Cases on Eminent Domain

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CASES ON EMINENT DOMAIN

DEVORAH E.

BARDILLON

vsvs..

BARANGAY MASILI

BARANGAY MASILI of

of

Calamba, Laguna,

Res Judicata Res Judicata

Expropriation not capable of pecuniary Expropriation not capable of pecuniary estimation

estimation

Facts:

Two lots measuring 144 square Two lots measuring 144 square meters was to be expropriated by meters was to be expropriated by Bargy Masili for the purpose of Bargy Masili for the purpose of constructing a barangay hall. constructing a barangay hall. However, the barangay and the lot However, the barangay and the lot owners could not agree with the owners could not agree with the purchase price of Php 200,000.

purchase price of Php 200,000.

The first complaint was filed before The first complaint was filed before the

the MTC. MTC. Whereas, Whereas, the the secondsecond complaint was filed before the RTC. complaint was filed before the RTC.

The MTC dismissed the complaint The MTC dismissed the complaint for lack of interest of the petitioner lot for lack of interest of the petitioner lot owners.

owners.

The RTC stated that the MTC has no The RTC stated that the MTC has no jurisdiction over t

jurisdiction over t he case. he case. It also It also ruledruled in favor of Brgy Masili.

in favor of Brgy Masili.

Issue/s:

1.

1. WON the MTC has jurisdictionWON the MTC has jurisdiction over the case of expropriation; over the case of expropriation; 2.

2. WON the State is barred fromWON the State is barred from expropriating the property by expropriating the property by reason of res judicata; and

reason of res judicata; and 3.

3. Legality of entry into the premisesLegality of entry into the premises subject of expropriation.

subject of expropriation.

Ruling:

The SC held that the expropriation The SC held that the expropriation proceedings is within the jurisdiction proceedings is within the jurisdiction

of the RTC because it is incapable of of the RTC because it is incapable of pecuniary esti

pecuniary estimation. mation. As diAs discussed:scussed:

“xx An expropriation suit does not “xx An expropriation suit does not

involve the recovery of a sum of involve the recovery of a sum of money.

money. Rather, Rather, it it deals deals with with thethe exercise by the government of its exercise by the government of its authority and right to take property for authority and right to take property for public

public use. As use. As such, such, it it is is incapable incapable ofof pecuniary

pecuniary estimation estimation and and should should bebe

filed with the regional trial co

filed with the regional trial courts. xx” urts. xx”

As regards to the second issue, the As regards to the second issue, the principle of

principle of res judicatares judicata does not apply does not apply against the inherent powers of the against the inherent powers of the State.

State. The SC The SC has has this this to sto say:ay:

“xx

“xx Res Res judicata judicata literallyliterally means a matter adjudged, means a matter adjudged, judicially

judicially acted acted upon upon or or decided,decided, or

or settled settled by by judgment. judgment. ItIt provides that a final judgment on provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the conclusive as to the rights of the parties

parties and and their their privies; privies; andand constitutes an absolute bar to constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand or cause of same claim, demand or cause of action.

action.

The following are the The following are the requisites of res judicata: (1) the requisites of res judicata: (1) the former

former judgment judgment must must be be final;final; (2) the court that rendered it had (2) the court that rendered it had jurisdiction

jurisdiction over over the the subjectsubject matter and the parties; (3) it is a matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment

judgment on on the the merits; merits; and and (4)(4) there is -- between the first and there is -- between the first and the second actions -- an identity the second actions -- an identity of parties, subject matter and of parties, subject matter and cause of action.

cause of action.

Since the MTC had no Since the MTC had no jurisdiction

jurisdiction over over expropriationexpropriation proceedings,

proceedings, the the doctrine doctrine of resof res judicata finds

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even if the Order of dismissal even if the Order of dismissal may have been an adjudication may have been an adjudication on the merits.

on the merits. xx” xx”

The entry in the premises of the The entry in the premises of the expropriated property was held to be expropriated property was held to be justified by the SC.

justified by the SC. It ruled that:It ruled that:

“xx The requirements for “xx The requirements for

the issuance of a writ of the issuance of a writ of possession

possession in in an an expropriationexpropriation case are expressly and case are expressly and specifically governed by Section specifically governed by Section 2 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of 2 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Civil Procedure. Procedure. On the On the part ofpart of local government units, local government units, expropriation is also governed expropriation is also governed by Section 19 of the Local by Section 19 of the Local Government Code. Accordingly, Government Code. Accordingly, in expropriation proceedings, in expropriation proceedings, the requisites for authorizing the requisites for authorizing immediate entry are as follows: immediate entry are as follows: (1) the filing of a complaint for (1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form expropriation sufficient in form and substance; and (2) the and substance; and (2) the deposit of the amount deposit of the amount equivalent to 15 percent of the equivalent to 15 percent of the fair

fair market market value value of of thethe property

property to to be be expropriatedexpropriated based on its current tax based on its current tax declaration.

declaration.

In the instant case, the In the instant case, the issuance of the Writ of issuance of the Writ of Possession in favor of Possession in favor of respondent after it had filed the respondent after it had filed the Complaint for expropriation and Complaint for expropriation and deposited the amount required deposited the amount required was proper, because it had was proper, because it had complied with the foregoing complied with the foregoing requisites.

requisites.

The issue of the necessity The issue of the necessity of the expropriation is a matter of the expropriation is a matter properly

properly addressed addressed to to the the RTCRTC in the course of the in the course of the expropriation

expropriation proceedings. proceedings. IfIf

petitioner

petitioner objects objects to to thethe necessity of the takeover of her necessity of the takeover of her property,

property, she she should should say say so so inin her Answer to the her Answer to the Complaint.

Complaint. The The RTC RTC has has thethe power

power to to inquire inquire into into thethe legality of the exercise of the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to right of eminent domain and to determine whether there is a determine whether there is a

genuine necessity for it. xx” genuine necessity for it. xx”

PERCIVAL MODAY, ZOTICO MODAY

(deceased) and LEONORA MODAY

vs.

