SOME DIFFERENTIALS
2. The unity of being The second note is unity. “Being” is the content of
one objective concept, adequate and immediate, which expressly signifies neither substance nor accident, nor God nor creature, but all these in the manner of a unity, that is to say, in so far as they are in some way similar and concur in existing... This objective concept prescinds in its meaning from all its particulars or members divid-ing bedivid-ing, even though they be entirely simple entities.17
Suarezian being is simpliciter unum et secundum quid diversum. At this point it is appropriate to contrast the classical Thomist position with the Suarezian. Thomism’s tenets provide John with only two options to choose from: a unitary univocal concept or a multiple analogical concept of being. In the following passage he argues against the first option and in favor of the second, as
this concept, which is one, imperfect and inadequate, so prescinds from its inferiors that it remains in potency with regard to them and is contractible by the addition of a differential concept; it is deduced from that fact that it would thus be univocal. For “animal”
is univocal to all its species, because it is conceived as actually one in such a way that it possesses the dividing differences only in potency and is divided by their addition. Therefore the analogical concept, which lacks this kind of unity, but has unity only in a certain sense, must not include the diversity of its inferiors only in potency; for in this way it would remain simply one in actuality, which is what be-ing univocal means, and it would be multiple and diverse only in
po-17 DM 2: 2: 8 & 15 [25: 72 & 75]: unum conceptum obiectivum adae-quatum et immediatum, qui expresse non dicit substantiam neque accidens, nec Deum nec creaturam, sed haec omnia per modum unius, scilicet quaten-us sunt inter se aliquo modo similia et conveniunt in essendo... hic conceptquaten-us obiectivus est secundum rationem praecisus ab omnibus particularibus seu membris dividentibus ens, etiamsi sint maxime simplices entitates.
tentiality. In order that the concept not remain one simply, it must actually include diversity, though it need not actually explicate it.18 In choosing the second option John compares being as multiply con-ceived to a heap of sand seen from a distance. Though he upholds the doctrine of the unlimited Act, he is emphatic about excluding any strict unity from “being”; so in order that it not “not remain one simply, it must actually include diversity, though it need not actually explicate it” (Ut ergo non maneat simpliciter unum, actu debet includere diversita-tem, licet actu non explicet illam).
Here we again remark on the difference of univocity as Thomistical-ly and SuarezianThomistical-ly conceived. The Thomist univocal is a concept that has a simple unity. The Suarezian is more complex: it is a simple unity, but is applied to its inferiors indifferently, without any relationship of dependence (such a relationship renders the concept analogical. See Chapter 3, section V, no. 4.). As for the Thomist “being,” simpliciter diversum et secundum quid unum, it seems from the Suarezian view-point to be no different from the Nominalist universal, which is but a collection of particulars. As the Magister Incomparabilis (Venerabilis Inceptor, Doctor Invincibilis) WILLIAM Of OCkHAM (c. 1290-c.1349) describes them, universals, like the notion of “man,”
precisely signify singular things... it must be conceded that this name “man,” with equal priority signifies all particular men. It does not follow therefore that this name “man” is equivocal, because though it signifies many particulars with equal priority, nonetheless it signifies them by a single ascription, and in signifying them sub-ordinates them to one concept and not to many, because of which that concept is univocally predicated of them.19
18 JOHN Of ST. THOMAS, Cursus philosophicus thomisticus, Ars logica, pars II, q. 13, art. 5. Vol. 1 (Reiser ed.), p. 493: ita praescindens ab inferioribus, quod maneat in potentia ad illa et sit contrahibilis per additionem conceptus differentialis, ex eo deducitur, quia sic esset conceptus univocus. Nam animal ideo est univocum ad omnes species, quia concipitur ita unum in actu, quod differentias dividentes solum habet in potentia et per earum additionem divi-ditur. Ergo analogum, quod talem unitatem non habet, sed secundum quid, non debet solum in potentia includere diversitatem inferiorum; sic enim in actu simpliciter maneret unum, quod est esse univocum, et solum in potentia multiplex et diversum. Ut ergo non maneat simpliciter unum, actu debet in-cludere diversitatem, licet actu non explicet illam.
19 WILLIAM Of OCkHAM, Summa logicae, pars 1, cap. 17. Philoteus BOEH-NER, Venerabilis Inceptoris Guillelmi de Ockham Summa logicae, Cura Instituti
Likewise, Thomist “being” actually represents all particular beings. As Suárez sees it, a concept constituted of many distinct particulars is no different from many distinct concepts, and their unity is a mere flatus vocis. The Thomist response is that its particulars have a uniting prin-ciple, “proportional similitude.” When we think of the comprehensive categories “being” and “entity,” and their determined particulars like
“substance” and “quantity,” says Cajetan, we note that
the abstraction of being does not consist in that ‘entity’ is grasped and ‘substance’ or ‘quantity’ not, but in ‘substance’ and ‘quantity’ being grasped in the manner in which each is related to its own existence.
