Structural Separation Leads to Normative Incoherence

Structural separation takes various forms and as a result can lead to different causes of incoherence. As shown in figure 1 (chapter one) on incoherence, institutional arrangements and unintentional rivalries have been classified as the two causes of incoherence based on structural organization. To this, I have added competing interests and lack of information on the intentional side (bottom left corner) and institutional arrangement on the unintentional side (bottom right corner) (see figure 2, chapter one). In this section, I aim to show that several types of organization structure lead to those four reasons of incoherence. These causes are not definitive in the sense that they are not the only causes that lead to incoherence, within this structure-actor divide, they are most prominent.

The different types of organizational divides are the following: (1) Separation of roles within an embassy understood as the split of tasks between delegation staff; (2) geographical and linked to that a political-technical divide of foreign staff between North and South Vietnam;

and (3) a supra-national/inter-governmental divide between the EU and the member states.

Separation of Roles: Ambassador, Political Counselor, Trade Counselor, Development Counselor

Depending on the size of the countries, the first indication is the separation of tasks. In each embassy, the usual tasks correspond to diplomatic, political, economic, development and other affairs. In smaller embassies these tasks might overlap, whereas in bigger embassies there are often different departments. Each task usually handled by a so-called counselor or Head of Mission, who attends the monthly meetings organized by the EU delegation in Hanoi.

The Heads of Mission, political counselors, trade counselors and development counselors each have monthly meetings whereas consular counselors meet once every quarter. In these meetings, participants exchange about recent developments in their field or changes in the Vietnamese legislation that might also be relevant for the other attendants. Sharing and

158 coordinating are the main objectives of these meetings, especially in situations where the EU and the member states share their interests. These meetings are not a platform for negotiation.

As a result, a seemingly clear distinction is made between coordination and cooperation since larger cooperation projects being decided in the headquarters in the home country. Within the realm of coordination, financial resources are rarely fused (Interview 12).

The interviews reflect a strong tendency to separate between the different kinds of counselors insofar as development is generally not considered a mechanism for any normative discussions. Instead, normative discussions are left to political counselors or ambassadors. Development counselors mostly work on the supervision of development projects. Responsibilities often overlap in smaller embassies and fewer staff, consequently political and development responsibilities are merged in one person. In embassies where this is not the case, each counselor has their distinct role. In the monthly development meetings organized by the EU, donor coordination is the main objective with particular focus on ensuring that projects are not being duplicated (Interview 9, 12). This highlights the technicality of development instead of its potentially normative character. Additional examples for the non-normativity of the development sector are the multi-annual development programs. The EU’s 2014-2020 multi-annual development program for Vietnam focuses on sustainable energy and governance/rule of law (European Union, 2014a). Promoting the rule of law and good governance are two of the norms the EU is committed to and that are comprised in the set of norms relevant to this research. The fact that the EU makes this one of their priority sectors indicates a normative dimension in development to a certain extent. However, the budgetary contribution via the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) – the main development instrument next to thematic programs – shows how strongly sustainable energy is prioritized over governance and rule of law: out of the total commitment of EUR 400 million for the period 2014-2020, 86.5 percent are estimated for sustainable energy and 12.5 percent for governance and rule of law (and one percent for “other measures”). Under the thematic programming, the two main areas are human rights & democracy and civil society & local authorities, but further initiatives are not specified in the MIP.

Smaller programs are on environmental issues and sustainability (Interview 14). Smaller projects in cooperation with NGOs are along the thematic lines and can cover human rights concerns, minorities or illegal logging, whereas the big projects under the DCI are in cooperation with the Vietnamese authorities. To put the two instruments into perspective:

159 under the DCI EUR 400 million are allocated for seven years, which amounts to roughly EUR 57 million per year, whereas under the thematic instrument EUR 4 million were allocated for two years (Interview 14). Again, this reflects the EU’s priorities and indicates that non-normative projects are emphasized.