COURT

OF

APPEALS,

JUDGE

COURT

OF

APPEALS,

JUDGE

EVANGELINE S. YUIPCO OF BRANCH 6,

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AGUSAN DEL

SUR

AND

MUNICIPALITY

OF

SUR

AND

MUNICIPALITY

OF

BUNAWAN

Facts:

The Sangguniang Bayan passed a The Sangguniang Bayan passed a resolution authorizing the municipal resolution authorizing the municipal mayor to expropriate 1 hectare mayor to expropriate 1 hectare portion of the property owned by portion of the property owned by Percival

Percival Moday. Moday. The The mayor appmayor approvedroved the said resolution and submitted the the said resolution and submitted the same to Sangguniang Panlalawigan. same to Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

The latter denied the resolution The latter denied the resolution stating that there are other properties stating that there are other properties which may be expropriated.

which may be expropriated.

Notwithstanding the denial of the Notwithstanding the denial of the resiolution by the Sangguniang resiolution by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, the Municipality of Panlalawigan, the Municipality of Bunawan filed a complaint for the Bunawan filed a complaint for the expropriation of the property of expropriation of the property of Moday.

Moday. The The RTC RTC granted granted thethe

municipality’s motion to take municipality’s motion to take

possession of the parcel of lot. possession of the parcel of lot.

The Court of Appeals, upon petition The Court of Appeals, upon petition for certiorari, stated that the public for certiorari, stated that the public

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even if the Order of dismissal even if the Order of dismissal may have been an adjudication may have been an adjudication on the merits.

on the merits. xx” xx”

The entry in the premises of the The entry in the premises of the expropriated property was held to be expropriated property was held to be justified by the SC.

justified by the SC. It ruled that:It ruled that:

“xx The requirements for “xx The requirements for

the issuance of a writ of the issuance of a writ of possession

possession in in an an expropriationexpropriation case are expressly and case are expressly and specifically governed by Section specifically governed by Section 2 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of 2 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Civil Procedure. Procedure. On the On the part ofpart of local government units, local government units, expropriation is also governed expropriation is also governed by Section 19 of the Local by Section 19 of the Local Government Code. Accordingly, Government Code. Accordingly, in expropriation proceedings, in expropriation proceedings, the requisites for authorizing the requisites for authorizing immediate entry are as follows: immediate entry are as follows: (1) the filing of a complaint for (1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form expropriation sufficient in form and substance; and (2) the and substance; and (2) the deposit of the amount deposit of the amount equivalent to 15 percent of the equivalent to 15 percent of the fair

fair market market value value of of thethe property

property to to be be expropriatedexpropriated based on its current tax based on its current tax declaration.

declaration.

In the instant case, the In the instant case, the issuance of the Writ of issuance of the Writ of Possession in favor of Possession in favor of respondent after it had filed the respondent after it had filed the Complaint for expropriation and Complaint for expropriation and deposited the amount required deposited the amount required was proper, because it had was proper, because it had complied with the foregoing complied with the foregoing requisites.

requisites.

The issue of the necessity The issue of the necessity of the expropriation is a matter of the expropriation is a matter properly

properly addressed addressed to to the the RTCRTC in the course of the in the course of the expropriation

expropriation proceedings. proceedings. IfIf

petitioner

petitioner objects objects to to thethe necessity of the takeover of her necessity of the takeover of her property,

property, she she should should say say so so inin her Answer to the her Answer to the Complaint.

Complaint. The The RTC RTC has has thethe power

power to to inquire inquire into into thethe legality of the exercise of the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to right of eminent domain and to determine whether there is a determine whether there is a

genuine necessity for it. xx” genuine necessity for it. xx”

PERCIVAL MODAY, ZOTICO MODAY

(deceased) and LEONORA MODAY

vs.

COURT

OF

APPEALS,

JUDGE

COURT

OF

APPEALS,

JUDGE

EVANGELINE S. YUIPCO OF BRANCH 6,

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AGUSAN DEL

SUR

AND

MUNICIPALITY

OF

SUR

AND

MUNICIPALITY

OF

BUNAWAN

Facts:

The Sangguniang Bayan passed a The Sangguniang Bayan passed a resolution authorizing the municipal resolution authorizing the municipal mayor to expropriate 1 hectare mayor to expropriate 1 hectare portion of the property owned by portion of the property owned by Percival

Percival Moday. Moday. The The mayor appmayor approvedroved the said resolution and submitted the the said resolution and submitted the same to Sangguniang Panlalawigan. same to Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

The latter denied the resolution The latter denied the resolution stating that there are other properties stating that there are other properties which may be expropriated.

which may be expropriated.

Notwithstanding the denial of the Notwithstanding the denial of the resiolution by the Sangguniang resiolution by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, the Municipality of Panlalawigan, the Municipality of Bunawan filed a complaint for the Bunawan filed a complaint for the expropriation of the property of expropriation of the property of Moday.

Moday. The The RTC RTC granted granted thethe

municipality’s motion to take municipality’s motion to take

possession of the parcel of lot. possession of the parcel of lot.

The Court of Appeals, upon petition The Court of Appeals, upon petition for certiorari, stated that the public for certiorari, stated that the public

(4)

purpose for the expropriation is clear purpose for the expropriation is clear from Resolution No. 43-89 and that from Resolution No. 43-89 and that since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur did not declare Agusan del Sur did not declare Resolution No. 43-89 invalid, Resolution No. 43-89 invalid, expropriation of petitioners' property expropriation of petitioners' property could proceed.

could proceed.

Issue:

whether a municipality maywhether a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution which was of a municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan

Panlalawigan

Ruling:

The SC upheld the decision of the The SC upheld the decision of the Court of

Court of Appeals. Appeals. It stated It stated that thethat the only ground by which the Sangguniang only ground by which the Sangguniang Panlalawigan may deny a resolution or Panlalawigan may deny a resolution or an ordinance is the lack of authority. an ordinance is the lack of authority. Thus:

Thus:

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of Municipal Resolution disapproval of Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 is an infirm action which No. 43-89 is an infirm action which does not render said resolution null does not render said resolution null and void. The law, as expressed in and void. The law, as expressed in Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337, grants the Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337, grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to declare a municipal resolution to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is invalid on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to issue. Although Bayan or the Mayor to issue. Although pertaining to

pertaining to a similar a similar provision of provision of lawlaw but different factual milieu then but different factual milieu then obtaining, the Court's pronouncements obtaining, the Court's pronouncements in

in Velazco Velazco v. v. Blas, Blas, where where we we citedcited significant early jurisprudence, are significant early jurisprudence, are applicable to the case at bar.

applicable to the case at bar.

