).

Therefore, this post-cold war security agenda is still basically the Realist agenda, but now exhibiting previously secondary concerns brought forth with the sudden absence of the mobilising West-East threat. Sorenson (1990) seems to admit that strategic studies has sought for new security issues to fill the strategic vacuum left after the collapse of the cold war: “the search for a new national security focus has begun” (Sorenson 1990: 1). Thus the hidden goal of security - that of maintaining

power within the state - remains unchallenged so long as security is projected as an absolute imperative. In short, the effect of broadening national security to include social, political and environmental issues - without changing the referent away from the nation-state - is the further colonisation of domestic society by Realism’s ultimately violent logic.

In as much as the Realist conception of security dominates, this thesis is in agreement with Campbell, Dalby and Deudney. For as long as security remains tied up in the state-centric Realist paradigm, introducing new issues will be conceptually counterintuitive and practically counterproductive to these issues, and to peace. In most of the accounts discussed in this chapter, the logical confines of Realism are not broken, and the state remains the site of politics, hence:

Broadening the issue-agenda of security studies from the military-strategic dimension does not necessarily involve broadening the conceptual base. The recognition of additional dimensions of security - however welcome this may be - may be an ad hoc enlargement of a still state-centred concept of security (Shaw 1993: 162).

Therefore, expanding the security agenda without seriously contesting the

meaning of security perpetuates Realism’s failure to take into account the needs of people. In this broader (but not deeper) agenda, security is still the preserve of states acting in their own interests - interests which for the most part do not correspond to the needs of people.

However, the expansion of the concept of security is only malignant for as long as security equates with national security as constructed by Realism. There are a range of other definitions of security that identify alternative referents (chapters 9 and 10). These do more than expand the meaning of security, they seek to ‘reclaim’ it by deepening the concept such that it speaks to the security needs of people (not nations), and by addressing risk and uncertainty in proactive and peaceful ways (Barnett 1997b). Even given these radical approaches, it remains an open and ongoing question as to whether the notion of security is too thoroughly contaminated with associations of power and violence to warrant further use. This issue is taken up again in chapter 10 where the advantages and disadvantages of securitising environmental problems are considered.

5.6 Conclusions

The attempts to redefine security discussed in this chapter do so in

contradistinction to the dominance of the military emphasis and national focus. As Waever puts it “to the extent that we have an idea of a specific modality labelled ‘security’ it is because we think of national security and its modifications and limitations” (1995: 48). If, as Waever suggests, security only has meaning because of its close association with the nation, then all of the environmental security literature that speaks directly to, or explicitly against national security, is still nevertheless taking in terms of the nation-state.

Where the stated referent is still the nation-state, most efforts at redefining security serve the interests of the national and security elite rather more than they serve the interests of people. So, in this thesis’ view, despite good intentions, the search for ‘new security issues’ has lead to the discursive reinvigoration of the state and its self appointed protectors via the continued construction of Others and discourses of danger. In this context it is not surprising that we read that

“environmental degradation is becoming (along with extreme nationalism, religious radicalism, and economic conflict) a prime threat for the 21st century” (Winnefeld and Morris 1994: 2). The beginning of this discourse of environment as a threat can be largely attributed to Ullman and Myers, who presented

environmental insecurity in terms of conflict and national threats. This issue of conflict and the environment will be discussed in the following chapter.