Statecraft: An Alternative Approach

Bulpitt’s statecraft approach is adopted because it was developed, in part, with particular reference to studying the Conservative Party, and the party within the wider field of British politics. It is an approach that has proven itself highly influential, widely cited, and frequently referred to across a range of problems of British politics, despite only a handful of scholars having continued to advocate his work following Bulpitt’s untimely death. Many of the concepts Bulpitt either introduced or propounded continue to find resonance today, and whilst having attracted critical attention, it will be shown that these still have much to offer.

That said, statecraft is far from an unproblematic approach, and it has attracted significant and important criticism over the years. However, as will be detailed, the criticisms levelled at statecraft are of varying degrees of significance and severity, some can be dealt with; others perhaps just acknowledged and attempts made to minimize their impact upon the overall usefulness of the approach. This has led to the development of an interesting paradox. Bulpitt’s work is acknowledged as being influential, especially with regard to the study of Thatcherism and the relations between Westminster and local government, yet despite this it is frequently dismissed as being too problematic to be useful (Marsh, 1995). A central contention of this thesis is that the very fact that it has remained an influential and frequently cited approach to the study of British politics merits a fresh attempt to tackle some of its more problematic features. In so doing, it will be argued that in fact, many of the problems of statecraft are less damaging than is often thought.

However, the mere fact that something was developed in order to examine the Conservative Party is not, in itself, sufficient grounds for its adoption here. Instead it is argued that as well as suiting the research questions, statecraft offers a theoretically and conceptually informed way of addressing an area of British political science that has not received the attention it deserves: attempting to reconcile

the practice of politics, with the study of politics (see Bevir, 2005 for a discussion of this problem).

Furthermore, it was developed to provide a broad focus of analytical study, which is important, because this thesis, by its very nature, necessitates a broad analytical investigation (Bulpitt, 1996, p.

1095; and see Buller, 2000, p. 6). Whilst the principal focus of statecraft is on parties and their leadership, this is very much through the filter of strategic considerations, context, party management, party change, and the way in which they interact: which seems perfectly suited to the task in hand. Moreover, many of the issues that Bulpitt covered in his various statecraft analyses are the same as those under investigation here: principally how the Conservative Party recovers power, especially after a period when the political landscape seemed distinctly unpropitious. Other frameworks for studying the Conservative Party or the period are not dismissed, the adoption of the statecraft approach is not a repudiation of alternatives, rather it is merely argued that the statecraft approach itself is appropriate here, worthy of re-examination, and development.

2.2.1 Bulpitt's Statecraft

Before outlining the main characteristics of statecraft, it is necessary to clarify a few points. The first of these is that there has never been a systematic single exposition of what the statecraft approach is, or entails, and there are a number of reasons for this. The first is that as Bulpitt used it, it was constantly developing and evolving, largely in response to criticisms, but also because he extended it into other areas of application. Furthermore, a small number of other academics have also adopted the approach, and used it in different ways, often re-interpreting Bulpitt’s work in varying directions.

This will be returned to below in the literature review, but it is also argued that this melange of uses has been partly responsible for the confusion about what the statecraft approach actually is.

However, it is important, and suffice to say for now, that the statecraft approach adopted here is based most directly on Bulpitt’s earlier, and seminal work on the Conservative Party, his 1986 article on the first Thatcher administration. However, it is also informed by his later works, and the works of others, especially Jim Buller, and also critics of the approach. Despite this, the way statecraft is used in this thesis is quite different to the way others have used it, as it is adapted to both improve its fortitude and usefulness in the face of critics.

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The first point to note is that Bulpitt referred to statecraft as either an interpretation or an approach interchangeably, because that is how it is best seen, and both terms will be used here (Bulpitt, 1986, p. 19). It is frequently criticised for omitting some variables, or neglecting other features of political science, whereas Bulpitt was more concerned with stressing the connections between alternative approaches, than criticizing them per se. It is argued that Bulpitt was simply offering another approach, one which was, and remains useful, and he was not seeking to close off other methods of investigation (see Bulpitt, 1986, p. 19-20). Consequently, what is outlined below is not offered as the only approach to the study of the Conservative Party, but rather, it suits, and has much to offer, in addressing the questions under investigation.

Attention turns to the specifics of statecraft, and the first point to make is probably the most controversial. Bulpitt succinctly states that statecraft is “the art of winning elections, and achieving some necessary degree of governing competence in office” and the question Bulpitt applied it to was

“in what ways has the Conservative Party sought to gain office, govern satisfactorily and retain office within the structure of British politics” (Bulpitt, 1986, p. 21). In fact, the former is more a description of what good statecraft is, because one complicating feature of the terminology is that a distinction has to be made between a party’s statecraft and statecraft analysis. One is the practice, and the other is the study of the same thing, but the terms can become confused and it’s usually left for the reader to determine which is implied, but the distinction is significant, and an attempt will be made to render explicit which is referred to here.

