Rules of Proceedings

Each house shall determine its own procedural rules.

Corollary to Congress’ power to make rules is the power to ignore them when circumstances require.

Issues may either be:

Political - on matters affecting only internal operation of the legislature, the legislature’s formulation and implementation of its rules.

Justiciable - when the legislative rule affects private rights. Pacete vs. Sec. of Commission on Appointments (1971)

Facts:

• Felizardo S. Pacete alleged that he was appointed by the then President of the Philippines on August 31, 1964 as Municipal Judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato. He assumed office on September 11, 1964 and discharged his duties as such. As his appointment was made during recess of Congress, it was submitted to the Commission on Appointments at its next session in 1965. Appointment was

unanimously confirmed on May 20, 1965 (with Senate President and Chairman of Commission on Appointments Ferdinand Marcos even sending him a congratulatory telegram). Nine months after his confirmation, on February 7, 1966, the then Secretary of Justice advised petitioner to vacate his position as municipal judge. Petitioner was informed that on May 21, 1965, Senator Rodolfo Ganzon (a member of the Commission on Appointments) wrote to its Chairman stating that he was filing a motion for reconsideration of the appointment in view of derogatory information which he had received.

Ruling/Doctrine:

• The controlling principle is supplied by Altarejos v. Molo, which interpreted Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of the Commission on Appointments, which reads: “Resolution of the Commission on any

&+" appointment may be reconsidered on motion by a member presented

not more than one (1) day after their approval. If a majority of the members present concur to grant a reconsideration, the appointment may be laid on the table, this shall be a final disposition of such a motion.” Holding of the Court was that the mere filing of a reconsideration did not have the effect of setting aside a

confirmation. In the case, Aldeguer’s (respondent in Altarejos case) theory would give to the mere filing of a motion for reconsideration the effect which it would have if the motion approved, and hence, would dispense with the necessity of such approval, for which the concurrence of a majority of the members present is necessary. This is inconsistent with Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of the Commission.

o In case of an adjournment sine die the period for filing the motion for reconsideration having expired, under Section 22, then the motion for reconsideration not having been acted upon is not approved and therefore, has no effect whatsoever.

o What is decisive is that a confirmation duly made is not nullified simply by a motion of reconsideration being filed, without its being voted upon and approved.

• “The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the CA or until the next adjournment of Congress.”

o A distinction is made between the exercise of such presidential prerogative requiring confirmation by the CA when Congress is in session and when it is in recess. In the former, the President nominates, and only upon the consent of the CA may the person assume office. As with ad interim appointments, the appointment takes effect at once. The appointment is effective until disapproval by the CA or until the next adjournment in Congress. There must either be a rejection by the CA or nonaction on its part.

Arroyo vs. De Venecia (1997) Facts:

• Petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the

National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called “sin taxes” on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes.

• The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was approved on third reading and transmitted to the Senate which approved it with certain amendments on third reading on. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. • The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the

House at 8 a.m. on November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellated. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and asked for a head count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo appealed the ruling of the Chair, but his motion was defeated when put to a vote. The interpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded.

• Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did.

• On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.

• Petitioners’ principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House; that these rules embody the “constitutional mandate” in Art. VI, §16(3) that “each House may determine the rules of its proceedings” and that, consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation of the Constitution itself. They contend that the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and spurious. • Respondents’ defense is anchored on the principle of separation of

powers and the enrolled bill doctrine. Ruling/Doctine:

&!" • What is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No.

8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law. Therefore, it cannot be subject to judicial review.

• The case does not present a situation in which a branch of the government has “gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction” so as to call for the exercise of the Court’s power. • Petitioners were not prevented from seeking reconsideration. • Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the

Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and the

certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. Osmeña vs Pendatun, supra

Ruling/Doctrine:

• The House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if the Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmeña's conduct constituted disorderly behavior, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it has been said, has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.

- "The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, subject only to such limitations as are found in the Republic's Constitution. So that any power deemed to be legislative by usage or tradition, is necessarily possessed by the Philippine Congress, unless the Constitution provides otherwise." (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192, 212.) D. Power over members and right to sit

Vera vs. Avelino (1946)

Facts:

• Petitioners (Jose Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose Romera – Nacionalista party) were elected among the top 16 senators in the April 1946 elections. However, due to the rampant terrorism and violence in the provinces of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac; the senate approved the Pendatun resolution ordering petitioners not be sworn, nor seated as members of the Senate pending the investigation. If the votes cast for the petitioners in the said regions were to be nullified, they would not get enough votes to claim their seats in Senate. It was alleged that the voting in the mentioned provinces did not reflect the true and free expression of the popular will.

Ruling/Doctrine:

• The Senate has not exceeded its powers. The senate did not usurp the powers of the Electoral Tribunal. Independent of a constitutional or statutory grant, the Senate has, under parliamentary practice, the power to inquire into the credentials of any member and the latter’s rights to participate in its deliberations. The constitution provides limits upon the plenary rights of the legislative. The Electoral Tribunal on the other hand, is given jurisdiction over all contests relating to elections.

