Unmanifested dispositions.

‘Assumption 4: Truth functionality fails when “A” and “B” are both false’ (Edgington 1986, p.26).

According to Edgington, assumption 4 is mistaken for similar reasons to assumption 3. She provides the following argument. Suppose we are certain that John and Mary were together yesterday evening but we are uncertain as to whether they attended a party. Given that we are certain that they were together, we can be certain of the conditional claim that ‘if John went, Mary went’. But given assumption 4, there are three open possibilities:

John went Mary went If John went, Mary went

T T T

F F T

F F F

The important possibilities to consider here are possibilities 2 and 3. Upon both of these possibilities, neither John nor Mary went to the party but importantly, whether or not the conditional ‘if John went, Mary went’ is true, is an open possibility. This, however, contradicts our certainty in ‘if John went, Mary went’. As such, assumption 4 is to be rejected, claims Edgington.

Assumption 4 seems to be the intuition that allows us to make dispositional ascriptions even when the disposition is never stimulated nor manifested. Recall that the situation is one in which A and B are both false and yet we are uncertain as to the associated conditional ‘if A, B’. In dispositional terms, we might say that we are certain that the glass was neither dropped nor struck, nor was it broken, and yet we remain uncertain as to whether the conditional ‘if the glass was dropped, it would be broken’ is true. This is the perfectly familiar situation we often find ourselves in when making dispositional ascriptions to common objects. I look at the perfectly intact glass on the desk, I see that it is not struck and I see that it is not broken and yet I think it will break if I throw it at the wall; but I can’t be sure.

Consider a dispositional example of this but in the terms that Edgington provided. Suppose there is a glass hidden behind an opaque screen and suppose I am told that the glass was either both struck and broken, or was not struck and not broken. That is, A and B have the same truth-value but I do not know which it is. Again, the following possibilities obtain:

Glass was struck Glass broke If struck, broke

T T T

F F F

Because A and B have the same truth value, the possibilities on lines 1 and 2 are genuine, live possibilities. But, according to assumption 4, so is line 3. However, given that I know that A and B have the same truth value, I know that if the glass was struck, it broke, and

I know that if the glass was not struck, it did not break. Possibility 3 is not a genuine possibility. This contradicts our general intuition that we can make disposition ascriptions to objects that have been neither stimulated nor manifested.

3.8 Summary.

This chapter has discussed the relationship between dispositions, conditionals, and the attempt to analyze dispositions in terms of conditionals. The standard counterexamples to the Simple Conditional Analysis of dispositions have been outlined. I have applied Edgington’s (1986) argument against conditionals that she has called ‘stronger than truth functional’ to demonstrate that the assumptions made by those who endorse such conditionals are largely responsible for the standard counterexamples to conditional analyses of dispositions; chiefly, the Simple Conditional Analysis.

The primary claim that I have attempted to make is this: the value of the SM conditional is not independent of belief in D. Analyses state D and the SM conditional have the same semantic content, or same truth values, but the standard counterexamples show that this is not the case. That is, whenever one holds a belief concerning the possession or otherwise of some disposition by some object, one’s belief in the SM conditional will be determined largely by the prior belief in the possession or otherwise of said dispositional

property. The standard counterexamples are essentially counterexamples to this intuitive interdependence.

This presents two immediate options. First, one may accept that the counterexamples are in fact genuine and deny that there is any dependence between the possession of a dispositional property and associated stimulus and manifestation conditions. This option is to essentially deny the existence of dispositions. Second, one may retain the belief that there exists some sort of dependence between a dispositional property and its associated stimulus and manifestation conditions, but alter the nature of that relationship. This second option is the one that I pursue in this thesis.

If one wishes to retain the intuition that there is indeed an interdependence between the SM conditional, or its constituents, and the possession or otherwise of a disposition by some object, I suggest that an appropriate strategy is to hold that the nature of that interdependence is something weaker than truth.

In the following chapter I apply Edgington’s positive account of suppositionals to demonstrate that one can retain the assumption of interdependence between SM and D, while weakening the nature of that interdependence from truth to a sort of epistemic relationship that is more consistent with both folk and scientific reasoning concerning dispositions.

I will show why it is the case that SM and D are not independent and will provide an account (which I am hesitant to call an ‘analysis’ because I do not believe that it is

analytic) of the apparent conditionality of dispositions that allows for the dependence between SM and D while simultaneously accounting for our common use of dispositional concepts and avoiding the standard counterexamples. This comes at the cost of analyticity and of truth. Instead, my account captures the pragmatic content of dispositional concepts and ascriptions in manner that is consistent with their common use and use in science. While I do not wish to argue generally for a pragmatic approach to science, my account is consistent with such an approach.