The only ground upon which The only ground upon which a provincial board may a provincial board may declare any municipal declare any municipal

resolution, ordinance, or resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when such order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or resolution, ordinance, or order is "beyond the powers order is "beyond the powers conferred upon the council conferred upon the council or president making the or president making the same." Absolutely no other same." Absolutely no other ground is recognized by the ground is recognized by the law. A strictly legal question law. A strictly legal question is before the provincial is before the provincial board in its consideration of board in its consideration of a municipal resolution, a municipal resolution, ordinance, or order. The ordinance, or order. The provincial

provincial (board's)(board's) disapproval of any disapproval of any resolution, ordinance, or resolution, ordinance, or order must be premised order must be premised specifically upon the fact specifically upon the fact that such resolution, that such resolution, ordinance, or order is ordinance, or order is outside the scope of the outside the scope of the legal powers conferred by legal powers conferred by law. If a provincial board law. If a provincial board passes these limits, it usurp passes these limits, it usurpss

the legislative function of the legislative function of the municipal council or the municipal council or president.

president. Such Such has has beenbeen the consistent course of the consistent course of executive authority.

executive authority.

Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove without the authority to disapprove Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 for the Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power

power to to exercise exercise the the right right of of eminenteminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate said resolution, capacity to promulgate said resolution, pursuant

pursuant to to the the earlier-quoted earlier-quoted Section Section 9 9 ofof B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce, it follows that B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce, it follows that Resolution No. 43-89 is valid and binding Resolution No. 43-89 is valid and binding and could be used as lawful authority to and could be used as lawful authority to petition

petition for for the the condemnation condemnation ofof petitioners' property. petitioners' property. Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337 provides: Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337 provides: Sec. 153. Sangguniang Sec. 153. Sangguniang Panlalawigan Review. Panlalawigan Review. —— (1) (1)

(5)

Within thirty days after Within thirty days after receiving copies of receiving copies of approved ordinances, approved ordinances, resolutions and executive resolutions and executive orders promulgated by the orders promulgated by the municipal mayor, the municipal mayor, the sangguniang panlalawigan sangguniang panlalawigan shall examine the shall examine the documents or transmit documents or transmit them to the provincial them to the provincial attorney, or if there be attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial none, to the provincial fiscal,

fiscal, who who shall shall examineexamine them promptly and inform them promptly and inform the sangguniang the sangguniang panlalawigan

panlalawigan in in writing writing ofof any defect or impropriety any defect or impropriety which he may discover which he may discover therein and make such therein and make such

comments or

recommendations as shall recommendations as shall appear to him proper.

appear to him proper.

(2) If the sangguniang (2) If the sangguniang panlalawigan shall find that panlalawigan shall find that any municipal ordinance, any municipal ordinance, resolution or executive resolution or executive order is beyond the power order is beyond the power conferred upon the conferred upon the sangguniang bayan or the sangguniang bayan or the mayor, it shall declare such mayor, it shall declare such ordinance, resolution or ordinance, resolution or executive order invalid in executive order invalid in whole or in part, entering whole or in part, entering its actions upon the

its actions upon the minutesminutes and advising the proper and advising the proper municipal authorities municipal authorities thereof. The effect of such thereof. The effect of such an action shall be to annul an action shall be to annul the ordinance, resolution or the ordinance, resolution or executive order in question executive order in question in whole or in part. The in whole or in part. The action of the sangguniang action of the sangguniang panlalawigan shall be fi panlalawigan shall be final.nal. xxx

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis(Emphasis supplied.)

supplied.)

Diosdado Lagcao vs Hon Judge

Generosa Labra

Facts:

The Province of Cebu donated 210 The Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to

lots to the City the City of Cebu. of Cebu. Included inIncluded in the

the said said donation donation is is Lot Lot 1029. 1029. InIn 1965, petitioners Lagcao purchased Lot 1965, petitioners Lagcao purchased Lot 1029 in install

1029 in installment basis ment basis from the Cityfrom the City of Cebu.

of Cebu.

The same lots, however, reverted The same lots, however, reverted back to the province and the sale f Lot back to the province and the sale f Lot 1029 to Lagcao was being annulled by 1029 to Lagcao was being annulled by the

the province. province. The The appellate appellate courtcourt ordered the issuance of Deed of Sale in ordered the issuance of Deed of Sale in favor of Lagcao.

favor of Lagcao.

Lagcao initiated demolition Lagcao initiated demolition proceedings against the squatters proceedings against the squatters occupying Lot

occupying Lot 1029. 1029. This was This was enjoinedenjoined by the MTC granting the motion filed by the MTC granting the motion filed by the Province of Cebu.

by the Province of Cebu.

The Province of Cebu filed The Province of Cebu filed expropriation proceedings against expropriation proceedings against Lagcao.

Lagcao. The pThe purpose of urpose of which which is tois to construct in the lots socialized housing. construct in the lots socialized housing.

