What structural factors arc associated with the formulation of

the object of knowledge?

The object of knowledge and the real object

In describing the connection between the object of knowledge and the

41

real object is knowable but does not provide a detailed analysis of how

,

20

it can be guaranteed that a particular object is the rea1 object. One

major question raised by his analysis is: By what mechanism does the

production of the object of knowledge produce the cognitive appropriation

of the real object which exists outside thought - the real world?

(Althusser, 1970:56). Answer: By practice. Althusser rejects the

duality of theory and practice as opposites and suggests that the dichotomy

is merely an 'ideological myth' (Althusser, 1970:58). There exists only

distinct practices (e.g., economic, political, ideological, scientific).

As it is scientific practice which is of major importance for this paper

let us look more closely at what Althusser has to say about this practice.

Scientific practice is divisible into different 'domains' (e.g.,

mathematics, philosophy). The knowledge produced by these practices are

validated by the strict exercise of the scientific practice (Althusser,

1970:59) and the science itself (in practice) determines the validity of

its knowledge: 'They have no need for verification from external practices

to declare knowledges they produce to be "true", i.e., to be knowledge'

21

(Althusser, 1970:59). The same process is involved in Althusser's

presentation of how theoretical practices produce knowledge as is involved

in his critique of the Hegelian problematic which moves from the 'concrete'

to the 'abstract'. The latter is a reflection process in which the external

social formation validates the abstract. In scientific practice, reflection is still the process in the validation of the knowledge of scientific

practice, but it is an internal reflection determined by the practice

itself.

Unfortunately, the 'internal validation' thesis as proposed by

Althusser is purely descriptive and is only re-emphasising the structural

nature of knowledge as practice. Bernard views scientific practice as a

are compatible within the one construct. For Bernard it is a practice for

producing knowledge and in which 'experimental proofs consist in

demonstrating the conformity of a result with the specified conditions of

experimentation and its variants with these conditions' (Hirst, 1973:453).

This view is again consistent with the denial of the existence of any

universal method for the production of scientific knowledge - it is

scientific practices which determine scientific knowledge. From Bernard's

view of scientific practice, one thing that distinguishes the product of

scientific practice from non-scientific knowledge is that the latter,

unlike the former, cannot provide proof of its product in terms of the

'specified conditions of experimentation'.

Social formation as a determinant of thought

The above discussion, although throwing light on the problem of

scientific practice does not resolve the question posed earlier, i.e.,

what is the mechanism by which the object of knowledge appropriates the

real object? As we have seen the immediate answer to this is 'by practice'

but in order to clarify the nature of the object upon which this practice

operates it is necessary to consider in greater detail that which in

Althusser's schema constitutes the real object. The distinction that

Althusser makes between the real object and the object of knowledge is

paralleled in Marx by a distinction in the production of these objects.

Whereas the real object is produced by a series of historical events in a

real order:

The production process of the object of knowledge takes place entirely in knowledge and is carried out according to a. different order in which the thought categories which 'reproduce' the real categories do not occupy the same place as they do in the order of real historical genesis, but quite different places assigned them by their function

in the production process of the object of knowledge (Althusser, 1970:41).

Althusser's understanding of the relation between thought and reality is

43

material, the tools of the means of production and the historical

conditions in which it produces (Althusser, 1970:41). The reality

determines the thought of individuals 'who can only "think" the "problems"

already actually or potentially posed ... "thought" is a peculiar real

system' (Althusser, 1970:42). The nature of the reality, that is the

social formation (legal-political-ideological) then, determines in the

first instance the raw material, and hence, individuals in different social

22

formations worked on different raw materials. This raw material docs

not represent an intuition or 'imaginary posit' but a complex element

already elaborated and transformed (Althusser, 1970:43). The positioning

of thought and the raw material within a particular social formation (as

the determinant component) means that the problematic and solution of a

discourse reflect the elements (either as a unity or in part) of that

social formation (religious, ethical, political or other) (Althusser,

1970:52). In this context, with the object of knowledge existing 'in the

form of ideology at the moment of constitution of the science which is

going to produce knowledge from it in the specific mode that defines it'

(Althusser, 1970:46), the problem and solution exist in a sort of circular

void as a reflection of the elements of social formation. How then do we

break through this ideological - reflection - representation? Althusser's

response to this question is inadequate. He suggests that what is required

is the development of a 'new problematic which allows the real problem to

be posed' (Althusser, 1970:52). However the way in which a new problematic

is developed is not made clear nor is it clear how we know that it is now

the real problem which is posed.

Althusser avoids idealism by positing the distinction between the real

problem, practice, etc., and ideology, but the nature of the former and

methods of knowing it are not clearly elucidated. The inability of

leads him to resort to the idea of knowledge as (at least in part) a

function of historical circumstances:

At each moment of the history of the knowledges this history takes knowledges for what they are, whether they declare themselves

knowledges or not, whether they are ideological or scientific etc.,

for knowledges (Althusser, 1970:61).

In other words the products of these practices reflect a 'knowledge

effect' (Althusser, 1970:61). A further confusion in Althusser's

conception is that his writings suggest that the solution of the problem

of the appropriation of the real object lies solely within the nature of

the different practices applied rather than the nature of the object upon

which the practice operates. For instance he says:

The problem of cognitive appropriation of the real object by the object of knowledge, which is a special case of the appropriation

of the real world by different practices, theoretical, aesthetic,

religious, ethical, technical, etc. (Althusser, 1970:66, emphasis added).

