Some shared conceptions of skill

There appear to be three broad areas of agreement. The first relates to an

approach where skill is said to reside in the person (worker). This approach holds that skill is a property of the person and a function of human capital and is an approach which tends to be adopted by those favouring an ‘economics model’ of skill. In this conception, through the enhancement of human capital (increasing skills in the workforce) positive effects are reflected in industrial productivity (Becker, 1964). This is often referred to as ‘linear’ and embodies the notion that such personal expertise is, and will continue to be the basis for competitive

advantage (Bolton, 2004:21). This is of particular interest to this enquiry as writers such as Drucker (1993) assert that as productivity becomes more dependent on the exercise of specialist knowledge and competences and the ‘knowledge economy’ develops, it will become more dependent on the contributions of such ‘specialist knowledge workers’ in whom the skill is invested.

This understanding of skill as a property of the person may be contrasted with a second conception which sees skill not as a property of the individual but as belonging to society (Collins, 1989:82). In this conception skills and competences belong to the collective knowledge developed in society through its division of labour and skill (Ainley, 1993). This second, sociological approach, carries with it a requirement to examine job design, forms of control, the nature of the employment relationship together with the nature of the task to be undertaken (Littler, 1982). This conception also relates to Braverman’s (1974) concerns that skill is a function related to a job and as such, changes to the nature of employment such as

increasing technology, advances in industrialisation and increased automation contain the potential to produce a process of 'deskilling’(p p .3 -4 ) through the

application of Fordist and Taylorist principles (Grugulis et al, 2004:3).

This in turn needs contrasting with the view which holds that whilst skill, seen as a property of the task or job may be subject to ‘deskilling’, the opposite view - that through the application of technologies and access to education - ‘upskilling’ will come to predominate industrial notions of skill (Bell, 1973:115). There is some evidence within the literature however, that the major tendency with the western labour process is that of ‘deskilling’ and that it has perhaps reached it’s apotheosis with the McDonaldisation of employment practice (Ritzer, 1998; see

also,Thompson, 1989; Baldry et al, 1998; Beirne et al, 1998).

The third broad area of agreement relates to what is expressed in this literature as socially constructed views of skill. Essentially, although there are many variations, this construct arises from the negotiation between the ‘economic actors’ either collectively (as for example in management or union power) or individually (Grugulis et al, 2004:5-6). The intention of such constructions of skill is to advantage particular groupings such as professional bodies or craft unions, by artificially delimiting access to skill and skilled activities (Turner, 1962:108-14; Braverman, 1974:109-112; More, 1980:16). This understanding of skill as a social constructis particularly relevant to this enquiry (and methodologically problematic) and is subjected to a detailed analysis in chapters 6 and 8.

5.2.1 Towards more diverse understandings

Whilst there appears to be broad agreement within the industrial discourse that skill can be a property of the person, a property of the task or job, or a social construction designed to delimit human agency, many substantial differences remain. Mournier (2001) argues that searching for homogeneous and substantive definitions of skill is fruitless in that there is not one single logic which allows definitions of skill to be compared through time and space (p.28). Instead, Mournier advances a notion of ‘three logics’of skill: Technical- related to the exercise of labour power, equipment and methods of production; Behavioural- related to the subordination of employment, and interpersonal relationships within

the context of subordinated labour; and Cognitive - related to the level and type of general education which allows a population to understand and to act in the world (p.28). In this way, technical skillconcerns the development of workers’ potential to perform; behavioural skillprimarily concerns issues associated with the

realisation of labour potential on the job; and (crucially) cognitive skillwhich is functionally related to notions of citizenship and employment - the state’s underlying interest in the capacity of its citizens to engage with work. It is an approach which emphasises the interface between skill, work and education and seeks to structure each of these notions into a skills regime(Mournier, 2001:28). Adler (2004) argues for a two component model of skill: “mastery of the complexity of the tasks required of workers in their jobs, and mastery of the relations that co­ ordinate activity across these tasks” (p.246). He goes on to suggest the social construction of skill should be seen as ‘superstructural overlay’ over the first two componets. In this respect the definitions of Mournier (2001) and Adler (2004) are in broad agreement in that not only do they see the exercise of personal and procedural mastery as constitutive of skilled processes but in positing a form of unifying construction which determines the value, utility and societal conception of skills they open up an interface between skill (as an industrial artefact) and skill (as a social construction). It is an interface which appears to have led to the

development of a new conception of skill. This is considered next.

5.2.2 New ‘Skills’?

It is tempting to think of the broadly consensual understandings of skill within the industrial discourse as conferring some kind of unity. However, to do so would be to mistake the profound differences within the discourse (about which there is some agreement) for an agreement about the nature of skill itself (about which there is little if any agreement). As shown, the discourse contains contra-notions of skill as a property of the person (in that skill is an internal property of the worker), skill as a property of the job (in that it relates to job complexity and is open to market-based adjustments of what constitutes ‘skilled’ activity) and conceptions of skill as a social construction, designed to delimit access to ‘skilled’ occupations and place restrictions on human agency. These last two constructions could hardly be more opposed to conceptions of skill as constitutive of education, suggested by

authors such as Jessup (1991). The first would seem to place skills in the hands of the ‘market’ where their value, utility and function are open to the vicissitudes of economic forces (such as Fordist and Tayrorist tendencies). The second would seem antithetical to any reasonable construction of education which seeks to enable the development personal growth and advancement and to extend (rather than delimit) agency.

What seems apparent from an analysis of the industrial discourse is that there are profound, structural differences and conflicting ideologies which appear to be engaged in a long-standing conflict for hegemonic dominance. Many of the positions appear to be rooted in notions of historical or dialectical materialism or Fordist conception of production, Taylorist ideas of ‘scientific management’ and managerialist conceptions of power, labour, employment and capital. In such circumstances it would perhaps be little more than an interesting aside to the main business of this enquiry were it not that such hegemonic articulations within the industrial discourse appear to have crossed over into the discourse of education. And, through (what appears to be) a ‘Trojan horse’ of ‘transferable’ skills seems to have opened up a new set of inter-discursive antagonisms across several fronts. It is a ‘battle’ which education appears to be loosing.