C. REPORT ON JUDICIARY (Sec 16) D. THE LOWER COURTS
d.1. Qualifications and Appointments (Secs. 7[1][2], 8[5],9)
[A.M. No. 01-1608-RTJ. January 16, 2001.]
(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 97-471-RTJ)
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF TAGUIG, METRO MANILA vs. Judge SANTIAGO G. ESTRELLA Facts:
The present controversy stemmed from an election protest filed by then mayoralty candidate Ricardo R. Papa, Jr. against Isidro B. Garcia, the candidate proclaimed mayor of Taguig, Metro Manila in the May 8, 1995 elections. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig and was eventually raffled to the sala of respondent judge. The issue narrowed down to the determination of the number of Garcia votes that should have been considered stray, there having been another candidate named Garcia. A revision committee was formed and thereafter reported that Papa objected to a total of 11,290 ballots and 3,049 were plain Garcia votes. Respondent judge issued an order directing the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to examine the contested ballots in the presence of a representative of both parties. After the examination of the NBI, the ballot boxes were ordered by the respondent to be removed from his custody and transferred to another RTC Branch. The NBI submitted its report and Garcia moved to be furnished with the said report. Respondent judge denied the motion. Only the court was furnished with the copy of the NBI report. After several motions and petitions for the resetting of the promulgation of judgment, a judgment was promulgated in favor of Papa. On the day of the promulgation of judgment, Garcia was given only by the respondent judge a few minutes to go over several pages of questioned documents. In his complaint, Garcia alleged that respondent judge gave unwarranted benefits to Papa, which caused undue injury to him as well as the people of Taguig by depriving them of their duly elected mayor. Respondent judge denied Garcia's allegations. The Court referred the matter to the Court Administrator for report and recommendation. The Office of the Court Administrator consented to the Comelec's finding that the respondent's action showed utter disregard of the appropriate procedure required of him, resulting in the disenfranchisement of thousands of voters. Issue:
Whether the judge is impartial. Held:
Yes. No less than the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence (Rule 1.01, Canon 1). Indeed, in every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and applicable laws unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion, or fear of criticism (Rule 3.02, Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct). Thus, this Court has continually reminded members of the bench that; The Judge should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly and properly administer justice. He must view himself as a priest for the administration of justice is akin to a religious crusade. Thus, exerting the same devotion as a priest "in the performance of the most sacred ceremonies of religious liturgy," the judge must render service with impartiality commensurate with public trust and confidence repose in him. (Dimatulac vs. Villon, 297 SCRA 679 [1998].
On this score, we find pertinent our ruling in the recent case of Evelyn Agpalasin vs. Judge Ernesto M. Agcaoili (A.M. No. RTJ-95-1308, April 12, 2000), that; A judge should, in pending or prospective litigation before him, he scrupulously careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend to waken the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships constitute an element in determining his judicial course. He must not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and integrity. A decision which correctly applies the law and jurisprudence will nevertheless be subject to questions of impropriety when rendered by a magistrate or tribunal believed to be less than impartial and honest. Verily, a judge must promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. These
stringent standards are intended to assure parties of just and equitable decisions and of a judiciary that is capable of dispensing impartial justice in every issue in every trial (Abundo vs. Manio, Jr., 312 SCRA 1 [1999]).
Author’s Note:
This case is TOTALLY IRRELEVANT to the topic under which it is classified. This deals purelywith judicial ethics and election law. Nothing was said about Secs 7,8, and 9 of Art VIII of the Constitution.
d.2. Salary (Sec 10)
d.3. Congressional power to reorganize and security of tenure (Secs 11,2[2])
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 57883. March 12, 1982.]
GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA vs. MANUEL ALBA Facts:
Please refer to the facts of this case under A.4 (Security of Tenure). For convenience, the author reproduces the ruling of the SC of this case hereinunder:
Issue:
Whether BP 129 violates the security of tenure of the members of the judiciary, hence unconstitutional.
