4.5 Interview Analysis – Directing Stage
4.5.1 Weaknesses during the Directing Stage
In order to complete the important elements in the evaluation of the current Disaster Response Administrative System, different points of weakness have emerged from interviewees’ transcriptions. In the subsection that follows, directing weaknesses’ sub-themes as presented in Figure 4.14 below will be discussed in the next subsections.
Figure 4.14Nodes for Directing Weaknesses
4.5.1.1 Citizens’ Irresponsible Intervention
It is part of the Iraqi culture to want to help in times of crisis. It is, therefore, common to have a lot of people coming to the scene after an incident has occurred to help victims, although this can be a hindrance to the official disaster responders. Interviewees E1, E2, E6, E8, E12, E13, and E22- E24 find this matter one of the most critical challenges during the directing stage. All of these interviewees mentioned public intervention in matters outside the scope of their
responsibility. This theme also appeared in the planning challenges stage. Interviewee E11
criticises this behaviour because it is very “difficult to contain the chaos during the incident
because of the irresponsible intervention of citizens”. Interviewees E3 and E4 gave the reason
for this intervention as being due to the “lack of society's awareness regarding non-intervention
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necessity of non-interference and the crowd near the scene”. Moreover, due to the poor security
situation in Iraq, this intervention might be exploited by suicide bombers, which potentially increases the number of losses for such an incident. This point was confirmed by interviewee E20, stating that the “ignorance by citizens to the seriousness of the proximity to the scene and
exploiting this by suicide bombers” causes these additional problems. Interviewee E20 also
stressed the lack of citizen knowledge regarding the explosive materials as follows: “the lack
of knowledge and familiarity with the dangerous and explosive materials by people is evident”.
In addition, Interviewees E10 and E15 pointed out that “citizens gathering around the scene”
might hinder the responders in their work. Interviewee E13 attributed this gathering to the “lack
of society awareness in general, such as the crowd at the location of the accident”.
4.5.1.2 Communication and Information
Effective directing of resources, when responding to terrorist incidents, requires assessing information prior to, during, and after such events. According to interviewees E14, E17, E25- 28, there is a “lack of intelligence information to figure out who and when and where gets the
terrorist incident”. The interviewees gave different reasons for this lack of knowledge, for
example, “Delay in reporting” (E16), “the poor quality of the mobile network while reporting” (E8), “False calling” (E12), “lack of security camera systems” (E18).
Regarding the communication, there are different areas of difficulties in the communication when responding to disasters, such as “weakness of telecommunications networks during
disasters, there are often no alternatives” (E21), “outdated communications devices and there
is no regular maintenance for them” (E17, E25- E28).
4.5.1.3 Coordination between Organisations and Commanding the Scene
There is no doubt that a lot of difficulties appear in achieving overall co-ordination in any community disaster. One of these difficulties is the “coordination with the rest of the
government organisations” (E10). It is widely believed that local organisations have an
important role in responding to disaster through saving lives and supporting evacuees’ right after a disaster. But at the same time, if this rule is not applied correctly, this might lead to serious consequences, especially in extreme events. Interviewee E4 agreed with this view and went on to assert that there is a “lack of cooperation from the rest of the organisation according to the plan”. Interviewees E14 and E16 support this point and believe that there is
“too much variation in performance during the implementation of the response plan by other
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which worsens the situation. Interviewees E11 and E21 also mentioned this point in their responses, stating: “failure in the implementation of plans from other organisations”, “the
plans are not applied strictly by the rest of the organisations”.
Interviewees E2 and E19 raise an important point regarding the “weakness of responding to disaster from other organisations, such as services and security organisations”. Such weaknesses might cause delays while responding to disasters. This point was confirmed by interviewee E8, stating that “the civil defence teams are not allowed to enter some sensitive
areas in the country until after obtaining security permissions, leading to delays in response”.
This point was also supported by interviewee E19, who sees this from the operative point of view, “late arrival of the supporting rescue machines of relevant departments” might cause a delay in responding to the disaster.
In terms of commanding the scene, interviewees E11, E13 and E21 pinpointed this point as one of the most important challenges during the directing process as follows: “presence of too many
leaders at the scene causing failure to obtain satisfactory results”, “multiple sources of
decision making at the scene” which might increase the chaos at the scene. Interviewee E16 touched on this point by stating different views such as: “there is a difficulty in commanding the scene due to the intervention from responsible persons or non-experienced higher ranks from other organisations. This led to limit the authority of command at the scene”. Consequently, this might have a negative effect on directing the process during the response to disasters. Further, interviewee E19 puts emphasis on the “failure to secure the site before the intervention of civil defence teams” which killed a lot of disaster responders. Whilst interviewees E6, E19, E22-E24 add other points of weakness related to the “delay in reaching the scene because of the security roadblocks” and “weakness in the water pressure in the fire nozzles”.
