Gillian Russell observes that the negative effects of the distrust of the positivists on the abstract is the failure to make a distinction between sentences and propositions considering that for one to distinguish between the two, one has to discuss both –which the positivists abhor since they do not have regard for propositions which borders on the abstract. She observes that discussions involving the positivists center on sentences and not interpreted sentences (propositions). It is also for this purpose that the positivists were not passionate in discussing meaning in general and would rather prefer to talk about conventions governing the use of words. G. Russell observes that it is because of this that the expression “truth by convention” was often treated as being interchangeable with “truth in virtue of meaning.” This is expressed in these words:
It was fairly easy then, to slide between two of these: the thesis that a sentence could be true in virtue of meaning, and the thesis that what the sentence says –the propositions it expressed, or its content- could be true by convention. But while the thesis that a sentence can be true in virtue of meaning is of great interest, the thesis that a non-metalinguistic proposition may be true by convention is implausibly strong.28
Quine’s conclusion after the observations he made concerning the description of analyticity as being true by virtue of meaning alone is that there must be an appeal to matters of fact. And, if this is the case, then analyticity is meaningless since it is presumed to have no appeal to experience.
experience does not justify the choice of language considering that what lie at the very foundation of a language itself are analytic truths. He followed up this postulation with the notion that analytic statements in a particular language have nothing to do with experience. He also holds that speaking a language is in consonance with the acceptance of analytic sentence involved in the language. However, Quine disagrees with him here. His own opinion in the matter is expressed in his doctrine of holism.
The doctrine of holism by Quine partly implies that nearly none of our knowledge could be answerable to experience directly with the exception of what he terms ‘observation sentences’.
There is often an indirect relation in such a way that for a sentence to be answerable to experience, there must be the supposition of quite a chunk of theory. What this means is that for one to say that an observation such as ‘this football is spherical’ affirms or negates a particular theoretical claim (in this case, all things in the shape of a football is spherical), one implicitly talks in relationship to theoretical knowledge. Here, Quine claims that it is not only in a body of theoretical knowledge such we would have it in Physics or even formal sciences such as logic and mathematics that an observation corresponds to a theoretical claim such as “all bodies have weight and occupy space’. He postulates that the observations in almost all our sentences affirm or deny given theoretical claims. For instance, if one says, ‘he has grey hairs’ he is refuting the claim that human hairs should be dark and affirming the theoretical claim that the hair of an elderly should be grey.
Quine posits that all of our beliefs and, in fact, everything about our knowledge are interconnected with our sensory experience at the periphery. In view of this he writes:
The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges. Or, to change the figure, total science is like a field of force whose boundary conditions are experience. A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions readjustments in the interior of the field. But the total field is so underdetermined by its boundary conditions, experience, that there is much latitude of choice as to what statements to reevaluate in the light of any single contrary experience. No particular experiences are linked with any particular statements in the interior of the field, except indirectly through considerations of equilibrium affecting the field as a whole.29
Quine concludes that a statement in mathematics such as 3+4=7 corresponds to a theory of mathematics, in this case, which fundamentally holds that the sum of 3 and 4 should be seven.
He then holds that a close look at that expression shows an interplay between analytic truths (mathematical truth or theory that the sum of three and four should be seven) and a corresponding observation that the addition of three and four items results to seven items. He then says that any given analytic truth is part and parcel of our whole body of knowledge which also includes experience. Here, Quine explains that there are some sentences that contribute immensely to our whole body of knowledge. He gave an instance with elementary arithmetic which he says we cannot abandon without it completely affecting the whole system of our knowledge. This is such that those elementary arithmetic as well as other analytic truths cannot be separated from our whole system of knowledge including truths that depend on experience.
Hence, it would be practically impossible to separate analytic statements (such as elementary arithmetic) from synthetic statements. It is in view of this that Quine writes:
… it is misleading to speak of the empirical content of an individual statement -- especially if it be a statement at all remote from the experiential periphery of the field. Furthermore it becomes folly to seek a boundary between synthetic statements, which hold contingently on experience, and analytic statements which hold come what may. Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system.30
Another important issue raised by Quine is that pure analytic truths such as logical truths cannot claim to have more attributes of necessity than some obviously and universally correct beliefs such as, ‘the earth has existed for many years’. The first, logical truths, are not grounded in experience while the later, ‘the earth has existed for many years’, is justified through experience.
Quine asserts that both truths differ, not in kind, but only in degree and have link with experience. Again, he holds that both are also revisable. He concludes there is no basis for making a distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions, especially as the positivists do.31
Yet, one disturbing fact about Quine’s subjection of all truths to experience is the consideration of a priori truths. Carnap holds that logic, Mathematics and other formal sciences are accepted a priori parts of human knowledge and that they could also be termed analytic. They are, no doubt, necessary, the truth of which cannot be altered by experience since they are independent of experience. However, Quine disagrees with him on this matter. He accepts that those disciplines are presumed to be on the level of a priori as stated by Carnap. However, he questions the claim that they have no link with experience whatsoever. Again, he states clearly that there is no truth that is completely immune to revision. For these reasons he maintains that no distinction exists between the analytic and the synthetic.