Values influence why empathy occurs (i.e they are structuring causes)

Values are structuring causes of empathy (Dretske 1991). We have seen that values indirectly influence which targets (as triggering causes) an agent takes to be potential targets of empathy. On the other hand, a structuring cause is a cause which is responsible for a process being a process with a certain product (Ibid.). A product describes an event or condition, such that, until it occurs, the process has not ended (Dretske 1991, p 44). The product of empathy then–the point at which the process of empathy ends–is an agent’s motivation to help a target with their concerns. Accordingly, the value of care and terminal values are structuringcauses of empathy. They are the causal conditions for empathy being a process that causes an agent to feel motivated to help a target. We can schematize this relationship as follows:

Target (T) causes Empathy (E) which causes Helping behaviour (H)

We have already seen that terminal values and care influence which targets (T) cause empathy (E) to start. If we have knowledge of an agent’s terminal values, we may have knowledge of that agent’s goals, and the motivational orientations that the agent is in when pursuing those goals. This would allow us to infer from observation that a target (T) caused an agent to empathize (E) with that target, which in turn caused that agent to help (H) that target with their concerns. The agent helped the target when, and because, it saw a target which it selected as a potential target of empathy. But why did Empathy (E) cause helping behaviour (H)? This question is about the structuring cause (as opposed to the triggering cause) of the relationship between (E) and (H). It is about the conditions in which (E) causes (H) rather than something else.

Here again care will be important. Care affects which targets act as triggers of empathy. But it is also responsible for empathy being a process that causes helping behaviour–it is a structuring cause. When an agent is triggered to empathize by a target, care explains why a target feels motivated to help a target with their concerns as opposed to say feeling motivated to ignore the target or feeling motivated to perform some other activity. The

value of care that an agent assigns to a target explains why an agent feels motivated to help a target. This explanation of helping behaviour as a result of empathy resides not in the stimulus (or triggering causes), but in the correlations between care and helping behaviour. Care in empathy causes helping behaviour:

Target (T) causes Empathy (E) which causes Care (C) as a condition for helping behaviour (H)

Targets (T) as triggering causes explain why empathy gets started now.31 But care (C) as a structuring cause explains why helping behaviour results from empathy as opposed to something else.

Similarly, instrumental values are structuring causes of empathy. Instrumental values are desirable properties that an agent assigns to a behaviour. Examples of instrumental values include “respect”, “self-control”, “forgiveness”, “ambition”, “responsibility” (Rokeach 1973; Curhan 2007). Accordingly, like care, instrumental values are responsible for empathy being a process that results in a motivation to help a target. Instrumental values contribute to the explanation of why an agent who empathizes with a target helps that target with their concerns. It is because instrumental values are desirable properties of behaviour that they are motivational. For example, an agent that values “self-control” more than “forgiveness” may not help a target even if that agent cares for the target. On the other hand, an agent that values “responsibility” more than “self-control” is more likely to help a target (especially if the agent also cares for the target). Instrumental values do not reside in the stimulus or triggering causes of empathy. Like the value of care, they structure the process of empathy by being conditions for when helping behaviour will occur (as opposed to some other behaviour):

Target (T) causes Empathy (E) which causes Care (C) and Instrumental value (I) as conditions for Helping behaviour (H)

31 _{We have seen that care has an indirect influence on which targets are taken as triggers. But caring for a} target is not itself the stimulus that causes empathy. Care is not itself a triggering cause.

Instrumental values are causal conditions or structuring causes of empathy that importantly contribute to explaining why empathy is a process that causes helping behaviour. They are distinct from triggering causes which explain what causes empathy to start at a particular time, in a particular context, when stimulated by a particular target.

2.13.3

Values influence how empathy operates (i.e. which

motives are involved)

We have seen that instrumental values shape what agents take to be “desirable modes of conduct” (Rokeach 1973, p 7). They are properties of the means by which agents strive for desirable ends. Their significance for empathy is that they influence how empathy works. Specifically, instrumental values influence which behaviours an agent attempting to empathize with a target feels motivated to perform. How they do so is by their

connection to motivational orientations.

