COMELEC has been granted the power of eminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and the enforcement and administration of election laws by COMELEC must be shown; it is not casually to be assumed.
That the taking is designed to subserve "public use" is not contested by
petitioner PPI. We note only that, under Section 3 of Resolution No. 2772, the free
"COMELEC space" sought by the respondent Commission would be used not only for informing the public about the identities, qualifications and programs of government of candidates for elective o ffice but also for "dissemination of vital election information" (including, presumably, circulars, regulations, notices, directives, etc. issued by COMELEC). It seems to the Court a matter of judicial notice that government offices and agencies (including the Supreme Court) simply purchase print space, in the ordinary course of events, when their rules and regulations, circulars, notices and so forth need officially to be brought to the attention of the general public.
The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment of
"just compensation" (Article III, Section 9).
And apparently the necessity of paying compensation for "COMELEC space" is precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent Commission, whether Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is read as petitioner PPI reads it, as an assertion of authority to require newspaper publishers to "donate"
free print space for COMELEC purposes, or
as an exhortation, or perhaps an appeal, to publishers to donate free print space, as Section 1 of Resolution No. 2772-A attempts to suggest. There is nothing at all to prevent newspaper and magazine publishers from voluntarily giving free print space to COMELEC for the purposes contemplated in Resolution No. 2772.
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 does not, however, provide a constitutional basis for compelling publishers, against their will, in the kind of factual context here present, to provide free print space for COMELEC purposes.
Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.
As earlier noted, the Solicitor General also contended that Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, even if read as compelling publishers to "donate"
"COMELEC space, " may be sustained as a valid exercise of the police power of the state. This argument was, however, made too casually to require prolonged consideration on our part.
Firstly, there was no effort (and apparently no inclination on the part of COMELEC) to show that the police power— essentially a power of legislation — has been constitutionally delegated to
respondent Commission. Secondly, while private property may indeed be validly taken in the legitimate exercise of the police power of the state, there was no attempt to show compliance in the instant case with the requisites of a lawful taking under the police power.
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is a blunt and heavy instrument that purports, without a showing of existence of a national emergency or other imperious public necessity, indiscriminately and without regard to the individual business condition of particular newspapers or magazines located in differing parts of the country, to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers. No attempt was made to demonstrate that a real and palpable or urgent necessity for the taking of print space confronted the COMELEC and that Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 was itself the only reasonable and calibrated response to such necessity available to the COMELEC.
Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the State
.Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, in its present form and as interpreted by COMELEC in its 22 March 1995 letter directives, purports to require print media enterprises to "donate" free print space to
COMELEC. As such, Section 2 suffers from a fatal constitutional vice and must be
set aside and nullified
.•
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. v. COMELEC
Facts:
In the present case, the Court considers the validity of §92 of B.P. Blg. No.
881 against claims that the requirement that radio and television time be given free takes property without due process of law;
that it violates the eminent domain clause of the Constitution which provides for the payment of just compensation; that it denies broadcast media the equal protection of the laws; and that, in any event, it violates the terms of the franchise of petitioner GMA Network, Inc.
Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc.
is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. They are suing as citizens, taxpayers, and registered voters. The other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., operates radio and television broadcasting stations throughout
the Philippines under a franchise granted by Congress.
Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and the 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioner's allegation that it will suffer losses again because it is required to provide free air time is sufficient to give it standing to question the validity of §92.
. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and that to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize a taking which is not "a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private property.
B
.
P.
Blg.
881, (Omnibus Election Code)Sec. 92. Comelec time. — The commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as
"Comelec Time" which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the
candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of the campaign.
(Sec. 46, 1978 EC)
Thus, the law prohibits mass media from selling or donating print space and air time to the candidates and requires the COMELEC instead to procure print space and air time for allocation to the candidates. It will be noted that while §90 of B.P. Blg. 881 requires the COMELEC to procure print space which, as we have held, should be paid for, §92 states that air time shall be procured by the COMELEC free of charge.
Petitioners challenge the validity of
§92 on the ground (1) that it takes property without due process of law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of
media of communication or information during the period of election.