SPECIAL OPERATIONS

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4-185. More ammunition may be required to support the force in mountainous terrain because of reduced munitions effects.

4-186. Additionally, mountainous regions may affect MLRS employment because of the low trajectory of MLRS rocket munitions. Leaders should use the crest clearance tables in planning platoon OPAREAs (see appendix G).

4-187. C2 is degraded in mountainous regions because of decreased effectiveness of FM radio communications. Movement control is more difficult on winding mountain roads, as is occupation and displacement. Terrain marches may be impractical or impossible.

4-188. Logistics resupply is more difficult because of the limited number of roads and slower convoy speeds. Survey may not be as accurate, and terrain masks may limit target acquisition. Cross-country restrictions force the enemy to use roads and trails, which will enhance interdiction fires. Ambushes are likely in this type of terrain.

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4-189. MLRS is not normally appropriate for jungle operations. Jungle terrain is more suited to light cannon artillery. The MLRS generally requires open firing areas and freedom of movement to maximize both its effectiveness and survivability. Jungle operations also present problems because of the high humidity and dense vegetation. Humidity may reduce electronic equipment and launcher LRU operability.

Dense vegetation degrades M77 munitions effects. In a thick canopy, DPICM is not effective.

4-190. Communication is degraded because of high humidity, vegetation density, and electronic line-of-sight restrictions. Antennas may have to be elevated to overcome line-of-line-of-sight restrictions.

4-191. Immediate masks are prevalent in jungle terrain. Selection of platoon OPAREAs and launcher-firing points is hampered by soft terrain and thick vegetation. Terrain marches may be restricted.

4-192. Logistics resupply is hampered by reduced mobility, and survey control is more difficult to establish. Target acquisition accuracy is degraded because of heavy foliage. Launchers should be positioned closer together to provide for better security.

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4-193. Northern operations are characterized by frozen earth, snow-covered terrain, intense sunlight, and prolonged darkness. Rocket and missile smoke trails last longer in cold weather, thus making launchers more readily identifiable to enemy TA assets.

4-194. Radio communications can be unreliable in extreme cold, and equipment may become inoperative.

4-195. Frozen, snow-covered terrain may limit the number of available positions for platoon OPAREAs.

Mobility is slowed for headquarters elements, as wheeled vehicles and trailers generally are not suited for operations in northern areas. In extreme cold, metal tends to become brittle and parts breakage increases.

Convoys must travel in a close column during whiteout conditions and prolonged darkness.

4-196. Reduced mobility and difficulty in determining grid locations hamper logistics resupply.

Snowstorms and intense cold can adversely affect target acquisition equipment.

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4-197. The massive growth of urban areas and manmade changes to the landscape significantly affect the conduct of future battles. Commanders at all levels must be aware of the unique advantages and disadvantages associated with operations conducted in and around cities, towns, villages, and similar built-up areas. Special techniques may be used in attacking the defilade areas between buildings. Increasing the target altitude used in the AFATDS and FCS will allow the submunitions to achieve a more vertical fall prior to detonation and thus clear buildings and other obstructions (see figure 4-5). Commanders must, however, consider the precision error and large submunitions dispersion patterns when applying this method of attack due to the high probability of extensive collateral damage. Low-level winds at the target area will add to the precision error. At longer ranges, large altitude adjustments may yield a “NO SOLUTION ERROR” in the launcher FCS.

4-198. C2 of a firing platoon operating in an urban area is demanding. Decentralization to the maximum feasible extent may be required. The reduced ability to communicate necessitates more detailed orders and TSOPs. The height and density of structures reduce the planning ranges for all organic radio equipment.

Imaginative positioning of antennas for the platoon HQ, such as intermingling them with existing civilian antennas or in treetops, may increase transmission range and enhance survivability. Existing civilian communication networks may be used to supplement the organic capability of the unit.

Figure 4-5. Urban Targeting Solution

4-199. MLRS units should not position launchers in built-up areas. Buildings can serve as concealment for hide areas, but the low trajectory of the system necessitates open areas for firing. Any urban area used for hide or CP positions should—

• Be free of civilians.