• The Senate as a branch of the legislative department had the constitutional power to adopt rules for its proceedings, and by legislature practice, it can create orders in preserving its prestige and dignity. The Senate made no error in putting into probability the Electoral Tribunal annulling the election returns in the provinces mentioned earlier where there was widespread violence. It was an exercise of the authority, discretion, and inherent power of self- preservation (initiated by dictates of precaution or public policy). • The Senate was avoiding undesirable results from the participation of

disqualified members in its deliberations. Pendatun Resolution entry: In order to maintain alive the respect for democratic institutions among our people, no man or group of men should be permitted to profit from the results of an election held under coercion, in violation of law and contrary to the principle of freedom of choice which should underline all elections under the Constitution. E. Discipline of Members

&#" Each House may punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the

concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members: • Suspension (not exceeding sixty days). • Expulsion.

Other disciplinary measures:

1. Deletion of unparliamentary remarks from the record. 2. Fine

3. Imprisonment 4. Censure

Alejandrino vs. Quezon (1924) Facts:

• A resolution was adopted by the Philippine Senate composed of the respondent Senators, on February 5, 1924, depriving Senator

Alejandrino of all the prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments of his office for the period of one year from the first of January, 1924 for disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of the privileges of the Senate for having assaulted the Honorable Vicente de Vera, Senator for the Sixth District.

• Petitioner contends that the resolution above quoted is unconstitutional and entirely of no effect, for five reasons.

• By special appearance, the Attorney-General, in representation of the respondents, has objected to the jurisdiction of the court, and later, by demurrer, has pressed the same point.

• This is, in effect, a suit instituted by one member of the Philippine Senate against the Philippine Senate and certain of its official employees.

Ruling/Doctrine:

• Because of the separation of powers, the general rule of mandamus is that the writ will not lie from one branch of the government to a coordinate branch, for the very obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other. Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members, or its officers, to compel the performance of duties purely legislative in their character which therefore pertain to their legislative functions and over which they have exclusive control. The courts cannot dictate action in this respect without a gross usurpation of power.

• Precedents have held that where a member has been expelled by the legislative body, the courts have no power, irrespective of whether the expulsion was right or wrong, to issue a mandate to compel his reinstatement.

Osmeña vs Pendatun, supra Ruling/Doctrine:

• Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two- thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.

• For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been, or could be censured, committed to prison, suspended, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. The practice and the traditional power of legislative assemblies to take, disciplinary action against its members, including imprisonment, suspension or

expulsion have been recognized in the United States. The Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that the parliamentary practices of the Congress of the United States shall apply in a supplementary manner to its proceedings.

Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan (2001) Facts:

• Petition for Review on Certiorari of a Decision of the Sandiganbayan to preventively suspend petitioner in connection with pending criminal cases filed against her for alleged violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019).

Ruling/Doctrine:

• Sandiganbayan had authority to order the petitioner’s preventive suspension.

o It is a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon the determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of course. o Preventive suspension is not a penalty because it is not

imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. Section 13 does not state that the public officer must be suspended only in

&$" the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts

with which he has been charged.

o The requirement of valid information does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-

suspension proceeding before a trial on the merits proceeds. o It does not contemplate a proceeding to determine the

strength of the evidence of culpability against him, the gravity of the offense charged, or whether or not his

continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence before the court have a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the accused is the adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against him.

• RA 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.

De Venecia va. Sandiganbayan (2002) Facts:

On 12 March 1993, an Information (docketed as Criminal Case 18857) was filed with the Sandiganbayan (First Division) against then Congressman Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., of Agusan del Sur for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). After the accused pleaded not guilty, the prosecution filed a “Motion To Suspend The Accused Pendente Lite.” In its Resolution dated 6 June 1997, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion and ordered the Speaker to suspend the accused. But the Speaker did not comply. Thus, on 12 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution requiring him to appear before it, on 18 August 1997 at 8:00 a.m., to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. Unrelenting, the Speaker filed, through counsel, a motion for reconsideration, invoking the rule on separation of powers and claiming that he can only act as may be dictated by the House as a body pursuant to House Resolution 116 adopted on 13 August 1997. On 29 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution declaring Speaker Jose C. de Venecia, Jr. in contempt of court and ordering him to pay a fine of P10,000.00 within 10 days from notice. Jose de Venecia, Jr., in his capacity as Speaker of the

House of Representatives; Roberto P. Nazareno, in his capacity as Secretary- General of the House of Representatives; Jose Ma. Antonio B. Tuaño, Cashier, House of Representatives; Antonio M. Chan, Chief, Property Division, House of Representatives, filed the petition for certiorari. Ruling/Doctrine:

• As held in Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al., it was held that the doctrine of separation of powers does not exclude the members of Congress from the mandate of RA 3019. The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon a determination by the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member. The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively excluded members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes that each of the three co-equal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government – the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary – has exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively

prevents one branch from unduly intruding into the internal affairs of either branch.