REGULATIVE PILLAR

The  regulative  pillar  is  distinguished  by  its  explicit  process  of  rule-­‐setting,  monitoring   and   sanctioning   practices   (Xu   and   Shenkar,   2002).   In   this   view,   regulatory   process   involves  the  capacity  to  establish  or  set  rules,  ensure  its  conformity,  and  manipulate  its   sanction   (reward   or   punishment)   in   an   attempt   to   influence   present   and   future   behaviour  (Bruton  et  al.,  2010).  Sanctioning  processes  operate  either  through  diffused   informal  mechanisms  or  by  highly  formalised  and  specialised  structures  or  actors  like   polices  and  courts.  According  to  Abbott  et  al  (2001:  401)  legalization-­‐  the  formation  of   rules-­‐  “refers   to   a   particular   set   of   characteristics   that   institutions   may   or   may   not   possess”.   The   value   of   these   characteristics   varies   along   three   dimensions:   obligation,   precision   and   delegation.  Obligation   refers   to   the   extent   to   which   states   or   actors   are   bound  to  commit  and  obey  rules,  because  their  behaviour  is  subject  to  scrutiny  under   such  laws.  Precision  means  that  rules  uniquely  define  the  conduct  of  actors  as  required   or  authorized.  While,  delegation  refers  to  the  authority  granted  to  third  parties  to  make   rules   and   also   implement   rules   in   resolving   disputes.   These   dimensions   are   not   rigid   dichotomy,   but   independently   varying,   depending   on   the   degree   and   weight   of   gradation.  But  Scott  (2008:60)  suggests  “regulatory  systems  are  those  that  exhibit  high   values   on   each   of   these   dimensions   while   normative   systems,   exhibit   lower   values   on   them”.  

Researchers   like   (Bruton   el   at.,   2010;   Kshetri,   2010)   perceive   pressures   as   resting   primarily   on   the   regulative   arm.   For   instance,   North   (1991:   4)   conceptualised   environmental   forces   as   “perfectly   analogous   to   the   rules   of   the   game   in   a   competitive   team  sport.  That  is,  they  consist  of  formal  written  rules  as  well  as  typically  unwritten  codes   of  conduct  that  underlie  and  supplement  formal  rules…  the  rules  and  informal  codes  are   sometimes   violated   and   punishment   is   enacted.   Therefore,   an   essential   part   of   the   functioning   of   institutions   is   the   costliness   of   ascertaining   violations   and   the   severity   of  

punishment”.  North  emphasis  on  the  more  formalised  control  systems  reveals  that  they   are  likely  to  concentrate  on  individual  and   organisational  behaviour  in  markets  or  on   other   competitive   situations   like   politics,   where   opposing   interests   are   common,   and   therefore,   explicit   rules   are   necessary   to   preserve   order.     The   primary   mechanism   of   such  control  involves  the  use  of  “coercion”  (Aguilera  et  al.,  2004;  Dimaggio  and  Powell,   1983).  To  Doyle  (2012:  57)  regulative  factors  play  a  major  role  in  the  management  of  an   organisation.  In  his  study  on  the  development  of  occupational  programs,  it  was  evident   that   regulative   variables   as   pressures   have   direct   relationship   with   how   occupational   programs   are   developed.   Some   of   these   relationships   are   direct   and   some   are   consequential.   The   legitimacy   concerns   of   this   pillar   focuses   on   managing   regulatory   and  government  demands  (Kshetri,  2010).    

Regulation   implores   the   vision   to   suppress   and   constraint,   but   several   types   of   regulations   enable   and   empower   social   actors   and   actions   with   special   benefits   like   conferring  licenses,  special  powers  etc  (Mohammed,  2008).  In  fact,  regulatory  processes   within  the  private  sectors  are  more  likely  to  depend  on  positive  returns  such  as  profits;   and   are   public   actors   that   make   greater   use   of   negative   sanctions.   However,   in   argument,  can  this  claim  be  extended  to  private  investments  operating  to  provide  basic   services   like   education?   However   public   sector   actors   are   capable   of   framing   social   actors  with  more  restricted  powers  of  acting.  

