Instructor Materials
VALUE OF USING STRUCTURED ANALYTIC TECHNIQUES
In this case study, the use of Structured Analytic Techniques would have benefited the analytic process in two ways. They would have:
▸ Encouraged analysts to develop a full range of possible outcomes—or testable hypotheses—
including a deception hypothesis. In this situation, the analysts focused mostly on only two outcomes—
significant disruption or no significant disruption.
To this extent, Skoug was correct when he observed that no one had thought about Cuba striking back at the Cuban American supporters of Radio Marti by cancelling the family visit agreement. By encouraging the development of the full range of hypotheses, Structured Analytic Techniques would have helped analysts inform policy makers about alternative possible outcomes, spurring them in turn to seek more information about those outcomes.
▸ Prompted analysts to focus on the data most critical in examining which course of action Castro was most likely to take. The use of analytic techniques could have spurred analysts to examine clandestine reporting with special care because it offered the best insights into Castro’s true intentions. However, the analysts would have been extremely unlikely to have recognized at the time that Castro controlled virtually all human sources reporting on Cuba collected by the US Intelligence Community and was using that stream of reporting to transmit deceptive information about his plans to respond to Radio
Marti. That said, after Castro did not disrupt US AM broadcasting, some hard questions about the reliability of the key sources could have been asked.13
KEY TAKEAWAYS
▸Structured analytic techniques provides one of the best mechanisms for overcoming—or, at least, mitigating the effects of—cognitive traps and mental mindsets that lead to making poor analytic
judgments. Always develop a full range of credible hypotheses when beginning an analysis. This also helps ensure that policy makers will not be surprised by what actually transpires.
▸ When working with reporting—particularly from clandestine sources—that is critical to the analysis, always ask if the reporting might be intentionally deceptive. In this case, it was used to reinforce open source reporting that Cuba had the means and the intent to disrupt US AM broadcasting.
NOTES
1. Kenneth N. Skoug Jr., The United States and Cuba Under Reagan and Shultz: A Foreign Service Officer Reports (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), 17.
2. E.O. 12323. The Federal Register.
3. Skoug, The United States and Cuba Under Reagan and Shultz, 19.
4. For a detailed treatment of the Cuban Missile Crisis case, see Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision:
Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Longman, 1999).
5. Skoug, The United States and Cuba Under Reagan and Shultz, 27; Michael Wines and Ronald J. Ostrow, “Cuba Exults That CIA’s Men in Havana Were Double Agents; In a Television Series, Alleged Spies-Turned-Heroes Tell How They Duped American Agency,” LA Times, August 12, 1987.
6. For more information on the Multiple Hypotheses GeneratorTM, go to http:// www.globalytica.com.
7. See Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1994) for an extensive discussion about the principles of social science research; also see Richards J. Heuer Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Reston, VA: Pherson Associates, 2007) for a discussion of cognitive issues affecting analysis.
8. Richards J. Heuer Jr. and Randolph H. Pherson, Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2015), 180.
9. Ibid., 185.
10. Skoug, The United States and Cuba Under Reagan and Shultz, 23.
11. Ibid., 56.
12. Susan B. Epstein and Mark P. Sullivan, Cuba: Background and Issues Through 1994 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service), 2.
13. Skoug, The United States and Cuba Under Reagan and Shultz, 23.
53
T
his case asks students to grapple not only with hard tactical and operational choices but also with implicit beliefs about economic and political development and their suitability for the region’s culture. At the tactical and operational levels, the case presents several potential trade-offs: to build the road quickly might compromise the project’s security; to proceed more deliberately could reduce its potential political impact. It also highlights some complex realities that demand a carefully considered approach. The people in the region are not only the villagers with whom relationships must be built to facilitate construction and generate support for central government;they are also the very insurgents with which the United States must contend, and it is unclear how many might be open to changing sides. The cultural code of Pashtunwali means that many locals will outwardly embrace and even aid US plans, but they will inwardly reject the incursion into their way of life; people who are assisting the project by day may very well be planting improvised explosive devices (IEDs) along the construction route by night.