Issue:

WON the private property mayWON the private property may be expropriated for the purpose of be expropriated for the purpose of socialized housing thereon

socialized housing thereon Ruling:

Ruling:

The SC granted the petition of The SC granted the petition of Lagcao and declared that the purpose Lagcao and declared that the purpose was not public use but is only was not public use but is only beneficial

beneficial to fto few a ew a handful handful few. few. ItIt explained:

explained:

“xx

“xx We have foundWe have found nothing in the records nothing in the records indicating that the City of Cebu indicating that the City of Cebu

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complied strictly with Sections 9 complied strictly with Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279. Ordinance and 10 of RA 7279. Ordinance No. 1843 sought to expropriate No. 1843 sought to expropriate

petitioners’

petitioners’ property property withoutwithout

any attempt to first acquire the any attempt to first acquire the lands listed in (a) to (e) of lands listed in (a) to (e) of Section 9 of RA 7279. Likewise, Section 9 of RA 7279. Likewise, Cebu City failed to establish Cebu City failed to establish that the other modes of that the other modes of acquisition in Section 10 of RA acquisition in Section 10 of RA 7279 were first exhausted. 7279 were first exhausted. Moreover, prior to the passage Moreover, prior to the passage of Ordinance No. 1843, there of Ordinance No. 1843, there was no evidence of a valid and was no evidence of a valid and

definite offer to buy petitioners’ definite offer to buy petitioners’

property

property as as required required by by SectionSection 19 of RA 7160

19 of RA 7160..[20][20] We thereforeWe therefore find

find Ordinance Ordinance No. No. 1843 1843 to to bebe constitutionally infirm for being constitutionally infirm for being

violative of the petitioners’ right violative of the petitioners’ right

to due process. to due process.

It should also be noted It should also be noted that, as early as 1998, that, as early as 1998, petitioners

petitioners had had alreadyalready obtained a favorable judgment obtained a favorable judgment of eviction against the illegal of eviction against the illegal occupants of their occupants of their property.

property. The The judgment judgment in in thisthis ejectment case had, in fact, ejectment case had, in fact, already attained finality, with a already attained finality, with a writ of execution and an order writ of execution and an order of demolition. But Mayor Garcia of demolition. But Mayor Garcia requested the trial court to requested the trial court to suspend the demolition on the suspend the demolition on the pretext

pretext that that the the City City was was stillstill searching for a relocation site searching for a relocation site for

for the the squatters. squatters. However,However, instead of looking for a instead of looking for a relocation site during the relocation site during the suspension period, the city suspension period, the city council suddenly enacted council suddenly enacted Ordinance No. 1843 for the Ordinance No. 1843 for the

expropriation of petitioners’ lot. expropriation of petitioners’ lot.

It was trickery and bad faith, It was trickery and bad faith, pure

pure and and simple. simple. TheThe unconscionable manner in unconscionable manner in which the questioned ordinance which the questioned ordinance

was passed clearly indicated was passed clearly indicated that respondent City that respondent City transgressed the Constitution, transgressed the Constitution, RA 7160 and RA 7279.

RA 7160 and RA 7279.

For an ordinance to be For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the city the corporate powers of the city or municipality to enact but or municipality to enact but must also be passed according must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by to the procedure prescribed by law. It must be in accordance law. It must be in accordance with certain well-established with certain well-established basic principles of a substantive basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles require nature. These principles require that an ordinance (1) must not that an ordinance (1) must not contravene the Constitution or contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with general and consistent with public

public policy, policy, and and (6) (6) must must notnot be unreasonable

be unreasonable..[21][21]

Ordinance No. 1843 Ordinance No. 1843 failed

failed to to comply comply with with thethe foregoing

foregoing substantivesubstantive requirements. A clear case of requirements. A clear case of constitutional infirmity having constitutional infirmity having been thus established, this been thus established, this Court is constrained to nullify Court is constrained to nullify the

the subject subject ordinance. ordinance. WeWe recapitulate:

recapitulate: first,

first, as as earlier earlier discussed, discussed, thethe questioned ordinance is questioned ordinance is repugnant to the pertinent repugnant to the pertinent provisions

provisions of of the the Constitution,Constitution, RA 7279 and RA 7160;

RA 7279 and RA 7160;

second, the precipitate manner second, the precipitate manner in which it was enacted was in which it was enacted was plain

plain oppression oppression masqueradingmasquerading as a pro-poor ordinance;

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third, the fact that petitioners’

small property was singled out for expropriation for the purpose of awarding it to no more than a few squatters indicated manifest partiality against petitioners, and

fourth, the ordinance failed to show that there was a reasonable relation between the end sought and the means adopted. While the objective of the City of Cebu was to provide adequate housing to slum dwellers, the means it employed in pursuit of such objective fell short of what was legal, sensible and called for by the circumstances.

Indeed, experience has shown that the disregard of basic liberties and the use of short-sighted methods in expropriation proceedings have not achieved the desired results. Over the years, the government has tried to remedy the worsening squatter problem. Far from solving it, however,

government’s kid -glove approach has only resulted in the multiplication and proliferation of squatter colonies and blighted areas. A pro-poor program that is well-studied, adequately funded, genuinely sincere and truly

respectful of everyone’s basic

rights is what this problem calls for, not the improvident

enactment of politics-based ordinances targeting small private lots in no rational fashion. xx”

Jesus

Is

Lord

Church

School

Foundation (JILCSF) vs Municipality of

Pasig

Facts:

The Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved the ordinance submitted thereto by the Municipality of Pasig, the purpose of which is to expropriate private lots to be used as public roads. Stated in the complaint was averment that the private owners were informed of the expropriation.

A complaint was filed against owners Ching Cuancos to expropriate their property pursuant to the Local Govt Code. The complaint included a photocopy of a letter to intent sent to Lorenzo Ching Cuanco.

The Municipality of Pasig caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens with the complaint under the name of Jesus is Lord Christian School Foundation (JILCSF). The latter was alleged to have bought the private lots from the Ching Cuancos.

JILCSF averred that there was no valid and definite offer to acquire the property and that the property in dispute was already being used by the public.

Issue:

WON there was a valid and definite offer

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The SC held that there was no definite and valid offer. The letter sent to the Lorenzo Ching Cuanco was merely a letter of intent stating that the property was to be expropriated.

An extensive discussion on the matter was as follows:

“xx An offer is a unilateral

proposition which one party makes to the other for the celebration of a contract. It creates a power of acceptance permitting the offeree, by accepting the offer, to transform the

offeror’s promise into a contractual

obligation. Corollarily, the offer must be complete, indicating with sufficient clearness the kind of contract intended and definitely stating the essential conditions of the proposed contract. An offer would require, among other things, a clear certainty on both the object and the cause or consideration of the envisioned contract.

