Content Role
2.4 Self-Respect
A second ideal that is relevant to normative discussions about work is self-respect. Throughout, I utilise a functional definition of self-respect, whereby an individual
enjoys self-respect only if she has a sufficient level of confidence in her own convictions such that, amongst other things, she is able to have, to revise, and
rationally to pursue her own ambitions.45 Self-respect is a political-ideal-based interest.
It is an interest that is intimately tied to the ideal of political citizenship and, in
particular, it is an interest that an individual has in virtue of having an interest in being a free and equal participant in a fair scheme of social cooperation.
2.4.1
The Social Bases of Self-Respect
Self-respect is a psychological phenomenon. An individual enjoys self-respect only if,
as a psychological matter, she enjoys sufficient confidence in her convictions to be able to have, to revise, and rationally to pursue her own ambitions. In an important sense,
therefore, it is irrelevant whether or not an individual feels as if her self-respect is being denied. Two cases illustrate this point. First, an individual may lack sufficient
confidence in her convictions but not realize it. Second, she may believe that she lacks sufficient confidence in her convictions without this in fact being the case.
The demandingness of self-respect depends greatly upon empirical information regarding how certain factors affect individuals’ self-confidence. It is plausible that a
key determinant of an individual’s self-respect is the attitude of those with whom she interacts, including her friends, family, co-workers, employers, and customers, for
example. Indeed, as Rawls notes ‘unless our endeavors are appreciated by our associates it is impossible for us to maintain the conviction that they are worthwhile’.46
Rawls further supports this by adding that the appreciation of others tends ‘to reduce the likelihood of failure and…provide support against the sense of self-doubt when
mishaps occur’.47 This is why stigmatisation is so damaging to self-respect.
45 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 386. 46 Ibid., 387.
These ideas are related to, but distinct from, claims about prejudice. An individual is a victim of prejudice if she is a victim of treatment motivated by the belief
that she has less than equal moral worth. Very often, prejudice leads to stigmatisation such that it damages the self-respect of the victim. This is most obviously true of many
kinds of racist or sexist prejudice. But, this need not always be the case. An individual may be a victim of prejudice but she may be otherwise entirely unaffected by this; she
may even be unaware of others’ beliefs. When this is the case, the prejudice does not damage her self-respect, and so cannot be unjust for these reasons. To be sure, this is
not to say that such prejudice is not unjust; it is unjust.48 The simple point is that it is
unjust for reasons unrelated to self-respect. It is in one way easier to theorise about
prejudice than it is to theorise about stigma. We ought simply to stamp out prejudice and, providing we have in place a decent education system, we can expect of each
individual that she believe in the equal moral worth of all individuals.49 Stigmatisation is
much more complicated.
One apparently obvious way in which to protect the interest in self-respect is to assert that every individual is entitled to appreciation of her endeavours from others.
A problem with this move is that it would be self-defeating, since an individual’s self- respect relies upon others’ appreciation being genuine rather than artificial in the sense
described. If an individual knows that others appreciate her endeavours only because they are duty-bound to do so, the appreciation is unlikely to have the psychological
effect necessary for securing self-respect. For this reason, we must develop an alternative approach.
48 I defend this conviction more fully in Adam Slavny and Tom Parr, ‘Harmless Discrimination’, Legal
Theory (forthcoming).
49 For further discussion of the appropriate response to prejudice, see Daniel Halliday, ‘Inheritance and Hypothetical Insurance’, (unpublished manuscript).
Instead, we can focus on the variety of political and social factors that are conducive to securing self-respect. Again, Rawls makes this move, when he refers to
the social bases of self-respect.50 My aim in the remainder of this section is to elaborate on
this idea and to highlight areas that are of specific relevance to an account of justice in
work.
2.4.2
Self-Respect and Work
Commenting on the relationship between the social bases of self-respect and work in particular, Gerald Doppelt notes that ‘Social research concerning work strongly
suggests that the injuries to self-respect in the labor process partly stems from the self- stultification implicit in its most powerless positions’.51 By this, Doppelt means to refer
both to the fact that many workers feel that they are treated as if they are not responsible agents – as if they are mere cogs in a machine, so to speak – and to the fact
that many workers then internalise this message, which jeopardises their self-respect. Sociologists and psychologists highlight a number of properties of various
arrangements of work that predictably have this deleterious effect on workers’ self- respect. Rather than survey this literature, I shall instead mention and clarify only two
of these properties, both of which relate to inegalitarian social relationships.52
50 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 478.
51 Gerald Doppelt, ‘Rawls’ System of Justice: A Critique from the Left’, Noûs, 15 (1981), 259-307 at 273. 52 For summaries, see Gomberg, ‘Justice and Work’; Hsieh, ‘Justice in Production’. For further analysis, see Melvin L. Kohn and Carmi Schooler, ‘The Reciprocal Effects of the Substantive Complexity of Work and Intellectual Flexibility: A Longitudinal Assessment’, American Journal of Sociology, 84 (1978), 24- 52; Kohn and Schooler, Work and Personality, esp. 204-07; and Arthur Kornhauser, Mental Health of the Industrial Work (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965).