This statement implies that epistemologically, there is no important

distinction between the appropriation of the real object by the object of

knowledge and other practices. That is, there is no indication why the

appropriation of the real world by the object of knowledge needs to be

regarded as a special case. Althusser seems to be positing the existence

of the real object which is 'true' but which no adequate method of

appropriation of this object can be specified. This is also coupled with

an historical and cultural notion of knowledge effect. This position

seems to come close to Foucault's notion of truth and power which will be

dealt with later.

Althusser does not clearly elucidate on the nature and role of truth

in his theory of knowledge but appears to be talking about different

levels of truth. At one level he seems to be referring to an absolute

truth, e.g., 'the Marx through whom spoke the truth' (Althusser, 1969:52),

while the most common usage of the term in his writing is to treat it as

45

synonymous with knowledge, i.e., the product of practices, and is

therefore confirmed by the practice itself:

We showed that the validity of a scientific proposition as a knowledge was ensured in a determinate scientific practice by the action of particular forms which ensure the presence of scientificity in the production of knowledge, in other words, by specific forms that confer on a knowledge its character as a ('true') knowledge

(Althusser, 1970:67).

This usage of 'truth' in this context implies validity which reintroduces

the problem of the means for determining the nature of these specific

forms that confer on a knowledge its character as 'true' knowledge.

A third usage of the term truth which is related to this notion of

validity is in the context of the criticism Althusser makes of the

Hegelian model of science, i.e., the duality of theory and practice. If,

in this model, the theory and solution to questions are imposed from

'external bodies' then indeed the ideas are judged according to the norms

imposed by the external body as to what is true (Althusser, 1970:56-57).

Consistent with this particular formulation and his notion of scientific

practice, Althusser argues that a scientific practice provides its own

assessment of what is true (Althusser, 1970:59).

Althusser has distinguished between the object of knowledge and the

real object and presented a critique of empiricism which can be applied

to the Willers' scientific system of knowledge. His critique of empiricism

is not based solely on the inadequacy of the sensory process of developing

empriricist knowledge, but upon the nature of a problematic which

incorrectly distinguishes between two levels, i.e., theoretical and

empirical, and which confuses the object of knowledge with the real object.

Geras has neatly summarised Althusser's position in two propositions,

one of which is:

Scientific knowledge is not immediately and directly (i.e.,

miraculously) given in the consciousness of an individual or class, but has its specific condition and processes of production, which involve, among other things, the activity of theoretical labour ...

However, some of Althusser's arguments on theoretical practice and the

production of knowledge 'lead us straight into the realms of mystery'

(Geras, 1972:80). Althusser's position, while avoiding the relativism and

sociologism of Kuhn's, suffers from the shortcomings of, on the one hand,

describing a general form of a theory of knowledge, but on the other

omitting the means by which it operates, e.g., how is Generality I

determined? It is unclear as to what role the social formation (ideological,

political, economic) and its corresponding elements (legal, religious) play

in determining practices. Consequently, a major failing in Althusser's

scheme is his inability to connect certain practices to knowledge. Ills

view is consistent if his apparent insistence on truth, the real object

and scientific practice is rejected for a nihilistic notion of knowledge.

That is, it is accepted that scientific practice, e.g., the experiment,

produces knowledge and that all practices work on raw materials (concepts)

I

which constitute the object of knowledge but that we can never produce

knowledge of the real object. To argue against this position, in the

context of Althusser' s approach, is to disregard the distinction he makes

between the real object and the object of knowledge, and fall back into the

empiricist pit! Furthermore, in respect of Althusser's scheme, to claim

that we can produce knowledge of the real object, is to argue for the

existence of absolute truth, a position which, in regard to a materialist

conception of scientific knowledge, is difficult to sustain. If looked at

closely then, Althusser's conceptualisation, at least the parts of it

discussed in this chapter, while presenting some useful ideas for the

production of knowledge, seems to contain a number of inconsistencies and

to create serious dilemmas. It seems fair to say that Althusser himself

is aware of some of these problems and their implications and sees some

answers lying within the structure of discourse-.

We can say, then, that the mechanism of production of the knowledge effect lies in the mechanism which underlies the action of the forms of order in the scientific discourse of the proof (Althusser, 1970:67) .

47

If discourses (and problematics) represent thought systems, and if knowledge is a function of thought (which is itself determined by the social

formation), and if the interiority of the theoretical practice determines the validity (i.e., supplies the proof) of the practice, then the

organisation of concepts within a discourse is one important point of focus for an understanding of how knowledge is produced. (Another important point of focus is the nature of the social formation which Althusser has

not dealt with adequately in his analysis.) However it needs to be kept

in mind that:

The knowledge effect is produced as an effect of the scientific discourse, which exists only as a discourse of the system, i.e., of the objects grasped in the structure of its complex constitution

... (Althusser, 1970:68).

It is possible that some of the problems involved with Althusser's notion

of knowledge effect can be elaborated on, even resolved, by adopting some

of the ideas from other writers, e.g., Michel Foucault.

Michel Foucault and knowledge as discourse

At the outset it must be realised that there are 'three Foucaults',

i.e., three writings of the author which represent considerably different

and incompatible epistemological positions on the development of knowledge.

These writings can be classified as 'early Foucault' (episteme), 'main

Foucault' (archaeology of knowledge) and 'later Foucault' (truth and

power). It is important then to be clear as to which particular set of

concepts is being considered when analysing the work of Foucault. The

concept which offers a noticeably radical and different conception of

scientific knowledge than that offered by the positivists, the Willcrs, or

Althusser is Foucault's episteme. It is also probably the most difficult

to sustain on the basis of rigorous, coherent argument. To recap briefly

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