The purpose of the requirement of a valid and definite offer to be first made to the owner is to encourage settlements and voluntary acquisition of property needed for public purposes in order to avoid the expense and delay of a court action. The law is designed to give to the owner the opportunity to sell his land without the expense and inconvenience of a protracted and expensive litigation. This is a substantial right which should be protected in every instance. It encourages acquisition without litigation and spares not only the landowner but also the condemnor, the expenses and delays of litigation.

It permits the landowner to receive full compensation, and the entity acquiring the property, immediate use and enjoyment of the property. A reasonable offer in good faith, not merely perfunctory or pro forma offer, to acquire the property for a reasonable price must be made to the owner or his privy. A single bona fide offer that is rejected by the owner

will suffice.

The expropriating authority is burdened to make known its definite and valid offer to all the owners of the property. However, it has a right to rely on what appears in the certificate of title covering the land to be expropriated. Hence, it is required to make its offer only to the registered owners of the property. After all, it is well-settled that persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens certificate of title are not required to go beyond what appears on its face. xx ”

As regards to the second contention of Public Necessity, the SC held:

The subject property is expropriated for the purpose of constructing a road.

The respondent is not mandated to comply with the essential requisites for an easement of right-of-way under the New Civil Code. Case law has it that in the absence of legislative restriction, the grantee of the power of eminent domain may determine the location and route of the land to be taken unless such determination is capricious and wantonly injurious. Expropriation is justified so long as it is for the public good and there is

genuine necessity of public character. Government may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken.

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The respondent has demonstrated the necessity for constructing a road from E. R. Santos Street to Sto. Tomas Bukid. The witnesses, who were residents of Sto. Tomas Bukid, testified that although there were other ways through which one can enter the vicinity, no vehicle, however, especially fire trucks, could enter the area except through the newly constructed Damayan Street. This is more than sufficient to establish that there is a genuine necessity for the construction of a road in the area. After all, absolute necessity is not required, only reasonable and practical necessity will suffice.

Nonetheless, the respondent failed to show the necessity for constructing the

road particularly in the petitioner’s

property and not elsewhere. We note that the whereas clause of the ordinance states that the 51-square meter lot is the shortest and most suitable access road to connect Sto. Tomas Bukid to E. R. Santos Street.

The respondent’s complaint also

alleged that the said portion of the

petitioner’s lot has been surveyed as

the best possible ingress and egress. However, the respondent failed to adduce a preponderance of evidence to prove its claims.

FILSTREAM INTERNATIONAL, INC.

vs

.

COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE FELIPE S.

TONGCO and THE CITY OF MANILA

Facts:

Petitioner, Filstream International Inc., is the registered owner of the properties subject of this dispute consisting of adjacent parcels of land located in Manila.

Petitioner filed an ejectment suit against occupants of the abovementioned parcels of land on the grounds of termination of the lease contract and non-payment of rentals.

During the pendency of the ejectment proceedings, the City of Manila government approved Ordinance No. 7813 authorizing Mayor Lim to expropriate the parcels of land which form part of the properties of Filstream then occupied by private respondents. The said properties were to be sold and distributed to qualified tenants of the area pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the City of Manila.

Judgment was rendered by the MTC ordering private respondents to vacate the premises and pay back rentals to petitioner.

Filstream filed a motion to dismiss the expropriation proceedings on the grounds that there was no valid cause, no public necessity, and that there was no just compensation because the price offered was too low.

Issue:

WON the private property which was adjudged in an ejectment case be the subject of expropriation proceedings for socialized housing

Ruling:

The SC held that the City Government of Manila has the right to expropriate private properties for its public use. Thus:

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“xx the City of Manila has an undeniable right to exercise its power of eminent domain within its jurisdiction. The right to expropriate private property for public use is expressly granted to it under Section 19 of the 1991 Local Government Code, to wit:

SECTION 19. Eminent Domain – A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, that the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted; Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of

the taking of the property.” (Italics

supplied)

More specifically, the City of Manila has the power to expropriate private property in the pursuit of its urban land reform and housing program as explicitly laid out in the Revised Charter of the City of Manila (R.A. No. 409) as follows:

“General powers – The city may have a common seal and alter the same at pleasure, and may take, purchase, receive, hold, lease, convey, and dispose of real and personal property for the general interest of the city, condemn private property for public use, contract and be contracted with, sue and be sued, and prosecute and defend to final judgment and execution, and exercise all the powers

hereinafter conferred.” (R.A. 409, Sec. 3; Italics supplied).

x x x x x x x x x

“Sec. 100. The City of Manila is authorized to acquire private lands in the city and to subdivide the same into home lots for sale on easy terms to city residents, giving first priority to the bona fide tenants or occupants of said lands, and second priority to laborers and low-salaried employees. For the purpose of this section, the city may raise necessary funds by appropriations of general funds, by securing loans or by issuing bonds, and, if necessary, may acquire the lands through expropriation proceedings in accordance with law, with the approval of the President x x

x”. (Italics supplied).

In fact, the City of Manila’s right

to exercise these prerogatives notwithstanding the existence of a final and executory judgment over the property to be expropriated has been upheld by this Court in the case of Philippine Columbian Association vs. Panis, G.R. No. 106528, December 21, 1993.[32]Relying on the aforementioned provisions of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, the Court declared that:

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“The City of Manila, acting

through its legislative branch, has the express power to acquire private lands in the city and subdivide these lands into home lots for sale to bona-fide tenants or occupants thereof, and to laborers and low-salaried employees of the city.

That only a few could actually benefit from the expropriation of the property does not diminish its public use character. It is simply not possible to provide all at once land and shelter for all who need them (Sumulong v.

Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461 [1987]).

Corollary to the expanded notion of public use, expropriation is not anymore confined to vast tracts of land and landed estates (Province of Camarines Sur v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nol 103125, May 17, 1993; J. M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]). It is therefore of no moment that the land sought to be expropriated in this case is less than the half a hectare only (Pulido v. Court of Appeals, 122 SCRA 63 [1983]).

