Warning System and Tests

All staff interviewed were reasonably knowledgeable of the warning system at the ski area. All knew it existed, and that a siren and announcement would be broadcast over the ski area. However, permanent staff were more concerned about the warning system than seasonal staff. A few raised concerns over whether the warning system would actually be triggered by an eruption, and also whether they would be able to hear it in their position on the ski area.

Issues regarding the testing of the warning system were also brought up during the interviews, with permanent staff having much more to comment on the issue. This was likely because their extended employment on the ski area has resulted in them being present for past simulations, blind tests, and false alarms of the warning system. Permanent staff had very positive opinions of simulations performed in the past, and seasonal staff seemed to feel their lahar hazard training would have been more complete if they would have participated in a simulation (which they were due to have approximately one week after the interviews were conducted). A seasonal staff member reasoned:

“There’s not been like a drill or anything where we can all actually see for ourselves what we’re meant to do. I mean, it’s alright them explaining it to us in, in a comfy room down here. But when it’s up there, and it’s happening and there’s noise and people shouting stuff…”

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Opinions on blind tests of the warning system were mixed amongst permanent staff members. Some felt that blind test were very important:

“Because it keeps people on their toes. It sees what actually people are actually gonna do rather than getting reminded that morning ‘alright, so you’re gonna be on this lift at that time and when that happens you do this, and…’. I think with a volcanic emergency then, um, you’re not really gonna get told what to do.”

However, the same staff member later said that he/she believed a simulation was much more effective than a blind test at teaching staff their roles during a volcanic event. Permanent staff members generally also felt concerned about the loss of urgency with regards to the response to an alarm. For example, one staff member said:

“Well from what I’ve seen, whenever we’ve done practices, um, people generally, or not generally but often, just, just ignore it. People in the valleys often just fall over and lose all of their ski gear and spend the next sort of 10 minutes picking it up and trying to get it back on, just standing in valleys.”

Nevertheless, many of these same staff members thought it was very important to have tests of the warning system, but implied the importance of having a balance between making sure that the warning system is working well and desensitizing people. The concept of desensitization is discussed by Morrissey and Reser (2000), as it is common for one to feel that nothing is going to happen after hearing a number of warning messages that do not result in an emergency. The anxiety that accompanies the warning messages may become switched off, causing one to stop listening and attending to the warnings. It was stressed to groups during Whakapapa staff induction week that staff should treat all alarms as real, however it may be important to repeat the importance of responding quickly to the alarm which may go off multiple times in a single season.

On March 22nd, 2005, there was a false alarm at the ski area due to a power failure in Whakapapa Village and subsequent failure of the back-up batteries. The lahar warning alarm was also triggered for Whakapapa Village. The alarm ended up ringing on the ski area for 15 to 20 minutes, and RAL staff were unsure of whether it was a real alarm. RAL staff were eventually informed after

contacting the DoC Visitor Center that it was indeed a false alarm. However, RAL still had

customers up on the ski area who were not notified and several ended up calling ‘111’ to determine whether it was safe to come down. RAL was only aware of these customers after they received a call from the police in Wellington. The customers eventually walked down the mountain but were very upset at not being notified it was a false alarm.

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Management at RAL found their staff response on the day disappointing, stating that:

“I think the key, the disappointing thing about that day was just, was probably….I had a feeling that most people…in the company probably assumed it was a test.”

This brings up another issue for RAL, which is their preparation for an alarm in the off-season and how they will notify customers on the ski area. It is a very different situation than the winter, as in the summer the RAL operating area only extends from their lift at the bottom to the top of the top lift for people using the lifts to get up to the Crater Lake. The situation also will likely not be as dangerous in the summer, with less people on the ski area and less snow. The most important issue that was raised during the false alarm was the desensitization of staff to the alarm, as most ignored it, however customers on the field who were hearing it for the first time were quite flustered. This issue likely lies more in the hands of DoC than with RAL, as DoC is able to make a an

announcement over the entire ski area at any time. It would have been beneficial during this

situation for DoC to broadcast a false alarm statement as soon as possible, which should be a lesson taken from this false alarm.