Held:
No. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. The ponencia of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Cruz v. Primicias, Jr. reiterated such a doctrine: "We find this point urged by respondents, to be without merit. No removal or separation of petitioners from the service is here involved, but the validity of the abolition of their offices. This is a legal issue that is for the Courts to decide. It is well- known rule also that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. . . . And, of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office. The preliminary question laid at rest, we pass to the merits of the case. As well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith." The above excerpt was quoted with approval in Bendanillo, Sr. v. Provincial Governor, two earlier cases enunciating a similar doctrine having preceded it. As with the offices in the other branches of the government, so it is with the judiciary. The test remains whether the abolition is in good faith. As that element is conspicuously present in the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, then the lack of merit of this petition becomes even more apparent.
Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As
to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration.
To be specific, the Batasang Pambansa is expressly vested with the authority to reorganize inferior courts and in the process to abolish existing ones. As noted in the preceding paragraph, the termination of office of their occupants, as a necessary consequence of such abolition, is hardly distinguishable from the practical standpoint from removal, a power that is now vested in this Tribunal.
d.4. Removal (Sec 11) d.5. Jurisdiction (Sec 1)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 74457. March 20, 1987.]
RESTITUTO YNOT vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT Facts:
The constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A is assailed in this case. EO 626-A prohibits the unauthorized interprovincial movement and slaughtering of carabaos. The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raised by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.
The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains that the measure should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional.
Issue:
Whether the lower court are prevented from passing on issues involving constitutionality of law. Held:
No. This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the
constitutionality of certain measures. This simply means that the resolution of such cases
may be made in the first instance by these lower courts.
And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then "will be the time to make the hammer fall, and heavily," to recall Justice Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.
Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no shirking of the task for fear of retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially this Court.
d.6. Preparation of Decisions (Sec 14)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 169885. July 25, 2006.]
ARTEMIO PEDRAGOZA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FRANCISCO SUMULONG, JR. Facts:
This case started as an election protest which reached the COMELEC en banc. The said tribunal decided the case against Pedragoza. Pedragoza assailed the COMELEC Resolution because two Commissioners of the said tribunal inhibited themselves without expressly citing the reason therefor. Petitioner is of the view that this omission annuls the 30 September 2005 Resolution for lack of quorum, with the two non-participating Commissioners' votes becoming "inexistent."
While there is no extant record of the COMELEC's proceedings in adopting Section 1, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules, the parallel deliberations of the framers of the 1987 Constitution on Section 13, Article VIII shed light on the purpose of the rule requiring a member of this Court and all lower collegiate courts to state his reason for taking no part in a case. Because of the exact identity of the rule in question as stated in Section 1, Rule 18 and Section 13, Article VIII, these deliberations apply here by analogy.
Issues:
1. Whether the subject resolution is valid.
2. Does non-compliance with cite-the-reason requirement affect the validity of the decision? Held:
First Issue:
No. Under Section 1, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure 4 ("COMELEC Rules"), a COMELEC member who takes no part in a decision or resolution must state the reason for his inhibition. The provision states:
Procedure in Making Decisions. — The conclusions of the Commission in any case submitted to it for decision en banc or in Division shall be reached in consultation before the case
is assigned by raffle to a Member for the writing of the opinion of the Commission or the Division and a certification to this effect signed by the Chairman or the Presiding Commissioner, as the case may be, shall be incorporated in the decision. Any Member who took no part, or dissented, or abstained from a decision or resolution must state the reason therefor. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution imposes an identical requirement on the members of this Court and all lower collegiate courts. By intent of the Constitution's framers, as reflected in the language of the text, this requirement is mandatory. Owing to the exact identity of the two provisions' phrasing of the requirement in question, Section 1, Rule 18 (which, in all probability, was lifted from Section 13, Article VIII), must be of mandatory nature itself.
Second Issue:
No. Being a devise to dissuade members of this Court and all lower collegiate courts (or in this case, the members of the COMELEC) from not taking part in the deliberation of cases, the requirement has nothing to do with the ruling involved but concerns the judge himself. Thus, non-compliance with the rule does not annul the ruling in which a judge takes no part but may be basis for holding him responsible for the omission.
Indeed, the omission involved here is akin to the failure of the head of a collegiate court to issue the certification under Section 13, Article VIII that "The conclusions of the . . . Court in any case submitted to it for decision en banc or in division [was] reached in consultation before the case [was] assigned to a Member for the writing of the opinion of the Court," a requirement also imposed on the Chairman or the Presiding Commissioner of the COMELEC, as the case may be, under Section 1, Rule 18. We held in Consing v. Court of Appeals that
such omission does not invalidate the
questioned ruling but "may be basis for holding the official responsible for the
omission to account therefor.