Through the years, the public use requirement in eminent domain has evolved into a flexible concept, influenced by changing conditions (Sumulong v. Guerrero, supra; Manotok v. National Housing Authority, 150 SCRA 89 [1987]; Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 [1983]). Public use now includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage, including a particular, urban land reform and

housing.” xx”

THE CITY OF MANILA

vs.

CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, ET

AL

Facts:

The City of Manila filed a petition for expropriation or private properties for the purpose of constructing public improvement. Included in the private properties to be expropriated is the parcel of lot covered by the Chinese Cemetery.

The Chinese Community refused the offer on the ground that expropriation is not necessary, there will be more expenses to be incurred and that parcels of lots to be expropriated were already devoted for public use.

Issue:

WON the parcel of lot forming part of Chinese Cemetery and owned by the Chinese Community be expropriated

Ruling:

The SC ruled in the negative. Thus, it stated:

“xx Where a cemetery is open to public, it is a public use and no part of the ground can be taken for other public uses under a general authority. And this immunity extends to the unimproved and unoccupied parts which are held in good faith for future

use… It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in question may be used by the general community of Chinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of the definition of a public cemetery,

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would make the cemetery in question public property. If that is true, then, of course, the petition of the plaintiff must be denied, for the reason that the city of Manila has no authority or right under the law to expropriate public property. xx ”

The Supreme Court also added

“xx But, whether or not the cemetery is public or private property, its appropriation for the uses of a public street, especially during the lifetime of those specially interested in its maintenance as a cemetery, should be a question of great concern, and its appropriation should not be made for such purposes until it is fully established that the greatest necessity exists therefor. xx”

On the issue on whether the eminent domain may be exercised by a municipality, the Supreme Court ruled in the wise:

“xx It can scarcely be contended that a

municipality would be permitted to take property for some public use unless some public necessity existed therefor. The right to take private property for public use originates in the necessity, and the taking must be limited by such necessity. The appellant contends that inasmuch as the legislature has given it general authority to take private property for public use, that the legislature has, therefore, settled the question of the necessity in every case and that the courts are closed to the owners of the property upon that question. Can it be imagined, when the legislature adopted section 2429 of Act No. 2711,

that it thereby declared that it was necessary to appropriate the property of Juan de la Cruz, whose property, perhaps, was not within the city limits at the time the law was adopted? The legislature, then, not having declared the necessity, can it be contemplated that it intended that a municipality should be the sole judge of the necessity in every case, and that the courts, in the face of the provision that "if upon trial they shall find that a right exists," cannot in that trial inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity for the appropriation in a particular case? The Charter of the city of Manila authorizes the taking of private property for public use. Suppose the owner of the property denies and successfully proves that the taking of his property serves no public use: Would the courts not be justified in inquiring into that question and in finally denying the petition if no public purpose was proved? Can it be denied that the courts have a right to inquire into that question? If the courts can ask questions and decide, upon an issue properly presented, whether the use is public or not, is not that tantamount to permitting the courts to inquire into the necessity of the appropriation? If there is no public use, then there is no necessity, and if there is no necessity, it is difficult to understand how a public use can necessarily exist. If the courts can inquire into the question whether a public use exists or not, then it seems that it must follow that they can examine into the question of the necessity.

The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a public character. The

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ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany, and not follow,

the taking of the

land. (Morrison vs. Indianapolis, etc. Ry. Co., 166 Ind., 511; Stearns vs. Barre, 73 Vt., 281; Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo, Ry. etc. Co., 72 Ohio St., 368.)

The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be confused with the right to exercise it in a particular case. The power of the legislature to confer, upon municipal corporations and other entities within the State, general authority to exercise the right of eminent domain cannot be questioned by the courts, but that general authority of municipalities or entities must not be confused with the right to exercise it in particular instances. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question which the courts have the right to inquire into.

The conflict in the authorities upon the question whether the necessity for the exercise of the right of eminent domain is purely legislative and not judicial, arises generally in the wisdom and propriety of the legislature in authorizing the exercise of the right of eminent domain instead of in the question of the right to exercise it in a

particular case. (Creston Waterworks Co. vs. McGrath, 89 Iowa, 502.)

By the weight of authorities, the courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. (Fairchild vs. City of St.

Paul. 48 Minn., 540.) xx”

CAMARINES

NORTE

ELECTRIC

COOPERATIVE,

INC.

(CANORECO)

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, HON. LUIS L.

DICTADO, Presiding Judge, RTC,

Branch 39, Daet, Camarines Norte,

EDUARDO R. MORENO, LT. COL.

RUFINO CHAVEZ, CAPT. ALFREDO

BORJA, CONRAD C. LEVISTE and VINES

REALTY CORPORATION

Facts:

Conrad Leviste filed a complaint for the foreclosure of mortgage against Philippines Smelter Co. Judgment was made in favor of Leviste. Two parcels of lot were levied upon and were sold at public auction. The lots were sold to Vines Realty Co.

Owner Vines Realty Co. filed a petition for the removal of the improvements on the lot. Included in such improvements are the power lines owned by petitioner CANORECO.

Issue:

WON the installed power lines and posts constitute expropriation of property that would required CANORECO to pay just compensation

Ruling:

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The Supreme Court held that the simple right-of-way easement do not require the owner to be compensated. However, due to the nature of the power lines, the private owner is constricted in its use of the lot. The Supreme Court stated:

“xx Electric cooperatives, like

CANORECO, are vested with the power of eminent domain.

The acquisition of an easement of a right-of-way falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain. Such conclusion finds support in easements of right-of-way where the Supreme Court sustained the award of just compensation for private property condemned for public use. The Supreme Court, in Republic vs. PLDT thus held that:

"Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right-of-way."

However, a simple right-of-way easement transmits no rights, except the easement. Vines Realty retains full ownership and it is not totally deprived of the use of the land. It can continue doing what it wants to do with the land, except those that would result in contact with the wires.