4.5.1.4 Fire nozzle network
The most important tool for any firefighter or responder is the fire nozzle; it tends to be used as a primary weapon for the responders. In Iraq, there is a “lack of adequate fire nozzles” (E18). Interviewee E19 stressed the “absence of fire nozzles, especially in commercial areas”. Interviewee E9 confirmed this point stating: “there is an inadequate number of fire nozzles,
despite setting up new networks, but sometimes these do not work properly”. Interviewee E10
gave a reason for this defect, stating that there is a “failure in the installation of new fire nozzles” causing these to malfunction. Interviewee E4 added, “too few fire nozzles and these
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being buried or having weak water pressure causes more problems”. Interviewee E19
attributed this shortage and malfunction to the “lack of regular maintenance of the old fire nozzle network”.
4.5.1.5 Frequent Blackouts from National Electricity
Iraq has suffered from programmed cutting off of National Electricity since the First Gulf War in 1991, due to the significant damage in many power stations and transmission lines. Electricity is frequently cut off in any 24 hour period, and this results in illegal wiring by households, who wire up a connection to the national grid, because they need power throughout the day and night. This illegal wiring is often poorly constructed and consequently dangerous since the wires often hang down to head height. When responders are driving tall vehicles to the scene of a disaster, they are often forced to drive through these live wires, making themselves subject to an electric shock, and sometimes vehicles can get stuck in the wires. Interviewee E17, E25- E28 stressed this important point as it generates a lot of challenges for the responders, for example, “having illegal wires connecting to the national electricity grid system as a result of
frequent power shortages” can lead to more losses amongst responders’ teams (E4, E6, E11,
E18, and E22- E24). This point was also supported by interviewee E7 who saw this from the operative point of view: “frequent use of generators due to a lack of supply of national power”. Interviewees E4, E6, E7, E10, E11, E22- E24, agreed with E7’s view, stating that “random wiring, especially for Simi-Generic Generators that prevent the arrival of civil defence teams
to the scene” cause many problems. Similarly, interviewees E12, E13, E17, E20, E25-E28
assert the same point, adding “random wiring for Simi-Generic Generators and consequent
excess on the national electricity grid” will cause delays in responding to disasters.
Furthermore, interviewee E10 raises a slightly different challenge, although linked to electricity supply, by stating that there is a “weakness in the electrical network maintenance”. This weakness can have a significant impact on responders’ lives since the very poor levels of safety can be fatal. Furthermore, by using low-quality electrical materials, such as illegal wires, this might also increase deaths of responders, as well as the general public. Interviewees E6, E22- E24 also mentioned the “absence of quality control on imported materials, particularly
electric” can have a huge impact on safety.
4.5.1.6 Individual Mistakes
Undoubtedly, mistakes happen when responding to extreme events. To avoid duplication of mistakes, lessons should be learned from experts’ experience, especially when the price of error could be human lives. According to interviewee E1, “individual mistakes” might happen while
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responding to a disaster. Interviewee E12 gave a reason for these mistakes as being that “tasks overlapped”, while interviewee E11 gave another reason, the “misplaced judgement in rushing to the scene or task without a thought about the potential consequences”. Interviewees E4 and E14 highlight an important point about “failing to secure the site before the intervention of civil defence teams”. Such failure might cause many responders’ and peoples’ lives. Mistakes in responding to a disaster are attributed by interviewees E2 and E3 as being an “over-reliance on others to do the work” and “full compliance with laws and
regulations (there is not enough flexibility)”. Based on interviewee E8’s responses, there is a
“failure to maintain the public and private property in some cases” which might increase the
physical damage to such property. However, interviewee E16 pointed to the problem of “false reporting or fictitious accidents”, which are made by irresponsible people. Consequently, such false reporting can lead to disaster responders’ resources being wasted.
4.5.1.7 Misuse of Machines and Equipment
It is widely acknowledged that the capability of disaster responders’ mobility could be enhanced by using more sophisticated and reliable machines and equipment. Through interviewees’ responses, a number of weaknesses identified related to “misuse of machines and equipment” (E9). Interviewee E12 touched on this problem as follows: “equipment is not updated” and
“machinery maintenance is limited to remedial maintenance only”. Interviewee E8 explains
this point of weakness more by stating: “There is a lack of care for firefighters’ equipment at the scene, causing rapid deterioration of this equipment”.
4.5.1.8 Moral and Financial Incentives
It is generally accepted that responding to extreme events such as terrorism requires good morale in the disaster responders’ team. To maintain this morale, two types of incentives are given to staff that have done special or unusual work while responding to disasters. Points of weakness have been revealed from experts’ responses related to the application of this point. According to interviewees E4 and E14, “the authority of giving financial incentives is exclusively limited to the director of the General Director of Civil Defence in Baghdad”. This means the directors of all the Civil Defence branches in all Iraqi cities cannot give any financial incentives to their employees. Moreover, despite having morale incentives from heads of departments or general managers, there is no financial benefit. Unlike the morale incentives are given by the Prime Minister and the minister which might lead to a 6 month or one-year promotion (with consequential financial reward).
