RESETTLEMENT THEORY AND POLICY IMPLICATION

The main theoretical framework dealing with dam resettlement continues to be the four-stage model I suggested in the late 1970s (1981 and in press; Scudder and Colson, 1982). In evolving that frame- work, I drew heavily on earlier work by Robert Chambers (1969) as well as on Michael Nelson (1973), both of whom presented three-stage frame- works dealing, respectively, with institutional and eco- nomic issues involved in land settlement schemes. I also drew heavily on Elizabeth Colson’s and my long- term study of those Gwembe Tonga, who were relo- cated in the 1950s because of the Kariba Dam scheme in what is now Zambia and Zimbabwe. Especially influential was Colson’s The Social Consequences of Resettlement (1971), which I believe remains the best single case study of the resettlement process.

Throughout, my focus has emphasized resettler behavior at different periods. Briefly, the four stages are characterized by planning; efforts by the reset- tlers to cope and to adapt following removal; econom- ic development and community formation within resettlement areas; and handing over and incorpora- tion.

The influence of Chambers is clear in the empha- sis placed on the need for facilitating agencies to hand over eventual responsibility to resettler institu- tions; the influence of Nelson is clear on the need for success to be defined not just in terms of increased production but also improved living standards for the majority.

Successful resettlement takes time. At minimum, it should be implemented as a two-generation process. Barring the impingement of unfavorable factors external to the resettlement process, if success can- not be passed on by the first generation of resettlers to their children, then resettlement has failed. Following an initial planning and recruitment stage, the second stage is characterized by the struggle to adjust to the loss of homeland and to new surround- ings. That stage is characterized by multidimensional stress, with physiological, psychological and sociocul- tural components synergistically interrelated.

Increased morbidity and mortality rates are indicative of physiological stress, while psychological stress relates to the loss of home and habitat and anxiety about the future. The non-transferability of various natural resources and knowledge, and cessation, at least temporarily, of a wide range of behavioral pat- terns, statuses and institutions, cause sociocultural stress.

As a result of such multidimensional stress, I have hypothesized that a majority of resettlers cling to familiar routines and rely on kin, neighbors and co- ethnics to the extent possible during this stage. I also have hypothesized that they are risk-averse, behaving as if a sociocultural system was a closed system. Although a minority may not be affected, such stage two behavior appears to be associated with at least the initial year or two immediately fol- lowing physical removal.

At least during that initial year, living standards also can be expected to drop to well-planned and well- implemented schemes, since resettlers are faced with

the daunting tasks of familiarizing themselves with a new natural resource base, new neighbors and new government expectations while simultaneously devel- oping new production systems and settling into new homes. Hence the cautious, risk-adverse stance con- tinues for a majority of the first generation of reset- tlers, at least until they have adjusted to their new habitat and gained a measure of household self-suffi- ciency. Then, if new opportunities are available, the third stage of economic development and community formation can begin. The tragedy of most resettle- ment to date is that a majority of resettlers never reach stage three. Rather, as the resettlement process proceeds, they remain, or subsequently become, impoverished. Based on comparative analy- sis of development-induced rural and urban resettle- ment, Cernea has identified eight impoverishment risks (Cernea, 1990 and in press), all of which are applicable to dam relocation. They are: landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization,

increased morbidity, food insecurity, the loss of access to common property and social disarticulation. As a ninth risk, I would add the loss of resiliency.

As for the third stage, I have hypothesized that it is one of the paradoxes of resettlement that after the ini- tially stressful cessation or inapplicability of a wide range of behavioral patterns and indigenous knowl- edge, important statuses and institutions may subse- quently foster a more dynamic process of economic development and community formation. Less inhibit- ed by previously restricting customs (relating, for example, to land tenurial patterns and community rit- uals) and by entrenched leaders, aspiring entrepre- neurs and leaders are apt to find themselves in a more flexible environment. If true, and more

research is required, this finding has important poli- cy implications since attempts by government, NGOs and other institutions to provide appropriate opportu- nities for resettlers and host communities could speed the arrival of stage three and reduce the trau- ma and lower living standards that are associated with stage two. They could also increase project ben- efits by allowing resettlers and hosts to become pro- ject beneficiaries rather than liabilities.