The acquisition of this easement, nevertheless, is not gratis. Considering the nature and effect of the installation power lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private

respondents of its ordinary use. For these reasons, Vines Realty is entitled to payment of just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the money equivalent of the property.

Just compensation has been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss, which the owner of the res expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation. The value of the land and its character at the time it was taken by the Government are the criteria for determining just compensation. No matter

how commendable petitioner’s purpose is, it

is just and equitable that Vines Realty be compensated the fair and full equivalent for the taking of its property, which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity.

Moreover, CANORECO only sought the continuation of the exercise of its right-of-way easement and not ownership over the land. Public utilities’ power of eminent

domain may be exercised although title is not transferred to the expropriator.

Consequently, we rule that a court’s

writ of demolition cannot prevail over the easement of a right-of-way which falls

within the power of eminent domain. xx”

ESTATE

OF

SALUD

JIMENEZ,

petitioner, vs.

PHILIPPINE

EXPORT

PROCESSING

ZONE,

respondent.

Facts:

In 1981, Private respondent PEZA filed a complaint before the RTC to expropriate three parcels of lot owned by Salud Jimenez.

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Ten years thereafter, the trial court decide in favor of PEZA. However, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the properties will only be transferred to Philippine Vinyl, Co.

PEZA and the petitioner executed a compromise agreement. One of the provisions therein is that the disputed property of Salud Jimenez will be swapped with one of the lots owned by PEZA. Thus:

“Estate of Salud Jimenez shall transfer lot 1406-B with an area of 13,118 square meters which forms part of the lot registered under TCT No. 113498 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite to the name of the plaintiff and the same shall be swapped and exchanged with lot 434 with an area of 14,167 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14772 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite which lot will be transferred to the name of Estate of Salud Jimenez.

However, PEZA failed to transfer the parcel of lot to

petitioner because the same was not registered under the name of PEZA but under Progressive Realty, Inc.

The trial court annulled the compromise agreement and ordered PEZA to return the property.

The Court of Appeals decided in favor of Salud Jimenez.

Issue:

WON the disputed property may be returned to the estate of Salud Jimenez

Ruling:

The SC held that the property cannot be remanded back to petitioner Salud Jimenez despite the nonpayment of just compensation for 11 years. the SC has this to say:

“xx In the case at bar, the trial court approved the compromise

agreement. Petitioner insists that Articles 2038, 2039 and 1330 of the New Civil Code should apply. Said articles provide that:

Article 2038. A compromise in which there is mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or falsity of documents, is subject to the provisions of Article 1330 of this

Code.

However, one of the parties cannot set up a mistake of fact as against the other if the latter, by virtue of the compromise, has withdrawn from a litigation already commenced.

Article 2039. When the parties compromise generally on all differences which they might have with each other, the discovery of documents referring to one or more but not to all of the questions settled shall not

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itself be a cause for annulment or rescission of the compromise, unless said documents have been concealed by one of the parties. But the compromise may be annulled or rescinded if it refers only to one thing to which one of the parties has no right, as shown by the newly discovered documents.(n)”

Article 1330. A contract where consent is given through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or fraud is voidable.[40]

The applicability of the above-quoted legal provisions will not change the outcome of the subject of the rescission. Since the compromise agreement was only about the mode of payment by swapping of lots and not about the right and purpose to expropriate the subject Lot 1406-B, only the originally agreed form of compensation that is by cash payment, was rescinded.

This Court holds that respondent has the legal authority to expropriate the subject Lot 1406-B and that the same was for a valid public purpose. In Sumulong v. Guerrero[41] , this Court has ruled that,

the “public use” requirement for

a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. In this jurisdiction, the statutory and

judicial trend has been summarized as follows:

this Court has ruled that the taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise expropriation is not allowable. It is not anymore. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent

domain comes into play… It is

accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. [Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 (1983) at 234-235 quoting E. Fernando, the Constitution of the Philippines 523-4 (2nd Ed. 1977)

The term “public use” has

acquired a more comprehensive coverage. To the literal import of the term signifying strict use or employment by the public has been added the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage.

In Manosca v. Court of Appeals, this Court has also held that what ultimately emerged is a concept of public use which is just as broad as “public

welfare.” [42]

Respondent PEZA

expropriated the subject parcel of land pursuant to Proclamation No. 1980 dated May 30, 1980

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issued by former President Ferdinand Marcos. Meanwhile, the power of eminent domain of respondent is contained in its original charter, Presidential Decree No. 66, which provides that:

Section 23. Eminent Domain. –

For the acquisition of rights of way, or of any property for the establishment of export processing zones, or of low-cost housing projects for the employees working in such zones, or for the protection of watershed areas, or for the construction of dams, reservoirs, wharves, piers, docks, quays, warehouses and other terminal facilities, structures and approaches thereto, the Authority shall have the right and power to acquire the same by purchase, by negotiation, or

by condemnation

proceedings. Should the authority elect to exercise the right of eminent domain, condemnation proceedings shall be maintained by and in the name of the Authority and it may proceed in the manner provided for by law. (italics supplied)

Accordingly, subject Lot 1406-B was expropriated “for the construction … of terminal

facilities, structures and

approaches thereto.” The

authority is broad enough to give the respondent substantial leeway in deciding for what public use the expropriated property would be utilized. Pursuant to this broad authority, respondent leased a portion of the lot to commercial

banks while the rest was made a transportation terminal. Said public purposes were even reaffirmed by Republic Act No. 7916, a law amending

respondent PEZA’s original

charter, which provides that: Sec. 7. ECOZONE to be a Decentralized Agro-Industrial, Industrial, Commercial/Trading, Tourist, Investment and Financial Community. Within the framework of the Constitution, the interest of national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic, ECOZONE shall be developed, as much as possible, into a decentralized, self-reliant and self-sustaining industrial, commercial/trading, agro-industrial, tourist, banking, financial and investment center with minimum government intervention. Each ECOZONE shall be provided with transportation,

telecommunications and other facilities needed to generate linkage with industries and employment opportunities for its own habitants and those of nearby towns and cities.

