3 Rawls at Work
3.8 The Difference Principle
When theorising about how we should distribute society’s burdens and benefits, Rawls
begins by considering a society characterised by strict equality, such that there are no inequalities between individuals in the distribution of social primary goods. This
possibility has considerable intuitive appeal and, partly for this reason, represents the baseline against which we must justify social and economic inequalities. Significantly,
though, Rawls believes that some departures from this baseline may be justifiable. In particular, he writes:
Society should take into account economic efficiency and the requirements of organization and technology. If there are inequalities in income and wealth, and differences in authority and degrees of responsibility, that work to make everyone better off in comparison with the benchmark of equality, why not permit them?88
On the basis of this, Rawls affirms the difference principle, which holds that social and
economic inequalities, measured in terms of a range of social primary goods, are ‘to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society’.89
I should add four qualifications to this claim. First, the difference principle does not say that we are required by justice to accept inequalities that make everyone
better off in comparison with the benchmark of equality. Rather, justice permits these inequalities.90 Second, according to the difference principle, a given level of inequality is
just only if there is no alternative arrangement under which the least advantaged fare better.91 Third, the difference principle is silent with respect to whether or not the
inequalities it sanctions are in some sense regrettable, even though just.
88 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 130-1. 89 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 42-3.
90 I put to one side the many complications discussed in Andrew Williams, ‘The Revisionist Difference Principle’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 25 (1995), 257-81.
91 The difference principle defines the least advantaged anonymously, such that an inequality is not necessarily unjust if, for a given disadvantaged individual, there is an alternative arrangement under which she fares better. What matters is that no alternative arrangement under which the least advantaged fare better, whoever they may be.
Finally, the difference principle does not govern the distribution of all social primary goods. This is because prior principles, such as the principle of basic liberties,
govern the distribution of some social primary goods. For example, the difference principle would not recommend increasing the position of the least advantaged if we
could achieve this only via the use of means that deny some individuals the social bases of self-respect, and thus violate the principle of basic liberties. Relatedly, some claim
that the difference principle governs the distribution of income and wealth only, such that it concerns the position of the least advantaged measured in terms of income and
wealth alone. This is inaccurate. Rawls is explicit that the difference principle ranges over ‘social and economic inequalities’, that it applies also ‘to the design of institutions
that make use of difference in authority and responsibility’,92 and that the social
primary goods that vary in their distribution ‘are the rights and prerogatives of
authority, and income and wealth’.93 The difference principle governs the distribution
of an index of social primary goods, including income and wealth as well as advantaged
social positions or, in Rawls’s terms, powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of authority and responsibility.94
3.8.1
The Difference Principle and a Detailed Division of Labour
Several Rawlsian theorists invoke the difference principle in order to support
objections to certain arrangements of work. Arnold and O’Neill each offer arguments of this kind, which purport to establish that a detailed division of labour violates the
92 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 53. 93 Ibid., 80.
principle.95 A detailed division of labour obtains when ‘job complexity, responsibility,
and authority [are distributed] very unequally across producers’.96 This distribution of
work arises in hierarchical organisations and undemocratic organisations, as well as perhaps other kinds of organisations. It is the kind of organisation of work that is
advocated by economists and engineers such as Frederick Taylor.97
A detailed division of labour is interesting from the Rawlsian perspective for at
least two reasons. First, in virtue of distributing responsibility and authority very unequally, a detailed division of labour produces unequally advantaged social positions.
This is significant because, as I earlier noted, advantaged social positions feature in the index of social primary goods whose distribution is subject to evaluation by the
difference principle.98 Thus, in order for a detailed division of labour to be just, these
social inequalities must be distributed in a way that satisfies the difference principle.99
Second, a detailed division of labour distributes job complexity and variety unequally. Whereas one individual’s work involves complex and varied activities,
another’s work does not. The distribution of job complexity and variety is relevant for two reasons. First, drawing upon my remarks in section 2.4.2, we should note that
unskilled, repetitive, and simple work can threaten self-respect because the worker may internalise the idea that she is not a responsible agent – that she is a cog in a machine,
95 Arnold, ‘The Difference Principle at Work’; and O’Neill, ‘Three Rawlsian Routes Towards Economic Democracy’.
96 Arnold, ‘The Difference Principle at Work’, 109.
97 Frederick Taylor, ‘Principles of Scientific Management’ (Sioux Falls, SD.: Nuvision Press, 2007 [1911]).
98 It is noteworthy that, for Rawls, one reason why social inequalities are bad is because they make ‘peoples’ lives less good than they might otherwise be’.See Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 131.
