A theoretical framework

The concept of FACE is going to be presented and analysed within the theoretical framework of cognitive linguistics (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987, 1993).

Lakoff (1987) formulated a notion of radial category, which can be represented structurally as a container. Its subcategories are containers inside it. It is structured by the center—periphery schema. One subcategory is the center, defined by a cluster of converging cognitive models. The other subcategories,

non-central extensions, are linked to the center. They “may be ‘subcenters,’ that is

they may have further center—periphery structures imposed on them” (Lakoff, 1987: 287). Extensions are not specialized instances of the central category, but are extended by convention as its variants (Lakoff, 1987). Different categories have a radial structure; e.g., Lakoff (1987) presents the two concepts of MOTHER and TRUTH as radial categories; Roman Kalisz and Wojciech Kubiński (1993) discuss the radial category of speech acts; Bogusław Bierwiaczonek (2002), analysing various subcategories of LOVE, describes them in terms of radial models. In the radial category, there may be two different kinds of extensions: metaphoric and metonymic.

In cognitive linguistics, metaphor is understood as “a cross-domain mapping in the same conceptual system” (Lakoff, 1993: 203), e.g.:

TIME IS MONEY You are wasting my time. You’re running out of time.

That flat tire cost me an hour (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 7—8).

The target domain is “usually abstract or psychological, and the source domain, usually a physical domain, is more basic and easily accessible for human perception” (Kalisz et al., 1996: 42). The term “metaphorical expression refers to a linguistic expression (a word, phrase, or sentence) that is the surface realization of such a cross-domain mapping” (Lakoff, 1993: 203). The mappings

are not arbitrary. They obey the principle called by Lakoff (1993) the Invariance

Principle, which says that:

Metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive topology (that is, the image-schema structure) of the source domain, in a way consistent with the inherent structure of the target domain (Lakoff, 1993: 215).

These mappings are grounded in the body and everyday experience. The inherent target domain structure automatically limits the mappings. For

example, in the metaphor ACTIONS ARE TRANSFERS, actions are

conceptualized as objects which are transferred from an agent to a patient (e.g., to give someone a kick, to give someone a punch). It is common knowledge that an action does not exist after it occurs (target domain knowledge), while the recipient possesses the object given after the giving (source domain knowledge). However, this cannot be mapped onto the target domain as no such object as a kick or a punch exists after the action is over (Lakoff, 1993).

Our knowledge about the world is organized by Idealized Cognitive Models (ICM), perceived as structured wholes having parts (Lakoff, 1987). Metonymy is defined as “a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same domain, or ICM” (Kövecses and Radden, 1998: 39). Using the concept of ICM, Zoltan Kövecses and Gunter Radden (1998: 48—54) formulated a typology of metonymy:

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was upset for “something made her upset.”

It is often hard to distinguish between metaphors and metonymies, although the criteria for distinguishing between them are quite clear (Kalisz, 2001). The difference between them may be characterized in the following way: While metonymy “involves a contiguity relationship, which can be expressed by several specific associative relationships,” metaphor involves a relationship between both domains, which can be characterized in terms of similarity (Feyaerts, 2000: 64). Because metonymic mappings occur within one domain, there are no qualitative differences between the elements of the relationship, as in the case of metaphorical mappings (Kalisz, 2001). Unlike metonymic mappings, metaphorical mappings occur only within the same ontological realm (the “concept” realm) but map across different and “distant” domains (Kövecses and Radden, 1998; Dirven, 1993).

Metaphors and metonymies often interact with each other (Barcelona, 2000a; cf. Goossens, 1990). Most often this is interaction at the purely conceptual level. There are two subtypes of this interaction (Barcelona, 2000a: 10):

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metaphor in Radden, 2000),

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In the first case the mapping involves two conceptual domains which can be traced back to one conceptual domain (Croft, 1993) (e.g., the metaphor SAD IS DOWN/HAPPY IS UP is conceptually motivated by the metonymy DOWN(WARD BODILY POSTURE) FOR SADNESS (Barcelona, 2000b)). The metaphorical conceptual motivation of metonymy may be found in metonymic interpretations of a linguistic expression possible only within a co-occurring metaphorical mapping (e.g., to catch somebody’s ear — the metonymy EAR FOR ATTENTION, a specific variety of the metonymy BODY PART FOR (MANNER OF) FUNCTION is conceptually motivated by the metaphor ATTENTION IS A (TYPICALLY MOVING) PHYSICAL ENTITY (Barcelona, 2000a)).

There is an obvious relation between metaphors and metonymies and culture, understood “as a set of shared understandings that characterize smaller or larger groups of people” (Kövecses, 2005: 1). As Lakoff and Johnson claim in their book Metaphors We Live By (1980), metaphors exist not only in language, but also in thoughts and action. They cannot be treated as mere linguistic ornaments, because “we actually understand the world with metaphors” (Kövecses, 2005: 1). In different cultures people share different understandings of the world and conceptualize reality in different ways, and consequently the metaphors they use also vary. Certain conceptual metaphors, however, are potentially universal or near-universal. These metaphors are based on universal human experiences and are shared by different cultures, but in different languages they commonly display variation in metaphorical linguistic expressions (Kövecses, 2005).

FACE belongs to the conceptual system in terms of which we both think and act. It is one of the concepts which govern our everyday life. Among its numerous meanings, FACE is the positive social value every person effectively claims to have (cf. Goffman, 1967). And as one of many social values it is not independent, but must form a coherent system with the other metaphorical concepts we live by. As a term designating a very significant element of the human body, face is considered “part of a universal analogical repertoire which can be used for metaphorical production in all cultures” (Strecker, 1993: 121).