The ECOZONE shall administer itself on economic, financial, industrial, tourism development and such other matters within the exclusive competence of the national government. (italics supplied)

Among the powers of PEZA enumerated by the same law are:

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Sec. 12. Functions and Powers of PEZA Board. ---- The Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) Board shall have the following function and powers:

(a) Set the general policies on the establishment and operations of the ECOZONE, Industrial estate, exports processing zones, free trade

zones, and the like;

x x x

(c) Regulate and undertake the establishment, operation and maintenance of utilities, other services and infrastructure in the ECOZONE, such as heat, light and power, water supply, telecommunications, transport, toll roads and bridges, port services, etc. and to fix just, reasonable and competitive rates, fares, charges and fees thereof .[43]

In Manila Railroad Co. v. Mitchel [44] , this Court has ruled that in the exercise of eminent domain, only as much land can be taken as is necessary for the legitimate purpose of the condemnation. The term

“necessary”, in this connection,

does not mean absolutely indispensable but requires only a reasonable necessity of the taking for the stated purpose, growth and future needs of the enterprise. The respondent cannot attain a self-sustaining and viable ECOZONE if inevitable needs in the expansion in the surrounding areas are hampered by the mere refusal of the private landowners to part with

their properties. The purpose of creating an ECOZONE and other facilities is better served if respondent directly owns the areas subject of the expansion program.

The contention of petitioner that the leasing of the subject lot to banks and building terminals was not expressly mentioned in the original charter of respondent PEZA and that it was only after PEZA devoted the lot to said purpose that Republic Act No. 7916 took effect, is not impressed with merit. It should be pointed out that Presidential Decree No. 66 created the respondent PEZA to be a viable commercial, industrial and investment area. According to the comprehensive wording of Presidential Decree No. 66, the said decree did not intend to limit respondent PEZA to the establishment of an export processing zone but it was also bestowed with authority to expropriate parcels of land “for the construction … of terminal

facilities, structures and

approaches thereto.” Republic

Act No. 7916 simply particularized the broad language employed by Presidential Decree No. 66 by specifying the purposes for which PEZA shall devote the condemned lots, that is, for the construction and operation of an industrial estate, an export processing zone, free trade zones, and the like. The expropriation of Lot 1406-B for the purpose of being leased to banks and for the construction of a terminal has the purpose of

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making banking and transportation facilities easily accessible to the persons working at the industries located in PEZA. The expropriation of adjacent areas therefore comes as a matter of necessity to bring life to the purpose of the law. In

such a manner, PEZA’s goal of

being a major force in the economic development of the

country would be

realized. Furthermore, this Court has already ruled that:

…(T)he Legislature may directly

determine the necessity for appropriating private property for a particular improvement for public use, and it may select the exact location of the improvement. In such a case, it is well-settled that the utility of the proposed improvement, the existence of the public necessity for its construction, the expediency of constructing it, the suitableness of the location selected, are all questions exclusively for the legislature to determine, and the courts have no power to interfere or to substitute their own views for those of the representatives of the people.

In the absence of some constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, the necessity and expediency of exercising the right of eminent domain are questions essentially political and not judicial in their

character .[45]

Inasmuch as both Presidential Decree No. 66 and Republic Act No. 7916, bestow respondent

with authority to develop terminal facilities and banking centers, this Court will not question t he respondent’s lease

of certain portions of the expropriated lot to banks, as well as the construction of terminal facilities.

Petitioner contends that respondent is bound by the representations of its Chief Civil Engineer when the latter testified before the trial court that the lot was to be devoted for the construction of government offices. Anent this issue, suffice it to say that PEZA can vary the purpose for which a condemned lot will be devoted to, provided that the same is for public use. Petitioner cannot impose or dictate on the respondent what facilities to establish for as long as the same are for public purpose.

Lastly, petitioner appeals to the sense of justice and equity to this Court in restoring the said lot to its possession. From the time of the filing of the expropriation case in 1981 up to the present, respondent has not yet remunerated the petitioner although respondent has already received earnings from the rental payments by lessees of the

subject property.

We have ruled that the concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot

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be considered “just” inasmuch as

the property owner is made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.[46]Payment of just compensation should follow as a matter of right immediately after the order of expropriation is issued. Any delay in payment must be counted from said order. However, the delay to constitute a violation of due process must be unreasonable and inexcusable; it must be deliberately done by a party in order to defeat the ends of justice.

We find that respondent capriciously evaded its duty of giving what is due to petitioner. In the case at bar, the expropriation order was issued by the trial court in 1991. The compromise agreement between the parties was approved by the trial court in 1993. However, from 1993 up to the present, respondent has failed in its obligation to pay petitioner to the prejudice of the latter. Respondent caused damage to petitioner in making the latter to expect that it had a good title to the property to be swapped with Lot 1406-B; and meanwhile, respondent has been reaping benefits from the lease or rental income of the said expropriated lot. We cannot tolerate this oppressive exercise of the power of eminent domain by respondent. As we have ruled

in Cosculluela vs. Court of Appeals:[47]

In the present case, the irrigation project was completed and has been in operation since 1976. The project is benefiting the farmers specifically and the

community in

general. Obviously, the

petitioner’s land cannot be returned to him. However, it is high time that the petitioner be paid what was due him eleven years ago. It is arbitrary and capricious for a government agency to initiate expropriation

proceedings, seize a person’s

property, allow the judgment of the court to become final and executory and then refuse to pay on the ground that there are no appropriations for the property earlier taken and profitably used. We condemn in the strongest possible terms the cavalier attitude of government officials who adopt such a despotic and irresponsible stance.

Though the respondent has committed a misdeed to petitioner, we cannot, however,

grant the petitioner’s prayer for

the return of the expropriated Lot No. 1406-B. The Order of expropriation dated July 11, 1991, has long become final and executory. Petitioner

cited Provincial Government of Sorsogon v. Rosa E. Vda. De Villaroy a[48]to support its contention that it is entitled to a return of the lot where this Court

ruled that “under ordinary

circumstances, immediate return to the owners of the unpaid