First, let’s consider an arrangement in which a worker enjoys to a much lesser extent than others the capacity to exert control over her own working life, as well as
the working lives of colleagues. The resulting social relationships between this worker and her colleagues are inegalitarian in the sense that there is an unequal distribution of
the capacity to control others’ lives. Inequalities of this kind are significant because, as Rawls points out, they tend to produce ‘deference and servility on one side and a will
to dominate and arrogance on the other’.53 At least under certain conditions, this
deference and servility may be great enough to undermine an individual’s confidence in
her convictions to such a degree that it threatens her self-respect.
Second, let’s consider an arrangement in which an individual feels stigmatised.
This involves an inegalitarian relationship in so far as she feels looked down upon by others. One possibility is that this arrangement is one of the principal purposes of
some kinds of work. Indeed, Muirhead claims that it may even be the sole purpose of some forms of work, including, for example, some instances of the wealthy’s
employment of domestic servants.54 Whilst it is not plausible that this is ever the sole
purpose of this kind of employment, Muirhead is no doubt correct to allude to the fact
that it may be one of the main purposes of some forms of work. To be sure, the point is not (only) that the wealthy employ domestic servants in part because it gives them
the opportunity to look down on their servants. Rather, there is the further idea that, by employing these servants, the wealthy are able to uphold a wider social hierarchy
that enables them to look down upon others in a more general way.
53 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 131. See also Hsieh, ‘Justice in Production’, 91-2. For a more general discussion of what is objectionable about inequalities in the distribution of control over others’ lives, see T. M. Scanlon, The Difficulty of Tolerance: Essays in Political Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 202-18.
A second possibility is that, though the work provides an opportunity for others to look down upon an individual, this is not the purpose of the work. Perhaps
this is the case with dirty work. Despite often carrying out socially important tasks, workers who perform dirty work are often stigmatised by members of their society.55
Though, in some cases, this stigma results from displays of prejudice, in many cases it does not. It most often results from the fact that these workers feel as if others do not
appreciate their efforts.56 As I noted above, stigmatisation of this kind is a clear threat
to self-respect.
It is important for us to keep apart the different ways in which various arrangements of work threaten self-respect. This is because the appropriate responses
to each of these differ. The obvious response to an unequal distribution of the capacity to control others’ lives may be to intervene so as to ensure that workplace relationships
do not possess this property. I examine and defend this claim in detail in the next chapter. The obvious response to arrangements of work that involve stigmatisation is
to try to shape public culture, through the use of civic education, say, so as to minimise the likelihood of stigmatisation. As Richard Arneson notes, the stigmatisation that
many workers suffer is a result of ‘cultural beliefs that could be changed and perhaps ought to be changed…perhaps an egalitarian norm ought to reject this way of
thinking’.57 Moreover, depending upon how time-intensive, physically intensive, and
mentally unengaging her work is, an individual may also be able to achieve self-respect
55 Walzer, Spheres of Justice, 175-8. In his study of different kinds of dirty work, Stephen Ackroyd notes that exposure to dirt is not sufficient for stigmatisation. Stigmatisation typically occurs ‘only by handling large amounts of dirt and/or potent pollutants’. See Stephen Ackroyd, ‘Dirt, Work and Dignity’, in Sharon Bolton (ed.), Dimensions of Dignity at Work (Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2007), 31.
56 Ackroyd, ‘Dimensions of Dignity at Work’. 57 Arneson, ‘Is Work Special? ‘, 1133.
through her pursuits outside of work, providing that others are willing to recognise these pursuits. As Arneson again points out:
there are ways to gain self-esteem other than job performance. Individuals can be dedicated to pursuing avocations, cultivating friendships, carrying out duties of family life in exemplary fashion, attaining some virtue or recognized excellence of achievement, or working in free time for a cause one respects. Any of these and many other projects can be sources of self-esteem obtainable independently of the quality of one’s employment and on-the-job experiences.58
By ‘self-esteem’, Arneson has in mind what I call ‘self-respect’.59
Importantly, these suggestions are not vulnerable to the objection that they are
self-defeating. The present response does not utilise a duty to recognise these pursuits; rather, it states that we must shape the political and social environment so as to
increase the likelihood that individuals themselves recognise the value in others’ pursuits. The appreciation that an individual feels from others is, therefore, more likely
to be experienced as genuine in the relevant sense.
A more threatening objection claims that these suggestions are sociologically
naïve. As a sociological fact, perhaps it is not possible – or, at least, it is very difficult – to change public culture without greater reform of society’s economic institutions.60
Though potentially forceful, I shall not address this objection here. This is for two reasons.First, it would require too great a departure from the present set of issues.61
58 Ibid., 1132. 59 Ibid., 1146, n. 8.
60 This idea is defended thoroughly in G. A. Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978).
61 For a rejection of one of the premises on which this objection is based, see Paula Casal, ‘Marx, Rawls, Cohen, and Feminism’, Hypatia (forthcoming).
Second, my aim in this section – and, indeed, in this chapter – is not to defend in any particular view about how to arrange and to distribute work. My aim is more modest
than this. It is simply to draw attention to various questions that any complete account of justice in work must answer, thereby laying the foundations for further inquiry.