Theoretical Implication about the Two Structural Breaks

In the IR theory, the end of the Cold War has two implications, which are the end of a stable bipolar system and the shifting nature of the U.S.-China relationship. From the perspective of the realist scholars emphasizing the global structure, like Waltz (1979) and Mearsheimer

(1990), the dissolution of the Cold War system leads to endless regional conflicts definitely because the stable bipolar structure no longer exists. Based on this prediction, a more conflictive cross-strait relationship can be expected. On the other hand, the end of the Cold War also implies the end of the cooperative relationship between China and the United States to balance the Soviet Union. Then, what should be the nature of the U.S.-China relationship after the Cold War? Since the rise of China has been the most spectacular trend after the end of the Cold War, power transition theory provides a pessimistic prediction that the more close the gap of capability between the status quo hegemon and the revisionist challenger is, the more likely a hegemonic conflict will occur (Organski & Kugler 1980). Although the power transition prediction has been criticized in the IR field, scholars also agree that China will be more of a threat to the U.S. interests in East and Southeast Asia rather than a threat in a global scale (Levy 2008). Based on this prediction, a more conflictive U.S.-China relationship can be expected. In this case, the chance for China to tolerate the U.S. inference in the Taiwan Strait will become lower with the closing gap between the United States and China since the Taiwan issue is China’s core interest. Thus, a more conflictive cross-strait relationship can be expected in the power transition process. In sum, with the end of Cold War structure, theories in the realist context suggest a more

conflictive tendency in cross-strait relations because of the end of the bipolar system and the shifting nature of the U.S.-China relations after the Cold War.

The problem of the neorealist prediction is that in general, realist scholars tend to define and operationalize instability as the occurrence of conflictive events or even war. This definition has two weaknesses. First, war is not the only form of conflict. Second, the definition ignores another dimension of instability, which is the greater variance of behavioral pattern. This chapter may contribute to deal with the weaknesses in two ways. First, the GDELT event data applied in

this dissertation helps expand the scope of conflictive behavior ranging from verbal conflict to material conflict. More importantly, it helps test the validity of the neorealist prediction in the real world when stability is not only a dichotomous variable between war and peace. Second, the GARCH model applied in this chapter helps explore how the Cold War or the end of the Cold War influences the volatility of state behaviors in the triangle since all kinds of behavior have been quantified by the GDELT event database. As to the growing economic interdependence between Taiwan and China following the end of the Cold War, the impact will be discussed in the next chapter.

On the other hand, Taiwan’s democratization has a great impact on not only Taiwan’s “one China” position but also the framework of the Three Communiqués and One Act. Many foreign policy studies have suggested a correlation between incomplete democratization and the potential for military conflict. Mansfield and Snyder (2005) indicate that there is a great risk of military conflict for the incomplete transition from autocracy toward democracy. Due to the lack of institutional capacity to deal with the rising civil demand and politicians’ calculation to win elections, electoral agenda is easily to be dominated by nationalist emotion and prestige strategy, which may lead to military conflicts potentially. In sum, if the correlation is true, a more

conflictive relationship between Taiwan and China can be expected during Taiwan’s democratization.

More importantly, the nature of Taiwan’s domestic politics also makes the correlation between democratization and conflict in the Taiwan Strait appear reasonable. First, the

uniqueness of Taiwan’s democratization is that democracy is not the only game in town or issue at stake, and the nationalist emotion of Taiwan independence always plays a role in the

the debate between “independence first” and “democracy first” existed for a long time in the opposition camp. Second, as the main opposition party in Taiwan’s democratization, the output of the DPP’s China policy was usually a product of institutional design and the compromise among historical party factions. The process from the amendment of the party platform to establish the Republic of Taiwan in 1991 to the Resolution on Taiwan's Future in 1999 provides a good example of the compromise between the Formosa faction and the New Tide faction. The New Tide faction was the major force to push the DPP to include Taiwan independence in the party charter in 1991, and the Formosa faction basically held a priority that winning election is more important than advocating the Republic of Taiwan.33 The 1999 resolution clearly stood in the middle ground of the two factions because it claimed that Taiwan is an independent country in the name of the Republic of China and any change related to Taiwan’s future should be decided by all Taiwanese people. Thus, through the factional politics of compromise within the DPP, Taiwan independence has continually been a part of the DPP’s position toward China, because top leaders of the DPP cannot risk to lose the support from the New Tide faction.34 In sum, it is reasonable to assume that Taiwan’s democratization has a great potential to trigger the tension in the Taiwan Strait due to the nature of Taiwan’s democratization and the DPP’s position on Taiwan independence.

To sum up for the theoretical section, the end of the Cold War and Taiwan’s

democratization are not only challenges to the Cold War and the “one China” legacies, but also important cases to reflect the implications of the existing IR theories. First, did the two political

33 _{After 2000, the Formosa faction was disunited into several small factions, like the New Century Office and the} New Momentum faction, because its important leader, Hsu Hsin-liang, left the DPP. The two smaller factions also stopped functioning several years later.

34 _{The New Tide faction never shrinks from the position of Taiwan independence, and keeps functioning as the most} organized and powerful faction in the DPP.

events cause any behavioral change in the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle? Both realism and the empirical study of foreign policy predict a higher probability to have a more conflictive relationship between Taiwan and China. This chapter aims to examine the validity of these predictions. Second, how did the two political events influence the volatility of all state

behaviors in this triad? Current empirical studies in the IR field seldom directly investigate the volatility of state behavior caused by political events. Empirical works of political science applying a similar methodology focus on the relationship between parliamentary politics and the volatility of foreign exchange rate, like Leblang and Bernhard’s (2006) work. Clearly, the

behavioral stability of a state is not well explored in the IR field, and this dissertation attempts to explain the stability of state behaviors in the triad with the uncertainty created by the end of the Cold War and Taiwan’s democratization. In short, this chapter aims to investigate the changing patterns and the volatility of state behaviors in the triad under the impacts of the end of the Cold War and Taiwan’s democratization.