According to this procedure the proportional similitude is drawn attention to, and ‘substance’ and ‘quantity’ are not grasped absolutely speaking.20
Thus the relationship of the essence of the creature to its existence is proportional to the relationship of the essence of the Creator to His existence.
Such reasoning, for the Suarezian viewpoint, is fallacious. In propor-tional concepts relating two beings, like God and the creature, there need to be four terms—creature’s essence: creature’s existence: God’s essence: God’s existence. But here there are only three terms. The es-sence and existence of the creature, which Thomists say are distinct both conceptually and really, form two terms. Contrariwise, the es-sence and existence of God are not distinct even conceptually but only verbally, being totally convertible; their difference has no foundation Franciscani Universitatis S. Bonaventurae, N. Y. 1974, p. 60: Dicendum est quod talia nomina significant praecise res singulares. Unde hoc nomen “homo”
nullam rem significat nisi illam quae est homo singularis, et ideo numquam supponit pro substantia nisi quando supponit pro homine particulari. Et ideo concedendum est quod hoc nomen “homo” aeque primo significat omnes homines particulares, nec tamen sequitur quod hoc nomen “homo” sit vox aequivoca, et hoc quia quamvis significet plura aeque primo, tamen unica im-positione significat illa et subordinatur in significando illa plura tantum uni conceptui et non pluribus, propter quod univoce praedicatur de eis.
20 CAJETAN, De nominum analogia, cap. 5. n. 129. Hyacinthe-Marie RO-BILLARD, O. P., De l’analogie et du concept d’être de Thomas de Vio, Cajetan.
Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 1963, pp. 78 & 80: Entis abstractio non consistit in hoc quod entitas apprehenditur et substantia aut quantitas non;
sed in hoc quod substantia et quantitas apprehenditur ut sic se habet ad pro-prium esse; secundum hoc enim similitudo proportionaliter attenditur, et non apprehenditur substantia, aut quantitas absolute.
in reality, so they constitute just one term. Besides, the argument ap-pears to be circular: analogy is a method that aids us in knowing about God; all its notes must be determined before we have any knowledge of Him. But we cannot know what analogy is unless we already have prior knowledge of what the relationship is of God’s essence to His existence.
This ”existence” is none other than “Act”, which is strictly one, and signifies only perfection. An example of how Act retains this unity would be the Platonic idea of white, unaffected by any other color, never losing its unity as whiteness.21 For Suárez, however, an entity is limited by its efficient cause, which gives it only so much being and no more. But Thomists are emphatic that there can be no limitation without reception of act into limiter potency: if that potency does not cooperate, it would seem that an efficient cause could produce an infi-nite effect.22 For Suárez, however, dependence on an efficient cause is the hallmark of imperfection, and constitutes the very essence of the creature, while independence from cause is the source of God’s om-niperfection. Whether or not potency cooperates, God cannot create another God!
In sum, we noted that the Thomist tradition provides John of St.
Thomas with only two options, a unitary univocal concept or a multi-ple analogical concept of being, and impels him to choose just one, the latter. Our analysis however, reveals that he could have chosen both:
the analogical model for “being” in its widest sense, with its innate va-21 Joseph GREDT, O.S.B., “Doctrina thomistica de potentia et actu con-tra recentes impugnationes vindicatur,” Acta Pontificiae Academiae S. Thomae Aquinatis, N. S. I, 1934, p. 36: Thomistae, praeeunte S. Thoma, utuntur sen-sibili exemplo ad hanc metaphysicam veritatem declarandam: Si albedo tan-quam idea platonica essentialiter per se subsisteret, infinita esset in sua linea;
nam est id quo in indefinitum unumquodque album est album—nec posset esse nisi una.
22 Joseph GREDT, O.S.B., op.et loc. cit., p. 36: Nec potest dici actum limi-tari, non per potentiam in qua recipitur, sed per causam efficientem: actum limitationem suam accipere a causa efficiente a qua tanquam limitatus pro-ducitur. Causa enim efficiens non potest producere limitatum actum, nisi producat eum tanquam in potentia aliqua receptum. Si producit actum irre-ceptum, necesse est producat eum prout convenit actui irrecepto, i.e. tanquam infinitum. Ita revera Deus producit substantiam pure spiritualem in sua linea infinitam.
riety, and the univocal model for “Act”, or being in the fullest sense, with its innate uniformity.
Then analogy would have a more modest status in the Thomist sys-tem. What does Aquinas himself say about analogy? Gilson tells us that
His texts on the notion of analogy are relatively few, and in each case they are so restrained that we cannot but wonder why the no-tion has taken on such an importance in the eyes of his commenta-tors.23
It was his great “commentator” Cajetan, who seems to have real-ized analogy’s importance, and made it fundamental to the classical Thomist system.