Indeed, public works was another key program of Soustelle's that would become another structural element shaping the army’s strategic culture. At the end of 1955, he developed a new financing plan for public works projects and disseminated the framework to prefects in Algiers, Bone, Constantine, and Oran. Specifically, the plan created a new source of funding for projects –such as school-building– that were not sufficiently supported under the old budgeting structure, “TIC” (Travaux d'Initiative Communale – Communal Works Initiative). The two new “rubrics” under which projects were grouped were “Special Equipment Program for Accelerating the Modernization of Specific Rural Areas” and “Communal Works Initiative for Village Administrative Equipment,” presumably programs that could cover a large umbrella of projects. Money for regular TIC projects could be used for any community, but the Special Program
93 In some cases, like Galula’s, the commanding officer desired companies to stay consolidated when possible rather than split up to reach more villages. Galula split two of his platoons out to remote sites over time. Galula, Pacification in Algeria, 95-100.
money could be used only for the “mixed communities” (inhabited by Muslims,
administered by a Frenchman) and for the municipal centers related to them.94 Later, in 1956, the new administrator Robert Lacoste would expand upon this program under an “Emergency Program.”95
Now that funding was in place for the army to conduct public works projects, there was the expectation that the army would begin spending time and energy on these programs. The commanding general, General Lorillot, wanted to know exactly how the army was following Soustelle’s guidance. In early 1956, he issued a seemingly minor order that would have large repercussions for army operations: commanders were required to report on their pacification operations within each and every daily bulletin.96 Referencing this memorandum, Colonel Tabouis, Lorillot’s chief of psychological operations, wrote his divisional bureau chiefs along the same lines. He explained that it was in the army's best interest to publicize the extent of activities that occurred beyond the narrow field of policing. In particular, bureau chiefs were also expected to submit reports of pacification activities weekly, which could include “repairs of destruction and sabotage, new construction, help to economic activity (farms, industry, roadways), aid to the populations affected by terrorism or natural calamities, medical assistance, etc.” Tabouis would then ensure these activities would be publicized through press releases.97 These orders had a two-fold effect. First, by creating mandatory and regular reporting
94 Maurice Cuttoli, Equipment des régions rurales, December 1, 1955, 1H 2538, SHAT. 95 P Chaussade, Application d’un programme d'urgence, July 9, 1956, 1H 2538, SHAT. 96 Henri Lorillot, Note du Service: Bulletins quotidiens, 1956, 1H 2538, SHAT.
requirements, commanders knew the areas in which they would be expected to demonstrate continual progress. Second, Tabouis’s interest in publicizing divisional efforts could have created a certain competitive atmosphere among commanders determined to ensure their areas did not go without regular press releases (which would of course boost the commander’s reputation, if not indicate actual progress).
Since these programs had no explicit endstate or time period for completion, and commanders were now forced to submit daily progress reports, there was the potential for this program to absorb more time and effort from commanders than Lorillot and Soustelle may have intended. The constant generation of public works programs became a
structural element that field commanders had to deal with routinely. The public works program policy fits my definition of structural element because commanders had to adapt their forces, and exert time and energy creating public works, in order to please the needs of higher headquarters, but these public works were not directly linked to combat
operations or explicitly tied to local progress for those commanders. While there is no doubt that Soustelle and Lorillot believed the army would achieve some vague local improvements by improving quality of life for villagers, the addition of a specific reporting requirement for all commanders to comply with meant that every area in Algeria now needed public works projects. It became the program for every commander to follow, not an initiative suited better to some areas than others. Although commanders could choose how they wanted to follow it, this program became a sales game: numbers and production of public works would look good at higher headquarters and indicate progress, even if the numbers and projects were not actually tied to any local measure of improved security or compliance with French policies. Later, the command in Algiers
would disseminate matrices to record accomplishments (schools built, roads improved, enemy killed) in a numerical format, making it quite easy for higher command to compare efficacy of units, depending on how one interpreted the data.98 The end result was that while public works projects might have been exactly what every local area needed, the measure of success was the volume and size of projects, not necessarily whether those projects generated desired effects in establishing or maintaining peace. To complicate matters, if an area really needed a focus on combat operations, the local commander would not be as free to pursue that option because he would be tied to producing daily progress reports on his public works projects.
In early 1957, the army estimated the cost and benefits of the public works programs both in labor and capital-equivalent costs. The public works programs
conducted in 1956 cost 19 billion francs in contracts and provided a benefit of about 18.5 billion francs worth of soldier and local Algerian worker hours. (See Figure 3)
Additionally, soldiers injected roughly 50 billion francs into the local economy through spending.
98 For example, does fewer enemy killed in one sector vice another mean that one commander is less capable in finding the enemy or that he has pacified his area better?