The absence, however, of the certification would not necessarily mean that the case submitted for decision had not been reached in consultation before being assigned to one member for the writing of the opinion of the Court since the regular performance of official duty is presumed [Sec. 5 (m) of Rule 131, Rules of Court]. The lack of certification at the end of the decision would only serve as evidence of failure to observe the certification requirement and may be basis for holding the official responsible for the omission to account therefor . Such absence of certification would not have the effect of invalidating the decision. Accordingly, we hold that the failure of Commissioners Sadain and Tuason to state the reasons for their inhibition from the 30 September 2005 Resolution
does not affect the validity
of that ruling.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 164702. March 15, 2006.]
PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA (PM) and BUTIL FARMERS PARTY (BUTIL) vs. COMELEC Facts:
This case essentially raises again the question on the correct computation of seats to be allotted to party-list representatives as decided in the landmark case (now abandoned) of Veteran’s. The COMELEC resolution was questioned by the petitioners because it refused to apply the Veteran’s case computation but rather on a later November 20, 2003 Resolution in Ang Bagong Bayani case where the
Court gave an additional seat to BUHAY. However in the latter case, the court advised that such decision is pro hac vice.
Issues:
1. What is pro hac vice?
2. Whether it is proper for the COMELEC en banc to rely on that pro hac vice Resolution and consider the Veteran’s Doctrine abandoned.
Held:
First Issue:
Pro hac vice is a Latin term meaning "for this one particular occasion." A ruling expressly qualified as pro hac vice
cannot be relied upon as a precedent to govern other cases
.Second Issue:
No. It was therefore erroneous for respondent Commission to apply the November 20, 2003 Resolution and rule that the formula in Veterans has been abandoned.
d.7. Mandatory Period for deciding ART VIII, Sec 15
ART VIII, Secs 12-14
[G.R. No. L-42428. March 18, 1983.]
BERNARDINO MARCELINO vs. THE HON. FERNANDO CRUZ, JR. Facts:
A petition for prohibition and writ of habeas corpus to enjoin respondent Judge Fernando Cruz, Jr. from promulgating his decision in Criminal Case No. C-5910, entitled "People of the Philippines versus Bernardino Marcelino," and for release from detention of petitioner, the accused in said case, on the ground of loss of jurisdiction of respondent trial court over the case for failure to decide the same within the period of ninety [90] days from submission thereof. Petitioner espouses the thesis that the three month period prescribed by Section 11[1] of Article X of the 1973 Constitution, being a constitutional directive, is mandatory in character and that non-observance thereof results in the loss of jurisdiction of the court over the unresolved case.
Held:
Undisputed is the fact that on November 28, 1975, or eighty-five (85) days from September 4, 1975 the date the case was deemed submitted for decision, respondent judge filed with the deputy clerk of court the decision in Criminal Case No. 5910. He had thus veritably rendered his decision on said case within the three-month period prescribed by the Constitution. In Comia v. Nicolas, 29 SCRA 492, Ago v. Court of Appeals, 6 SCRA 530, and Balquidra v. Court of First Instance, 83 SCRA 122, this Court refers that
the rendition of the judgment in trial courts
refers to the filing of the signed decision with
the clerk of court
. There is no doubt that the constitutional provision cited by petitioner refers to the rendition of judgment and not to the promulgation thereof. Thus, it is this date that should be considered in determining whether or not respondent judge had resolved the case within the alloted period.Indeed, the date of promulgation of a decision could not serve as the reckoning date because the same necessary comes at a later date, considering that notices have to be sent to the accused as well as to the other parties involved, an event which is beyond the control of the judge. As pointed out in People v. Court of Appeals, 99 Phil. 786, the promulgation of a judgment in the trial court does not necessarily coincide with the date of its delivery by the judge to the clerk of court.
Section 11[1], Article X of the New Constitution provides in full, to wit:
"SEC. 11[1]. Upon the effectivity of this Constitution, the maximum period within which a case or matter shall be decided or resolved from the date of its submission, shall be eighteen months for the Supreme court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve