Stage 1 – Initial Response

The response to a volcanic event was divided into two parts by Galley et al. (2003):

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Most staff members interviewed seemed very confident in their role requirements for the initial response to activation of the warning system, particularly Ski Patrol and Lift Operators. Permanent staff often reiterated the need to stay cool, calm, and collected, as customers will look to them for help. Other staff members were very optimistic about the response effort, such as the following:

“I think that as long as the staff have a base knowledge, with the experience that they have up here, that they can assume the worst and hope for the best, and rely on the public to be as patient and as understanding as they can be.”

A few staff indicated they were very confident because they worked at the ‘Top of the Bruce’ area, which is a safe zone, so they did not feel they would be in huge danger. Although it is good for staff to be optimistic, overestimating response capabilities and underestimating risk can constrain disaster/crisis planning (Paton, 1996a) and may lead to an organization being not properly prepared for an emergency situation.

The only ski area departments that seemed to be a bit confused of what they are supposed to do was Snow School and Food and Beverage staff. Snow School Instructors were concerned about how they would be notified about a volcanic event if they could not hear the warning system, as Snow School instructors do not carry radios. A few instructors indicated they would try to ski their classes to the nearest lift station instead of immediately taking to higher ground. An international Snow School Instructor indicated he/she was confused about locating safe areas during an eruption event:

“I mean, we’ve got the maps, we’ve got the lahar safe areas. But when you’re actually on the mountain, it’s not, uh, certain where they are. I mean, when you’re skiing along as it is, it’s hard to know where you are. And especially if it’s bad weather as well…it’s hard to, sort of, orientate yourself.”

It was suggested that safe areas be marked with green flags so that customers and staff will be able to know where to go. However, this is likely unrealistic because it creates more work for Ski Patrol to make sure that the flags are maintained and would also create an expectation in users that only flagged areas are ‘safe’. A more realistic solution would be to clarify in lahar hazard training that higher ground anywhere on the ski area is always a safe area. An animation of how a lahar moves down valleys may help to get this point across. It would also eliminate confusion if Snow School Instructors were to carry radios. This would be beneficial not only for a lahar response but also in

Chapter Six

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the general running of the ski area. Food and Beverage staff seemed confused about whether they should keep customers in the building or evacuate them outside. A simple solution to this problem, as suggest by a few staff members, would be to utilize the building fire warden also as an

‘eruption’ warden. They could easily be trained the proper response during a lahar warning system alarm, and could take a leadership role amongst other staff in their building.

Permanent staff raised many more concerns about the initial response than seasonal staff did, particularly keeping staff and customers safe. Some staff members indicated that:

“it’s a very intimidating thought ‘cause I don’t really want to be involved in it. I’d rather watch if from a distance”, and

“It would be scary because I’d be on my own. I’d have to deal with all these people on my own”.

A few staff members raised concern that seasonal staff were expected to know what they needed to do, however it was likely that many of them would be unsure of what to do in an actual eruption event. One seasonal staff member explained “

“I think they think we have more knowledge than we actually do”.

This may lead to confusion in an event response, as staff may not act immediately and may crowd the radio channels requesting instructions. Also of concern, especially amongst international staff members, was that many customers on the mountain may be inexperienced and unaware of what to do. RAL has tried to prepare for this problem, with the introduction of a poster public education campaign in 2004 at Whakapapa (David Johnston, personal communication, 2006).

Snow School staff seemed to be the most concerned about customer safety. Each Snow School Instructor interviewed indicated that they would feel added stress in an emergency situation due to having the responsibility of looking after their classes. Several comments include:

“You’re responsible for those children, so you wouldn’t want to make a wrong move, send them places where they shouldn’t go, take them places where they shouldn’t go,” and “You’re responsible for their, their lives, like, and you know you hope you make the best decisions based on the circumstances and on their ability.”

Snow School instructors will have added responsibility during a volcanic event compared to other ski area staff. It is possible they may have a class of students with them, and it is likely those students would be children away from their parents. Due to the added pressure of not having a radio, it would be difficult for Instructors to get instructions on the evacuation procedure and to inform management staff of the children they have with them. This added responsibility should be explained to Snow School Instructors during lahar hazard training, as it will likely result in them being more concerned about knowing the proper response actions.

Results and Initial Discussion

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