The separation between the sectors reflects the separation of responsibility towards norms promotion. Each sector has its own norms and those relevant for this research, most prominently human rights and freedom of speech, are under the premises of the political counselors or ambassadors (Interview 1, 12, 14). Reality, however, is a bit more complicated than this simplistic separation of responsibilities. There are quite a few “grey zones” where responsibilities do overlap to some extent. The Human Rights Dialogue (HRD) is a case in point for this blurred separation. The HRD is a political dialogue between the EU and the Vietnamese government to share views on human rights policies and discuss the implementation of human rights measures. Especially political freedoms, such as a multi-party system, a fair chance to stand for elections¹⁶, a fair voting system, and freedom of speech and the press are a major concern. The HRD is held annually bringing together the EU Delegation under leadership from the EEAS and the Government of Vietnam. In addition to that, the EU and Vietnam have a Joint Commission with a sub-group on Cooperation in the Areas of Institutional Strengthening, Administrative Reform, Governance and Human Rights (EU Delegation to Vietnam, 2007).

In terms of structure, the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) is the contact point for the HRD. For development relations, the Vietnamese Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) is responsible (Interview 14). Thus, while there is not only a separation from the European side, the Vietnamese also make this distinction. Given this official separation, there are specific measure in place to ensure development projects do not entail any risks such as human rights violations. Every EU project needs to be validated by this measure, the so-called risk management framework, before any funds can be disbursed to the Vietnamese government. As can be noticed already, the language used for this procedure is rather technical and implies that there are certain standards that a project needs to meet, but apart from that there are no pro-active activities towards norm promotion in the field of development.

However, it needs to be kept in mind that legislative changes do not always represent societal

16 Independent people, people that are not member of the Communist Party, can stand for elections, but the process favors party members are consequently the chances of a non-member to be elected are very low.

160 changes. The Human Rights Dialogue is a political tool with which formal changes might be achieved, but the actual implementation in the society needs to follow to accomplish real change. In recent years, for example, Vietnam has changed their legislation about lesbian and gay people decriminalizing being homosexual and by doing so following the Western example. The donor countries were satisfied about the success but in reality, a son of Vietnamese parents is not allowed to be gay but needs to marry a woman and have children (Interview 1).

Another example of a grey zone of separation between the sectors relates to the phasing out of development programs, which lead to trade counselors attending the development meeting, because the delegation does not have a development counselor anymore (Interview 2). This is not the case for all the meetings, but important sessions are usually attended by a delegation representative other than the development counselor.

The separation of sectors does make sense from an efficiency point of view, but in turn has negative effects on the coherence between the policies. Spill-over from one sector to another does not seem to be desired. Ambassadors and political representatives are in charge of diplomatic affairs among which are normative discussions, while development staff in responsible for technical tasks and trade representative manage business relations between their home country and Vietnam. Because of this separation, norms do not constitute a major concern in the development and trade sector. Of course, there are exception, but general tendencies point towards a conscious split between each sector’s responsibilities.

As can be seen, development programs primarily emphasize technical support, leaving out the normative dimension that would cover human rights, equality, or democratic issues. With regard to the sub-question “Does the EU represent itself as a normative power in the development sector”, it can be said that this does not hold entirely true. Rather, development is a sector that focuses on economic development mainly, comprising all sectors from health to environment, but largely leaves our normative discussions. Instead, Heads of Mission and political counselors are in charge of normative exchange with Vietnam.