so to speak. To this extent, we can explain the injustice of this feature of a detailed division of labour by referring to the principle of basic liberties, rather than by
referring to the difference principle. This is because it is stipulated that the principle of basic liberties is sufficient to satisfy each individual’s interest in the social bases of self-
respect.
Second, as Arnold argues, it may be that job complexity and variety is itself a
distinct social primary good.100 Job complexity and variety is distinct from advantaged
social positions in that, whereas the former concern intellectual demandingness, the
latter concerns positions of authority and responsibility. Moreover, job complexity and variety seems also to pass both the all-purpose means test and the publicity test. Or,
more precisely, job complexity and variety seems to fare as well with respect to these tests as other social primary goods, including income and wealth. Regarding the all-
purpose means test, job complexity and variety is a property that to which many individuals attach some importance; and, regarding the publicity test, though there may
be some debate about precisely which properties make one job more complex and varied than another, it is clear that, whichever set of properties we settle on, their
distribution will be publicly verifiable. If we are correct to treat job complexity and variety in the same way as income and wealth, then similarly the demands of the
difference principle should be sensitive to its distribution also.
It is clear, then, that a detailed division of labour produces inequalities that are
relevant to the difference principle. In order for a detailed division of labour to be just, therefore, these inequalities must maximally serve the interests of the least advantaged.
One way in which a defender of a detailed division of labour may seek to justify these inequalities is by pointing to the efficiency gains that a detailed division of labour
makes possible.101 The argument goes as follows: though a detailed division of labour
produces unequally advantaged social positions and reduces job complexity and
variety, the system maximally benefits the position of the least advantaged because it generates economic gains that are made possible by a detailed division of labour
only.102 Moreover, these economic gains are said to compensate for the unequally
advantaged social positions and reduced job complexity and variety that the detailed
division of labour brings about.
There are at least two problems with this argument. First, in many industries, it
is not clear that a detailed division of labour produces any economic gains. John Tomasi, who is sympathetic to this argument, concedes that ‘New more flexible forms
of workplace management are replacing the rigid, hierarchical structures of the factory system’.103 Clarifying this idea, he adds:
the workplace cultures of high-technology enterprises such as Apple Inc. or high- flying start-ups such as Google are famous for encouraging creativity and innovation. Within western societies, the old industrial capitalism is being supplanted by more decentralized and micro-market-orientated forms of capitalism.…In this new economy, increases in value tend to be the result of innovation driven primarily by creative individuals and teams, rather than simply the product of machines and unskilled workers backed by massed capital.104
101 Tomasi, Free Market Fairness.
102 Arnold, ‘The Difference Principle at Work’, 109.
103 Tomasi, Free Market Fairness, 64-5. In support of this, Tomasi cites: Arnold Kling and Nick Schulz,
From Poverty to Prosperity: Intangible Assets, Hidden Liabilities, and the Lasting Triumph over Scarcity (New York: Encounter Books, 2009); and John Roberts, The Modern Firm: Organisational Design for Performance and Growth (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). See also John Budd, Employment with a Human Face: Balancing Efficiency, Equity, and Voice (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2004).
In other words, economic gains often go hand-in-hand with both equally advantaged social positions and high levels of job complexity and variety. When this is the case, it
is not necessary to introduce further social inequalities and/or to reduce job complexity and variety in order to make possible economic gains. When this is the
case, a detailed division of labour is unjust, according to the difference principle. Though compelling in some industries, this response will not be compelling in
all industries. In many industries, that is, economic gains are made possible only by introducing measures that produce unequally advantaged social positions and reduce
job complexity or variety.105 For this reason, we need a second response. This response
acknowledges that a detailed division of labour sometimes produces economic gains,
but it denies that these gains are sizeable, or, more specifically, it denies that they are of
sufficient size to defeat the specified losses. In many cases it will be preferable to take a
hit to economic efficiency, understood in terms of the production of material resources, when doing so is necessary to protect against introducing further social
inequalities and/or reducing job complexity and variety.