The result, is an approach, or interpretation to the study of various aspects of British politics, although in this thesis the emphasis is largely on where this relates to the Conservative Party, which starts from the assumption that parties principally try to win office. Of course, this is far from an uncontroversial assumption to make about the operation of a political party, and one that will be addressed in greater detail below, and qualified to some extent. It is also a ‘high politics’ or more academically, a macro-approach and elitist in nature, almost by necessity of the preceding assumption, and what Bulpitt was trying to address (Bevir, 2010, p. 446). The focus was on the

Conservative Party, but largely the leadership, its operation, and relationship to the wider party political environment. Once again, these matters will be discussed in greater detail below.

2.2.2 Dimensions of Statecraft

Attention now moves to what Bulpitt terms the major dimensions of a party’s statecraft, and it is these that will be used to provide the framework for the analysis in the following empirical chapters.

These dimensions are interesting because whilst Bulpitt introduces them as the components of

‘good’ statecraft, they are implicitly designed to also be criteria by which a party’s statecraft can be assessed. Despite this, they have only once been used in this way before, and on that occasion to British external relations (Bulpitt, 1988). In most other applications of the statecraft approach, the dimensions have been used flexibly, and largely lost in the analysis, and it is argued that adopting a formal framework provides a better structure for the analysis. There are five main features, and they operate in a statecraft cycle, much like an electoral cycle, though the two are not necessarily contiguous with it, nor are they necessarily sequential:

1. Party management. This is a feature throughout the cycle, although it may vary in significance, and covers the whole gambit of party management, including how the leader deals with such matters, or is constrained by them. The assumption is that generally leaders will seek quiescent party relations, but is acknowledged that at times, it may be necessary to “adopt a more positive posture”.

2. A winning electoral strategy. This includes creating a package of polices

“capable of being sold successfully to the electorate. But also involves finding a programme which will unite the party and stimulate the members’ belief that the party can not only (with luck) win an election, but also govern reasonably effectively”. “At times of incoherence in the party system it may also involve a stance towards a governing coalition in a hung parliament.”

3. Political Argument Hegemony (PAH). “This concerns the party achieving an easy predominance in elite debate regarding political problems, policies and the general stance of government”. This isn’t synonymous with ideology, but is

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“more comprehensive and cruder”. “It refers more to a winning rhetoric in variety of locations, winning either because the framework of the party’s arguments becomes generally acceptable, or because its solution to a particularly important political problem seem more plausible than its opponents'”. It can be won in opposition, or government, and lost at any time, and it is difficult to assess its significance, and “it may be “an attribute which the party elites require mostly for their own self confidence and party management”.

4. A governing competence. Government is about more than policies, “it is also about competence”. Policy selection is related to this but Bulpitt rejects the

“orthodox stance” that this stems from “ideology, citizen or special interest pressure...”. Policy rejection is as important as selection, and whilst this “may be the result of ideological preference... it may equally well be connected to problems of implementation”. There can be a number of reasons for considering a policy too difficult to implement effectively, and this includes domestic and foreign policy factors.

5. Another winning electoral strategy. This dimension is not directly applicable to this thesis, because in the period studied, the Conservative Party has only managed to (partially) win a single election. Bulpitt placed at least as much emphasis on remaining in office as gaining it in the first place. Instead, an analysis of this dimension will likely have to wait until after 2015 when the full statecraft cycle can be examined.

(quotes above from Bulpitt, 1986, pp. 21-22)

After listing these, Bulpitt goes onto make several more observations to clarify these points. These include the fact it is designed to start with a party in opposition, and the “end game” is a party retaining office after an electoral cycle (Bulpitt, 1986, p. 22). He also says that they can be

“achieved (and lost) at any point in the cycle” and that “there is no reason why the electoral strategy

and PAH dimensions should ‘fit’ its operations under the governing competence category” and states competence is of more significance than the others (Bulpitt, 1986, p. 22).

The crucial point for this thesis is that “a party can be assessed in terms of how many of these statecraft dimensions it achieves successfully” (Bulpitt, 1986, p. 22). Despite this statement, as mentioned above, this has only been attempted once before, every other application of the statecraft perspective has adopted an alternative structure, whereas the following three chapters of this thesis examine the Conservative Party between 2001 and 2010 explicitly according to a framework provided by this criteria⁹.

One further observation is the extent of the conceptual elements of statecraft, outlined in his seminal paper on the Conservative Party, Bulpitt’s only statecraft work solely focussing on the party’s return to office after 1979. As discussed below, many more remain implicit, but it is common for later authors to use conceptual devices introduced in Bulpitt’s later work, to criticise the earlier work, which is perfectly acceptable, but only so long as this is made explicit. Conversely, it is also common to find critics of statecraft concentrating on the earlier work, and overlooking some of the later developments Bulpitt and others have made. The formula here is to base the framework on Bulpitt’s 1986 dimensions, but draw on later improvements offered by other works.