Normative Coherence within Sectors

The above discussion might indicate that there is no normative coherence between the sectors, but at least within each of the sectors given the fact that there are monthly coordination meetings between the EU and EU member state delegates. But how coherent are the positions within each sector network? Out of the interview respondents, only two have an official

161 double position combining a political sector with a technical sector (Interview 2, 3). The political sector is underrepresented in the available pool of data, which is why no general arguments can be made, but in this case, a strong normative dimension is inherent to this political post (Interview 1, 12). Regarding the diplomatic network, the common norms are the support for human rights, for example through support of dissidents or human rights lawyers, the rule of law in relation to the death penalty, gender equality, but also economic topics (Interview 4, 7, 17, 24). Norms can best be addressed at occasions such as the EU-Vietnam Human Rights Dialogue, the German reunification celebrations or together with the United Nations, which are occasions that offer the space to discuss normative aspects, which are normally not observable in-day-to-day work (Interview 4, 17, 24). One respondent highlighted that human rights are a significant topic for all EU representations and plays a prominent role in the relations with Vietnam (Interview 24).

For the development network, norms can have different meanings to the development actors in the networks depending on their professional position. Naturally, the Head of Development in a big embassy is in charge of tasks, which differ from the tasks a project manager is responsible for at a national development organization. In their daily work, their professional priorities strongly differ. Similarly, the national development banks operate on other terms as embassy officials or development organizations do, and as a result, they prioritize other norms such as cost norms (Interview 5, 8, 9, 13). Environmental and social norms do play a role nevertheless in the selection process of a potential project to be funded but are often undermined by the project plans. As one respondent explained, in cases of resettlement in order to build a hydropower dam it will be considered how to maintain the standard of living of the resettled persons (personal interview not identified numerically in order to ensure anonymity). This example poses a difficult scenario in which access to electricity is weighed against resettlement, and a certain set of norms are in incorporated in the project selection and project implementation even though the project is such does not promote norms, but cost norms seem to dominate the decisions.

For economic representatives, i.e. in the trade network, the normative dimension is not observable. Instead, these issues are left to their colleagues at the embassy who are responsible for norm promotion (Interview 6, 11, 16). One respondent explained that the economic representatives’ task is “pure business”. In the trade network, norms as they are understood in this dissertation are not incorporated. Therefore, it cannot be said that the trade sector is

162 coherent in norm implementation.

Geographical & Political-Technical Separation between Northern and Southern Vietnam The separation between northern Vietnam and southern Vietnam in terms of responsibilities between third country representatives reinforces the above-mentioned divide between sectors.

More specifically, the separation of sectors strongly overlaps with the divide between representatives in Hanoi and representatives in Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC). In general, HCMC is the city for business and Hanoi the city for politics. This is because all the Vietnamese ministries are located in the capital. 70-80 percent of the Vietnamese business is in the South (Interview 6). As a result, foreign representatives adapt to this internal distinction by placing the embassies in Hanoi and general consulates or commercial offices in HCMC. Germany, for example, has the embassy in Hanoi as well as an office of the Delegates of German Industry and Commerce in Vietnam (Außenhandelskammer AHK), and a consulate, the German Business Association and another AHK office in HCMC. Denmark and Finland have their embassies in Hanoi and commercial/trade offices in HCMC. As a result, political and economic processes are rather kept apart, which is also reflected by the interview responses. The majority of respondents based in HCMC indicate that their tasks are primarily non-political, i.e. either trade or development related (Interview 6, 7, 8).

Interestingly, the EU does not have a separate office in HCMC. One of the respondents pointed out that this is one of the reasons why contact between the representatives in HCMC and the EU delegation in Hanoi is extremely rare (Interview 7). Similarly, visits from economic representatives based in HCMC might be just as rare and short, ranging from one day every couple of months to up to 5 days every month depending on the representative (Interview 2, 6, 14, 16).

Another issue to consider is that even development representatives HCMC are mainly focused on technical tasks and leave political tasks, such as the discussion around norms, to their colleagues in Hanoi (Interview 6, 8). Monitoring the implementation of infrastructure, education or environmental projects are among the daily concerns.

Supra-national/Inter-governmental Separation between EU and Member States

One of the major debates of European integration has been about supra-nationalism and inter-governmentalism. While the latter emphasizes national sovereignty, for former vouches for competences at the EU level. This debate does not materialize in those exact terms in EU

163 external relations, but in terms of member state’s support for the EU. A few member states are supportive of the EU, particularly of the EU delegation’s presence in Vietnam, whereas others did and still do not see the need for an additional delegation.

