United States Israel Total
Crisis decisions 14 17 31 Predominant leader 13 7 20 Single group 1 10 11 Coalition 0 0 0 Transition decisions 14 14 28 Predominant leader 6 0 6 Single group 8 14 22 Coalition 0 0 0
Results of Hypotheses
Decision Units
The first two hypotheses relate to the types of decision unit that emerged during the decision process.
H1: During sequential crisis decision-making, the nature and type of
decision unit will remain constant throughout the duration of the crisis.
H2: During sequential crisis decision-making, the decision unit will likely
take the form of predominant leader or single group.
The results of the study regarding the consistency of the decision unit is mixed. During the crisis period, the decision units for the U.S. fell overwhelmingly into the predominant leader category (13 of 14), but they were evenly split, seven predominant leader and seven single group, during the crisis transition period. Conversely, Israeli decision units were divided during the crisis period (seven predominant leaders and ten single group decisions); and all of the decision units in the transition period were single group. Overall, the trend in the type of decision unit from crisis to crisis transition was a dramatic decrease in predominant leader decisions (20 during the crisis, six during the transition).
There could be several reasons for this discrepancy. One reason could be the institutional structures involved in foreign policy decision-making, as well as the often times ambiguous nature of leadership roles. In Israel’s parliamentary system, foreign
policy decisions and matters of national security are the responsibilities of the prime minister and his or her Cabinet.1 And, according to Yehuda Ben-Meir (1986, 99), the
final governmental authority – in the absence of an explicit Cabinet decision to the contrary – is the prime minister (see also Brownstein 1977). Foreign policy decisions, therefore, seem to depend on the leadership style of the prime minister, as well as the coalition of the Cabinet (Ben-Meir 1986; Brownstein 1977; Dayan 1976; Meir 1975). Meir, prime minister during the crisis period, enjoyed a significant majority in her coalition government, holding 72 of 120 seats in the Knesset, as opposed to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (transition period), who had only a one-vote margin in the Knesset when he won his party’s leadership election in 1974. Meir generally had the support of her Cabinet, whereas Rabin had to contend with two adversarial Cabinet members with whom he disagreed on many issues (Brownstein 1977; Derfler 2014). In other words, Meir may have had some flexibility in exercising her authority, while Rabin did not.
As for the United States, foreign policy decision-making is generally conducted within the Executive Branch, which consists of the President and his subordinates (i.e., members of his Cabinet and various advisers). The Constitution signifies the President as the primary actor in matters of foreign policy, if he so chooses. However, because of the political problems that plagued the Nixon administration – i.e., Vice-President Agnew’s resignation and the Watergate scandal – Secretary of State Kissinger was the primary actor involved in managing the October crisis (Isaacson 1992; Kissinger 1982; Quandt 1977, 2001). Where Nixon was distracted with domestic issues, his successor,
(Quandt 1977). During the crisis period under the Nixon administration, Kissinger was able to take some liberties with decisions. This did not seem to be the case under Ford.
A second reason why the decision units may not be consistent across
governments could be the position of the players in the course of events. Israel was directly involved in the conflict, whereas the United States was primarily involved in conflict resolution. The environment in which Israel had to make decisions was decidedly more stressful than that in the United States. The literature suggests that decision-makers under stress may seek support from a group of trusted associates who have a first-hand understanding of the immediate crisis (Bar-Joseph and McDermott 2008; ‘t Hart, Stern, and Sundelius 1997). In addition, Brecher’s (1980) study on crisis decision-making in Israel finds that as stress increases, so does the number of persons consulted. That is not to say that an increase in consultations implies group decision- making. Indeed, the evidence shows, and both Meir (1975) and Dayan (1976) admit, that it was the prime minister who was responsible for, and ultimately made, many of the decisions during the October crisis.