On the other hand, I am aware of no cases where timely external assistance can allow a majority of resettlers to bypass stage two entirely. Involuntary resettlement involves trauma that most resettlers cope with in the conservative fashion described. But

the extent of that trauma can be lessened, and the length of stage two shortened, by the immediate pro- vision, for example, of upgraded educational and medical facilities. Security of tenure is another pre- requisite, whether of housing, land or other impor- tant household and community natural resources.

Joy A. Bilharz’s study of Seneca relocated in the 1950s in connection with Pennsylvania’s Kinzua Dam strongly suggests that resettler participation in the planning, implementation and evaluation of the reset- tlement and development processes has a positive effect on those involved as well as on their children (in press). We are confronted here with a tricky issue since we have cases where participation has under- mined local leadership (since that leadership was seen in the eyes of their constituencies as accepting the undesirable) and where it has strengthened it. How participation can occur and local leaders become involved would appear to be a delicate issue that requires careful comparative research.

Since the early 1980s in the tropics and subtropics, and much earlier in the United States, institution- building for such participation has been facilitated by assisting NGOs whose purview includes developmen- tal as well as environmental and human rights issues. As advocates for potential resettlers, such NGOs, as well as experts hired by local communities, have also been able to bring pressure to bear on governments and donors alike to improve planning and plan imple- mentation in ways that can increase the odds of reset- tlers eventually becoming project beneficiaries.

Where it helps to empower local communities and to improve their capacity to make informed choices, such assistance can be invaluable. In some cases, as with the Orme Dam in the United States, it can even play an important role in stopping projects that would involve destructive resettlement (Khera and Mariella, 1982). Such assistance, however, also involves risks for local communities. That is especially the case where the agendas of NGOs and potential resettlers vary, or where assistance, including legal challenges, not only fails to stop resettlement but increases the associated trauma by prolonging the period of uncer- tainty prior to the move.

Again, it is important to repeat that while the above “improvements” can reduce the trauma associ- ated with stage two, the theory holds that they can-

not eliminate that stage. As for its termination, there are a number of indicators that characterize move- ment toward the third stage of economic develop- ment and community formation. These include the naming of physical features and increased emphasis on community as opposed to household development as reflected in the establishment of funeral and other social welfare associations and places of worship, including churches, temples and mosques. Cultural identity is apt to be reasserted and even broadened, as in the case of Egyptian Nubians resettled in the mid-1960s in connection with the Aswan High Dam (Fernea and Fernea, 1991). Indeed, I hypothesize that stage three tends to be characterized by a resur- gence of cultural symbols, almost a renaissance, as community members reaffirm control over their lives.

As for institutional development, it continues and broadens throughout stage three. Because large dams incorporate project affected people within a wider political economy, the horizons of resettlers expand if new local, regional and national opportuni- ties exist. Economic development is fostered as households increasingly pursue dynamic investment strategies to access those opportunities. Here again, based on comparative analysis, I hypothesize similar trends around the world. Farmers initially begin shift- ing from a reliance on consumption crops to higher value cash crops. Increased emphasis is also placed on the education of children. Production systems at the household level also begin to diversify, not so much as a risk avoidance strategy as earlier, but as a means for reallocating family labor into more lucra- tive enterprises, including livestock management and small-scale nonfarm enterprises. Small businesses are run from the household’s homestead allotment with subsequent expansion to service centers within the resettlement area and, if especially successful, to urban centers, including national capitals, where real estate investments may also be made.

Stage three development must be sustainable into the next generation for the resettlement component to be considered successful. Stage four commences when the next generation of settlers takes over from the pioneers and when that generation is able to com- pete successfully with other citizens for jobs and other resources at both the national and local levels. It is also characterized by the devolution of what man- agement and facilitation responsibilities may be held by specialized resettlement agencies, NGOs and oth-

ers to the community of resettlers and to the various line ministries.

Having relocated the largest number of develop- ment-induced resettlers (40 million since the 1950s in connection with construction projects alone, many of which involve dams) it is significant that China’s first national research center for the study of resettlement issues has evolved a quite similar four-stage frame- work for describing a successful resettlement process (Hohai University, 1996).

DIFFICULTIES IN TRYING TO ACHIEVE