• Be away from the center of the built-up area.

• Have several routes of escape.

• Be off the main high-speed avenues.

• Afford as much cover and concealment as possible.

4-200. The use of existing structures (such as barns, auto repair shops, and warehouses) as hide areas or CP locations maximizes protection and minimizes the camouflage effort.

4-201. More time must be allotted for reconnaissance. Depending on the density of buildings in the area, the reconnaissance party may have to use infantry techniques for house-to-house fighting to clear and check the buildings.

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4-202. Deserts are arid, barren regions that cannot support any quantity of life because of lack of fresh water. They are characterized by temperature extremes (136 degrees Fahrenheit (F) in Libya or Mexico to bitter cold in the Gobi Desert) with fluctuations exceeding 70 degrees F. Fire support considerations vary according to the type of desert; however, considerations common to all include munitions effects due to the temperature extremes and a lack of identifiable terrain features. The three types of deserts are discussed below.

Mountain

4-203. The desert is characterized by barren, rocky ranges separated by flat basins that may be studded by deep gullies created during flash floods.

Rocky Plateau

4-204. The desert has slight relief with extended flat areas and good visibility. It is characterized by steep-walled, eroded valleys (wadis). These are extremely attractive for concealment and limited cover but are subject to flash flooding.

Sandy or Dune

4-205. The desert has extensive flat areas covered with dunes subject to wind erosion. The dune size, the texture of sand, and the leeward gradient may diminish haul capacity or prohibit movement entirely.

4-206. Map reading is difficult and resections are impossible, unless a number of prominent points are available. Position data from PADS, the launcher FCS, and the DAGR are critical.

4-207. Lack of vegetation makes camouflage difficult. In all cases, the MLRS unit is visible to the ground observer. From about 400 meters in the air, the camouflaged command posts appear bigger than the surrounding dunes or mounds of sand and vegetation. Moving directly from position to position using special formations is not only feasible but often preferable.

4-208. High temperature and ever-present sand cause failures in mechanical and electronic equipment.

Fuel and air filters must be cleaned after each operation, sometimes twice per day. Optics become opaque unless protected. Static electricity caused by hot winds interferes with refueling operations, radio traffic, and launcher reload operations. Turning radii of tracked vehicles is limited because of the buildup of sand between the idler wheel and the track.

4-209. See FM 90-3 for additional information on desert operations.

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4-210. Inherent in the concept of an amphibious assault is the projection of a fighting force into an area on shore that is assumed to be heavily defended. The force must build in combat power from zero strength to a

point where it is effective and credible. To provide adequate support, an MLRS unit must be prepared to fire immediately upon landing.

4-211. Although MLRS units are not intended to fulfill amphibious assault requirements, they may be required to conduct transit from ship-to-shore via landing craft. The force or MAGTF commander must consider the limitations of MLRS unit equipment with respect to each of the landing craft capabilities because MLRS unit equipment is not currently “through-surf” capable.

Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC)

4-212. This preferable method of ship-to-shore transit for the MLRS unit allows the launchers to disembark on dry land, affording maximum protection to MLRS system electronic components.

Landing Craft, Mechanized (LCM-8)

4-213. The commander must consider that use of the LCM-8 will likely expose the launcher to partial immersion, potentially damaging components with salt water. However, these craft can be used for all ancillary-wheeled vehicles.

4-214. Positioning coordination with the supported maneuver force is critical on beachheads. Units must remain flexible to change the predetermined positions as the situation develops on the beachhead.

4-215. Units must plan to embark and debark with all available MTOE equipment. Vehicles must be prepared for fording. Wheeled vehicle tires may be partially deflated for improved performance on beach sand. Salt water and sand increase the need for preventive maintenance. Unit basic loads must be transported forward with the unit. An adequate ship-to-shore resupply of ammunition must be part of the plan and coordinated by the controlling FA headquarters S-4.

Chapter 5