Therefore, one further layer of separation is the distinction between the EU and its member states. Only in 1996 did the EU open a representative office in Vietnam. By that time, some of the member states had already established their relationship with Vietnam and deepened their cooperation with the host country. Bilateral relations have shaped and still shape politics between the donors and the recipient. For some, the EU was an additional burden in the development sector as many donors were already present in Vietnam. Yet another donor was not appreciated by all, and, as a consequence, not all of the member states were and still are fully supportive of EU activities in Vietnam. The monthly coordination meetings are aimed to share information and avoid duplication of projects especially in those sectors where long-standing relations with Vietnam have already proofed to be successful. The meetings are based on consultation and consensus, and in some cases, certain member states have to be convinced of an EU project (Interview 9). It is unmistakable, that the member states do not follow any EU instructions, but that coordination takes place between equal negotiation partners. Member states report to their home countries and receive instructions from their headquarters. In that sense, any EU legislation or policy would make a detour via the member states’ government, which in turn would direct the delegations abroad. Some of the member states are more supportive of the EU delegation and the EU in general (Interview 3, 17), whereas others are more critical (Interview 2, 7).

Under a member state’s umbrella, cooperation between the different sectors appears to be quite good in terms of regular exchange. On the one hand, there are regular meetings among different development representatives, and, on the other hand, there are regular meetings between the development, trade and political representatives (Interview 6, 7 & 9).

Another measure that reflects on cooperation are the annual Blue Books that the EU delegation compiles. These Blue Books are documents that compile information about development activities pursued by the member states and the EU delegation and are publicly available since 2007. However, reporting mechanisms vary between the member states and, consequently, the data provided is hardly comparable. While the delegation has been working on a joint template, mechanisms to measure aid allocation and aid disbursements remain distinct (Interview 14). This practice illustrates the relationship between the EU and the

164 member states quite accurately: on the one hand, coordinating strategies are in place, but on the other hand, each member state adheres to its national rules and regulations.

Power relations between the member states and the EU institutions as introduced in chapter three, are broadly reflected by the practices in Vietnam. Earlier, it was mentioned that the member states are seeking more influence in the EU policy-making through the newly created EEAS. This is not to say that the member states generally undermine EU policies, but that governments enjoy their sovereignty and might not want to give a large share of their responsibilities to the bureaucratic staff in the Commission. Similarly, the monthly meetings initiated by the EU are attended by most delegations in Hanoi, but simultaneously, each member state pursues its own national development program. There may be coordination on shared interests, but where interests do not overlap, each actor follows its national strategies.

A common interest from a normative point of view, for example, is anti-corruption.

Legislation still varies between member states (Interview 2), but anti-corruption seems to be of interest to all actors, including development and trade actors (Interview 2, 3, 7, 8, 14, 17).

No Spill-over between Sectoral Policy Networks

Spill-over from one sector network to another was not identifiable. Diplomatic and political counselors do deal with norms such as freedoms, rule of law, equality, but in development they are quite underrepresented. In trade, these norms were of no importance.

This is due to the above-explained structural separation between counselors, between North and South Vietnam, and between the EU and the member states. All four causes of incoherence – diverging interests, institutional arrangement, lack of information, and rivalry – can be attributed to the organizational structure of EU-Vietnam relations. In terms of norm implementation, the structure seems to play a great role again. As already presented in the previous chapter, norms seem to be a political matter, to which less attention is paid to when

This is due to the above-explained structural separation between counselors, between North and South Vietnam, and between the EU and the member states. All four causes of incoherence – diverging interests, institutional arrangement, lack of information, and rivalry – can be attributed to the organizational structure of EU-Vietnam relations. In terms of norm implementation, the structure seems to play a great role again. As already presented in the previous chapter, norms seem to be a political matter, to which less attention is paid to when