At the strategic level, the case presents a contrast between local cultural norms and the transformational goals of the United States and—ostensibly—the Kabul government. One of the goals of this case is to teach students techniques that help them to uncover hidden assumptions underpinning policy options in order to troubleshoot policy plans and improve the odds of success.
The techniques in this case help students to assess implicit beliefs about the operating environment, anticipated enemy response, and the potential impact on broader US goals for Afghanistan. Students should focus their efforts not on building the specific steps in a course of action but on identifying those issues that could not only undermine the
immediate mission—completing the road—but also subvert the broader US goals in the region.
TECHNIQUE 1: KEY ASSUMPTIONS CHECK
The Key Assumptions Check is a systematic effort to make explicit and ques tion the assumptions that guide an ana-lyst’s interpretation of evidence and rea soning about any particular problem. Assumptions are usually a necessary and unavoidable means of filling gaps in the incomplete, ambiguous, and some times deceptive information with which the analyst must work. They are driven by the ana-lyst’s education, training, and experience, including the cultural and organizational contexts in which the analyst lives and works. It can be difficult to identify assumptions, because many are sociocultural beliefs that are uncon-sciously or so firmly held that they are assumed to be truth and not subject to challenge. Nonetheless, identifying key assumptions and assessing the overall impact should they be invalid are critical parts of a robust analytic process.
Task 1.
Conduct a Key Assumptions Check of the following issue:
The United States is leaning toward making a decision to complete the road from Kandahar to Tarin Kowt in time for the 18 September National Assembly elections as part of its broader goals to “spur economic development, promote central gover nance, and improve security.”
Step 1: Gather a small group of individuals who are working on the issue along with a few “outsiders.” The primary analytic unit already is working from an established mental model, so the “outsiders” are needed to bring other perspectives.
6 The Road to Tarin Kowt
Cases in Intelligence Analysis: Structured Analytic Techniques in Action
Instructor Materials
Table 6.3 ▸ Case Snapshot: The Road to Tarin Kowt
Structured Analytic Technique Used Heuer and Pherson Page Number Analytic Family
Key Assumptions Check p. 209 Assessment of Cause and Effect
Devil’s Advocacy p. 260 Challenge Analysis
Strengths-Weaknesses-Opportunities-Threats p. 308 Decision Support
Step 2: Ideally, participants should be asked to bring a list of assumptions when they come to the meeting. If not, start the meeting with a silent brainstorming session. Ask each participant to write down several assumptions on 3 × 5 cards.
Step 3: Collect the cards and list the assumptions on a whiteboard for all to see. A simple template can be used, as in Table 6.4 in the book.
An initial list of brainstormed Key Assumptions for this case might include several higher-order assumptions such as the following:
▸The local populace wants/needs the road.
▸The Afghan government wants/needs the road.
▸The US military wants/needs the road.
▸The US military has the capacity to construct the road.
▸The road will benefit the locals, the Afghan government, and US/NATO operations far more than it will benefit the Taliban.
Step 4: Elicit additional assumptions. Work from the prevailing analytic line back to the key arguments that support it. Use various devices to help prod participants’
thinking. Ask the standard journalistic questions: Who?
What? How? When? Where? and Why?
Phrases such as “will always,” “will never,” or “would have to be” suggest that an idea is not being challenged and perhaps should be. Phrases such as “based on” or “generally the case” usually suggest that a challengeable assumption is being made.
Asking these questions allows analysts to disaggregate and refine the initial brainstorming list. In this case, doing so reveals new, more nuanced assumptions and underlying assumptions. For example, an assumption about the Taliban’s willingness to allow the road to be built underpins the key assumption that the road will benefit the locals, Afghan government, and US/NATO operations. These otherwise hidden assumptions bear consideration as well, and they should be captured in the Key Assumptions table.
Step 5: After identifying a full set of assumptions, critically examine each assumption. Ask:
▸ Why am I confident that this assumption is correct?
▸ In what circumstances might this assumption be untrue?
▸ Could it have been true in the past but no longer true today?
▸ How much confidence do I have that this assumption is valid?
▸ If the assumption turns out to be invalid, how much impact would this have on the analysis?
Step 6: Using Table 6.4, place each assumption in one of