I described above the role of motivational orientations in the selection of which targets an agent takes to be potential targets of empathy. These motivational orientations play another important role in empathy. Namely, they determine which instrumental values an agent will make use of in any given situation. This is because the motivational orientation that an agent is in subsumes different instrumental values. For example, when in the competitive motivational orientation, an agent’s behaviours may be shaped by

instrumental values such as “ambition” or “logical” (Rokeach 1973, p 119). When an agent is in the cooperative or altruistic orientation, an agent’s behaviours may be shaped by values such as “broadminded” or “forgiving” (Ibid.). Thus, the motivational

orientation that an agent is in will affect the instrumental values that shape an agent’s behaviour. The import for empathy of the relationship between motivational orientations and instrumental values is that an agent’s motivations to help a target with their concerns will depend both on the motivational orientation the agent is in and on the terminal values of that agent subsumed under that orientation.

Instrumental values are important to integrate into an account of empathy for their explanatory contribution. By examining the relationship between an agent’s motivational

orientations and that agent’s terminal values we can understand why an agent’s

behavioural motivations to help a target with their concerns are as they are, as opposed to being some other way. For example, agent1 is in an altruistic motivational orientation

when attempting to empathize with target1 who is sitting in the street asking for money.

In this orientation, agent1’s behaviours are influenced by instrumental values such as

“helpful” and “loving”. This will contribute to an explanation of why agent1 stops, talks

to target1 about their concerns and gives target1 money. An agent with different

instrumental values who is attempting to empathize with the same target may behave quite differently because this agent’s motivational orientation is associated with different instrumental values. This agent2 is also in an altruistic orientation and attempting to

empathize with target1. But agent2’s altruistic motivational orientation is associated with

instrumental values such as “independent” and “responsible”. Thus, agent2 may stop and

talk to target1, but decide not to give target1 money. It is the difference between agent1

andagent2’s instrumental values under the same motivational orientation that explains the

difference in the behaviours they each felt motivated to perform when attempting to empathize with target1.

Figure 2: Motivational orientations and instrumental values

But this is not the whole story. We can imagine a case where agent1 and agent2 are both

in the same motivational orientation (e.g. altruistic), and that this orientation subsumes the same instrumental values (such as “helpful” and “loving”) for both agents. But even by keeping the relationship between motivational orientations and instrumental values constant, we can still imagine that agent1 and agent2 will differ in the behaviours they feel

motivated to perform in order to help target1. This is because terminal values also affect

the behavioural motivations of agents. They do so indirectly by affecting an agent’s conceptions of a target’s concerns. For example, when engaging in like-me perspective- taking an agent will become aware of and attribute concerns to a target. And we have seen that this will involve a match in emotional valence between agent and target based on an agent’s familiarity with contexts similar to that in which the target finds

will be influenced by that agent’s terminal values. An agent that is taking the perspective of a target and becoming aware of that target’s concerns sees the target in a particular context, makes use of past experience in similar contexts, and matches the valences of that target’s emotional states. But this process is not psychologically isolated from terminal values. I think it is useful to think of the contribution of terminal values as an agent’s “ideals” or “ideal outcomes” to the construction of an agent’s awareness of a target’s concerns. When attributing concerns to a target, an agent will be influenced by what that agent takes to be positive or ideal outcomes for that agent. As we have seen, this is because, when empathizing with a target, an agent cares for that target’s well- being. Accordingly, we can say that how an agent conceives of a target’s well-being is influenced by an agent’s terminal values. Agents will differ in their terminal values, and so they will differ in how they conceive of the well-being of a target. In turn, different agents will construct different concerns that they attribute to PETs.

Returning to our example then, we can imagine two agents that share the same

motivational orientation towards a target and whose motivational orientations subsume the same terminal values. And we can imagine that each of these agents will have different behavioural motivations to help the target with their concerns. This can be explained by the different concerns that each agent has attributed to the target. Agent1’s

conception of the well-being of target1 will have been influenced by different terminal

values than agent2’s. All things being equal, agent1 and agent2 will have different

behavioural motivations to help target1 when attempting to empathize. And this will have

been a consequence of the influence of terminal values on each agent’s construction and attribution of concerns to the target.

We can now see why the care account of empathy that integrates the role of care and values more generally is an improvement over accounts of the matching account type. There is clearly a necessary evaluative component that influences when an agent will, as a result of empathy, feel motivated to help a target. And when this evaluative component is understood as preferences over possible outcomes for the target, we can see that these preferences can only be known by adopting the evaluative stance of the target. By doing so, the agent is motivated to act in the target’s interests. This is what explains the

correlation between matching a target’s internal state and helping behaviour. Without considering the role of care and values, matching accounts cannot explain this

correlation.