Force,  sanctions  and  expedient  reaction  are  central  elements  of  the  regulatory  pillar,  but   are  often  altered  by  the  presence  of  rules  that  justify  the  use  of  force  (Hoffman,  1999).   When  coercion  is  both  supported  and  constrained  by  rules,  actors  move  into  the  realm   of   authority;   and   power   becomes   institutionalised   (Lee   and   Pan,   2014).   In   conceptualising  law  as  a  regulatory  mechanism,  Hult  (2003:154)  insist  that  the  coercive   function   of   law   should   not   be   conflated   with   its   normative   and   cognitive   functions.   Rather  than  operating  in  an  authoritative  manner,  a  lot  of  laws  are  usually  controversial   (ambiguous)  that  they  do  not  proffer  clear  prescriptions  for  conduct.  To  that  end,  law  is   better  contrived  through  sense-­‐making  and  collective  interpretation,  relying  more  on  its   cognitive  and  normative  elements  than  the  coercive  for  its  effects.  But  to  Hirsch  (1997:   1712)  “the   [regulative]   pillar’s   focus   is   on   unambiguous   and   uncontested   rules   and   laws…[it]   is   thus   narrower   than   the   field   of   law   and   social   science,   which   encompasses   more   of   the   dynamics   surrounding   the   creation   and   retention   of   laws   as   well   as   their  

enforcement”.   Arguably,   forces   reinforced   by   one   pillar   may   be   sustained   by   different   pillars  as  time  and  situations  unveil.    

The   institutional   logic   theory   provides   an   instrumental   view   of   regulative   pillar.   According  to  this  theory,  individuals  employ  rules  and  laws  that  tend  to  advance  their   interests;  and  confirm  to  laws  and  rules  because  they  seek  the  attendant  rewards.  By   this  view,  the  regulative  pillar  revolves  around  rational  choices  made  by  actors.  A  stable   formal  or  informal  system  of  rules  is  backed  by  sanctioning  power  influencing  actor’s   interests  and  choices  that  constitutes  one  prevailing  view  of  institutions.  Indicators  of   the   development,   extent   and   province   of   regulatory   institutions   are   found   in   constitutions,  laws,  codes,  directives,  regulations,  rules  and  formal  structures  of  control   (Scott,  2014).  

3.5.1.1.1  Government  Policies,  Regulations  and  Development  

Policies   are   altered   in   different   ways.   As   long   recognised,   some   policies   are   new   and   innovative,  while  others  are  purely  incremental  or  refined  (Bennett  and  Howlett,  1992).   These   policies   and   regulations   have   been   argued   to   be   important   in   guiding   organisational  operations  (Rastogi  2010;  Shafaeddin  2014)  in  distinct  ways.  According   to   the   European   Commission   (2007)   Government   policies   foster   the   internationalization  and  learning  activities  of  universities  and  shape  these  activities  in   beneficial   ways.   While,   Williams   (2002)   argues   taking   note   of   contextual   differences   that   the   regulative   framework   designed   for   organisations   restrains   their   power   on   certain  issues  thought  of  as  important  to  their  operations  because  they  are  expected  to   conform  and  operate  within  defined  regulations.  Learning  in  these  organisations  could   be  part  of  such  issues,  especially  when  restricted  or  defined  by  national  policies.  Altbach   and   Knight   (2007)   point   that   Government   policies   on   organisations   varies   from   the   provision   of   fund   and   resources,   governance,   quality   assurance   to   general   organisational   operations,   specifically   how   it   affects   a   sector   or   industry.   From   a   different   perspective,   Bennett   and   Howlett   (1992)   and   Borras   (2011)   examined   the   effects  of  learning  on  policies,  where  they  gathered  that  learning  tends  to  affect  policies   because   Government   and   its   agents   need   to   draw   lessons   and   knowledge   about   a   particular   aspect   before   making   policies.   Such   knowledge   is   drawn   from   learning   communities  and  organisations  who  relate  their  experiences  and  learning  from  where   lessons   are   used   to   modify   or   make   policies.   It   can   however   be   argued   that   national  

policies   and   regulations   do   not   only   interfere   with   the   operations   and   learning   in   organisation,   but   policies   are   also   influenced   by   the   learning   in   organisations   in   presenting   appropriate   policies   for   their   operations.   Government   policies   and   regulations   have   been   identified   as   the   main   regulative   institution   but   have   been   examined  with  concepts  like  organisational  change,  internationalization  (Aguillera  et  al   2006;   Altbach   &   Knight   2007;   Huerta   Melchor   2008;   Jenkins   2008;   Macfarlane   et   al.   2013;   Palthe   2014;   Smith   &   Graetz   2011)   and   would   be   relevant   to   consider   it   as   a   regulative  element  shaping  organisational  learning.