Brecher (1980) concludes that when stress is reduced in the environment, Israeli decision-makers return to routine procedures for choice – i.e., institutional versus ad hoc decision-making. Whether Meir merely consulted with the Cabinet or requested approval on a decision, Israeli leadership was confronted with an immediate physical threat to its security during the crisis period. With the possible exception of the nuclear alert, I would argue that the United States and Israel were operating under
different fundamental threats and stress levels, which may have had an effect on the type of decision unit that emerged during the crisis.
As for the crisis transition period, the evidence seems to support Brecher’s (1980) assertion of a return to institutional decision-making. In fact, while a
comparison of the U.S. and Israeli decision units suggests that there may be slightly different processes for policymaking, both governments moved toward an increase in group decision-making during the crisis transition period.
As to Hypothesis #2, the findings seem to support the proposition that the decision unit will likely take the form of predominant leader or single group during the crisis and crisis transition periods. All of the decision units across both time periods and both governments were either predominant leader (26 of 59 cases) or single group (33 of 59 cases). This is perhaps consistent with the literature that suggests that the number of actors involved in crisis decision-making tends to contract (George 1980; Hermann and Hermann 1989; Hermann 2001; ‘t Hart 1990; Trumbore and Boyer 2000). However, because the DU framework indicates that a single group need only consist of two members, it tells us nothing about the dynamic nature of the decision unit – only that no one member alone can commit or withhold the resources of the government.
In the Israeli instances where the predominant leader emerged (all during the crisis period), it was Golda Meir who was identified as such. In the United States, the predominant leader was not always the same individual. During the crisis period,
Kissinger emerged as the predominant leader in seven decisions, while Nixon was identified as such in six decisions.
During numerous telephone conversations, Nixon repeatedly told Kissinger that whatever he thought would be fine with him. He issued this remark regarding strategy and the oil embargo, military aid to Israel, and handling of détente with the Soviets. The instances where Nixon intervened on any of Kissinger’s decisions seemed to be when there was negative feedback from the press, when new information reached the
President, or when decisions were not being implemented. William Quandt (1977, 130) asserts that, because of Nixon’s preoccupation with his “crumbling domestic base of support,” Kissinger was given considerable latitude in American diplomacy, particularly in dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict. Quandt claims that Kissinger occasionally called on Nixon to invoke his presidential authority and kept Nixon informed at each stage. Kissinger also ignored presidential directives on occasion.
Gerald Ford also gave Kissinger some negotiating room with Israel and Egypt, but, unlike Nixon, Ford took a genuine interest in Middle East policy (Isaacson 1992; Kissinger 1982; Quandt 1977). And, although Kissinger heavily influenced foreign policy in the new administration, Ford chose to participate in the decision-making process. But because Kissinger did hold sway with Ford, the majority of decisions were made as a single group.
Since Meir resigned in April 1974 but stayed on in a caretaker capacity until the new government was formed in June, she was involved in ten of the fourteen decisions during the transition period. A comparison of the decision units alone from the Meir
regime to Rabin’s government does not say anything about the nature of the decision- making process.
Occasions for Decision
The occasions for decisions are classified into six types: (1) external shock, (2) internal (domestic) shock, (3) positive feedback, (4) negative feedback, (5) new
information, and (6) other. All of the types except for other are designed to address Hypotheses #3 through #7. The classification other incorporates all types of occasions for decision not otherwise specified. Where possible, I elaborate on the other category by providing some context as to the nature of the occasion for decision. For the
purposes of the study, there is no differentiation between the various contexts, and the effects of the other category are not considered.
As might be expected, one decision is often the result of more than one type of occasion for decision. Indeed, the findings indicate that out of the sixty-two decisions taken, twenty were initiated by two or more types of occasions. Likewise, one occasion for decision can spawn multiple decisions and thus multiple decision units. Table 7.2 provides a data summary of the different types of occasions for decision associated with the conditions of the decision environment (i.e., crisis versus crisis transition).
The type of occasion for decision most often found in this study is other (forty- one out of ninety-one), forty-five percent of the total. New information category accounts for the second highest number of occasions with seventeen; external shocks was observed in twelve cases; negative feedback was identified in eleven instances; and
The category internal shocks did not appear as the occasion in any of the identified decisions.