In support of this conclusion, Arnold asks us to consider having to choose
between the following:
a simple, unskilled job nestled in the base of a towering, undemocratic pyramid of command, but which pays pretty well; or a lower-paying job that activates your judgment, calls upon your capacities for self-government and sociability, and develops in you a range of skills and abilities that transfer to a host of non-work activities?106
105 In fact, Tomasi’s point is not even true in the case of Apple Inc. and high-flying start-ups such as Google, once we factor in their global operations and assemblers in, say, China, which in many cases make extensive use of a detailed division of labour.
Faced with this choice, we can safely assume that most people would opt for the latter job. In order to ensure that this is the case, we could further stipulate that the
inequality in pay between the two jobs is very small. When this is the case, the vast majority of individuals would forego the economic gains associated with a detailed
division of labour in order to protect against its associated losses. This result makes use of the idea that the difference principle tracks an index of social primary goods rather
than only income and wealth (though I shall say more about this in the next section). I have outlined two responses to those who defend a detailed division of
labour on the grounds that the economic gains it makes available adequately compensate for the losses in terms of other goods that it produces. The first response
denies that a detailed division of labour is necessary to produce these economic gains. This response is compelling in some, but not all, cases. The second response states
that, even when the first response is not compelling, the economic gains made possible by a detailed division of labour do not adequately compensate for the losses it
produces. An implication of this is that a detailed division of labour is unjust according to the difference principle. This conclusion is important as it illustrates one way in
which the difference principle yields conclusions that are of specific relevance to an account of justice in work.
3.8.2
Extending the Difference Principle
We can extend the difference principle further in order to yield more determinate
recommendations regarding the just arrangement and distribution of work. One possibility is to include within the index of social primary goods a concern for
presents the most sustained case in defence of this move.107 She begins by noting that
discretionary time is equally as generally necessary for the effective pursuit of one’s
ambitions as material resources, such as income and wealth.108 This ensures that
discretionary time passes the all-purpose means test.
Discretionary time also passes the publicity test. Though we lack sufficient information to be able to make fine-grained judgments in a range of cases, it is often
clear which individuals have more or less discretionary time. An individual who has to hold down two or three jobs in order to make ends meet clearly has less discretionary
time compared to a very wealthy individual who retires in her thirties. If discretionary time is as epistemically accessible as I suggest, then we may attribute to it the same
status that we attribute to other social primary goods, such as income and wealth. We can accept Rose’s central claim – a claim about the how discretionary time
should figure within the index of social primary goods whose distribution is governed by the difference principle – without having to accept her specific account of
discretionary time. In particular, I mean to focus on Rose’s definition of discretionary time as time ‘when one is not engaged in activities that are objectively necessary to
meet one’s own, orone’s dependents’, basic needs’.109 For the purposes of operationalising
the difference principle, it may be relevant that some people with dependents are
responsible for having them, and this may weaken or cancel their claims on resources that are supported by their lack of discretionary time. It is possible that the distribution
of discretionary time would be unjust, according to the difference principle, were it not for the fact the victim of the putative injustice is responsible for her condition.
107 Rose, ‘Money Does Not Guarantee Time’. See also Rawls, ‘Reply to Musgrave and Alexander’, 654; and Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 179.
108 Rose, ‘Money Does Not Guarantee Time’, 442. 109 Ibid., 439 [emphasis added].
Including discretionary time within the index of social primary goods provides additional resources by which to condemn as unjust certain arrangements and
distributions of work. In particular, it suggests that an otherwise just arrangement and distribution of work is unjust when it distributes discretionary time in a way that
violates the difference principle. The principle may therefore provide a basis by which to support measures that regulate the distribution of discretionary time, such as
working time directives, perhaps. This conclusion illustrates a further way in which the difference principle yields conclusions that are of specific relevance to an account of
justice in work.