Reflexivity and bias

Reflexivity is an important concept in most forms of qualitative human research. The theory of reflexivity proposes that the researcher can never be entirely independent from the subject matter under review. It challenges earlier research in sociological methods which posited that ‘objectivity’ could be achieved by approaching the subject matter with a sufficient degree of detachment. It is recognised that the presence, power, techniques and tacit agenda of the researcher may all intrude upon the research and alter the truth under investigation.

Reflexivity seeks to explore any feedback loops affecting the research being carried out. It demands that the researcher explore ways in which their own involvement with a particular study influences, acts upon and informs that research. 4

One question that arises is whether a person with an active Christian faith can be

sufficiently independent to undertake research exploring the role of theological motifs within an important endeavour like international development? I would answer this question ‘Yes.’

For decades, the study of human life maintained the appearance of objectivity. It was claimed that by exercising great care in the design and execution of human studies, especially ethnographic or anthropological studies, a truly objective view could be obtained. This was necessary because to be credible research needed to be ‘scientific’, and to be scientific it needed to be at arms’ length from the researcher. Research infected by subjective

4 _{Nightingale, D & Cromby, J 1999, Social deconstructionist psychology: a critical analysis of theory and} practice, Open University Press, Philadelphia, p. 228.

considerations was considered tainted and often had a pejorative connotation. Results could be impugned as imaginary, illusory or unverifiable.

More recently, it has been acknowledged that all research is necessarily reflexive. In grammar, a reflexive verb is one that has the same subject and direct object. In research it is now recognised that ‘because scholars are human beings, the study of human life is always and inescapably reflexive.’5 The researcher cannot leave themselves entirely out of the picture: ‘If we obtain the appearance of objectivity by leaving ourselves entirely out of our accounts, we simply leave the subjective realities of our work uncontrolled.’6 An egocentric predicament therefore arises: all knowledge is ultimately subjective and culturally located, and thus has the potential to be self-justifying. In particular, in the field of religious studies disinterest is constantly urged on scholars, but disinterest is impossible.

It is relevant to recall that for most of the twentieth century, the orientation of the academy was set firmly against religion. Jones and Petersen summarise: ‘The narratives of

modernisation and secularisation that shaped the social sciences for most of the postwar period saw religion as a conservative and traditional force, destined to withdraw and disappear from public life as part of societal progress towards an increasingly modern society.’7 Other commentators were blunter. 8 The impact of modernity was to relegate religion to the private sphere. Religious beliefs were seen as superstitious and unscientific. In addition, the academy saw itself striving against an old world order of European elites and repressive economic and political structures, which were often associated with and defended by the churches. The sociological literature reflected that contest.

At times there has been pressure to disavow or disassociate from any religious position. Norman Malcolm has stated: ‘In our Western academic philosophy, religious belief is commonly disregarded as unreasonable and is viewed with condescension or even contempt. It is said that religion is a refuge for those who, because of weakness of intellect or character, are unable to confront the stern realities of the world. The objective, mature, strong attitude is to hold beliefs solely on the basis of evidence.’9 Those who have the nerve to own up to their religious convictions in scholarship can be ‘given the appearance of deviance within the

5 _{Hufford, DJ 2000, ‘The scholarly voice and the personal voice: reflexivity in belief studies’, in Braun, W &} McCutcheon, RT (eds.) 2000, Guide to the study of religion, Continuum, London.

6 _{Ibid., p. 294.}

7 _{Jones & Petersen, p. 1292.}

8 _{For example, Wallace stated: ‘The evolutionary future of religion is extinction … Belief in supernatural} powers is doomed to die out, all over the world, as a result of the increasing adequacy and diffusion of scientific knowledge’ (Wallace, AFC 1966, Religion: an anthropological view, Random House, New York, p. 265). 9 _{Malcolm, N 1977, Thought and knowledge, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, p. 621.}

scholarly consensus.’10 The end result has been to conflate disbelief with taking an objective

or scientific stance.

In a seminal article, Hufford points out that holding to a ‘scientific gospel’ or arguments against the Divine is not a neutral position. No worldview can ever be impartial on matters of ultimate concern. Accordingly, every scholar will have personal beliefs, and the persistent bias of the academy against religious viewpoints must be acknowledged as itself a viewpoint. The argument for ‘methodological atheism’ serves to advance one culturally loaded belief as dispassionate neutrality, while unfairly asking scholars who do have religious convictions to confess to bias.11

This leads to the question of how faith-based researchers of religious topics should proceed with their enquiries. This researcher has accepted the counsel of Hufford. The position taken is that the researcher should openly acknowledge his or her religious convictions and then proceed with a scholarly voice, tone and methods: ‘If impartiality in belief studies cannot consist of having no personal beliefs, then impartiality must be a methodological stance in which one acknowledges one’s personal beliefs but sets them aside for scholarly purposes. Recognising that each of us has a personal voice, for research

purposes we choose to speak instead with our scholarly voice.’12

There is a risk that when a scholar presents conclusions which are congenial to their personal religious beliefs, that those personal beliefs have influenced the research findings.

However, to assume that this is necessarily the case is unwarranted. Good scholarship and

critical research may have produced those same conclusions. It is noted that in some cases it may be an advantage to have an active faith in conducting research on faith-related topics. A person of faith may see and observe things that make less sense to others, or they may gain the confidence of people reporting about their own faith and convictions.

Helpfully,grounded theory as a research methodology explicitly recognises that the researcher will approach their work laden with biases, and therefore insists on a self-aware, open and careful posture. Suddaby observes: ‘… in grounded theory, researchers must account for their positions in the research process. That is, they must engage in ongoing self- reflection to ensure that they take personal biases, world-views, and assumptions into account while collecting, interpreting and analysing data.’13

                                                                                                                          10 _{Hufford, p. 304.}

11 _{Ibid., p. 303.} 12 _{Ibid., p. 298.} 13 _{Suddaby, p. 640.}

As part of this accountability, it remains important for readers to be aware of any potential for bias, and for this reason a disclosure of personal beliefs and circumstances may assist in evaluating this research.

With this this discussion in mind, I make the following disclosures.