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4.5.1.9 Providing the Right Relief Supplies for People in Need at the Right Time
One of the main problems in public management is the effective logistical supply when responding to extreme events on a large scale. Interviewee E3 stressed this problem, stating that there is an “exaggeration of logistical supply” in some cases, meaning that in reality, the situation is often more difficult than reported.
4.5.1.10Security Cordons
Scene security is important for all agencies involved in the response. Unauthorised access to the scene of an emergency might jeopardise rescue activities or any investigations. To facilitate the operations of the disaster response services and other agencies and to prevent unauthorised interference with evidence or property, security cordons are established around the scene. According to interviewees E2, E4, E9, E13, E19, E21, there is often a “failure to impose a proper security cordon”. As a consequence, it is “difficult to contain the chaos during the
incident because of the irresponsible intervention of citizens” (E6, E11, E22-24). Similarly,
interviewees E16 and E19 stated that there are “incorrect procedures in imposing security cordons” and it might “be dependent on mood” (E3). Interviewee E3 also raised a different challenge, regarding control access, by stating, “the permission to go through the security cordon is subject in some cases to the mood of the enforcer”. Interviewee E8 touched on this point by stating: “there is often some ignorance in setting up of the security cordon by the
authorities, who are responsible for it, leading to confusion and delay in responding, as well
as having a negative influence on criminal evidence”. Based on interviewee E11’s opinion, this
problem sometimes occurs because of a possible “lack of seriousness in the local police for the citizens’ exclusion risk sites and emptying the area of people so that civil defencemen can
work properly without people intruding”.
4.5.1.11Speed of Response
It is widely acknowledged that speed of response is essential for effective disaster response because more lives can be saved. However, sometimes delays occur and this can have a detrimental effect on the rescue effort. Some of the interviewees suggested reasons for the responders’ delay; interviewee E4 attributed it to “the multiplicity of responsible agencies at
the scene, especially from other organisations”. This point was also supported by interviewee
E11 who saw this from the operative point of view: “varying periods of time can pass in response to a disaster for the other stakeholders who are related to the response process”. In a similar way, interviewee E19 criticises the “slow response from the rest of the relevant
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organisations”. Interviewee E8 brought up an important challenge for the directing process
regarding obtaining security permissions when entering some sensitive areas.
Due to the shortage of heavy rescue equipment, as shown in section 4.3.1.4 and section 4.4.1.6, interviewees E6, E19, and E22-24 shed light on an important point regarding this aspect, “the
support from the other organisations is not fast enough in responding to a disaster, particularly
when requesting heavy rescue equipment”. Moreover, interviewees E7 and E16 attributed the
delay in response to the lack of public awareness with respect to giving priority to emergency vehicles such as fire engines attending the scene. Interviewee E12 agreed with the aforementioned view and added another reason as follows: “the tribal mindset of people has a
negative impact on the response to the disaster”. This refers to the difficulty in responding to,
for example, a female victim, from a male responder. In addition to that, a different reason and point of view emerged from the interview transcriptions: “legal proceedings in the case of
exposure to traffic accidents” (E7), “false calling” (E12),“delay in reporting” (E16),
“multitude of decision sources” (E13), “exploiting firefighter vehicles for personal purposes”
(E20), and “lack of financial allocation for the Directorate (which led to the failure to
implement some of the tasks included in the plan). All of these points had a negative effect on
the speed of completion of duties, according to E3, together with a “lack of understanding of the guidance or orders given due to a lack of education and limited mental capacity”. There was also reference to the problem of maintenance from E3, saying “defective equipment and devices were not regularly and properly maintained”.
4.5.1.12Sub-sequential Bombings
Due to the poor security situation in Iraq, sub-sequential bombings occur frequently. This problem is considered the main challenge facing the responders in the directing stage. According to interviewees E7 and E12, there is a “fear of double bombings”. The terrorists use women, addicted teenagers, the elderly and disabled, especially people with mental illness, as well as animals and dead bodies to carry bombs(E6, E21- E24). So the responders cannot predict when and where the bombing will happen. Interviewees E15 and E21 touched on this point by stating: “there is a lack of knowledge about the people who carry out explosions and the time and place of the explosion”. Interviewees gave reasons for this problem as being due to subsequent or sequential bombings as a result of theabsence of security and awareness of the security men (E6, E11, E22- E24), in addition the lack of effective checking devices (E4, E14, E17, E25-28), “the lack of modern and effective devices to detect explosives” (E16), and
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the “ignorance of citizens to the seriousness of being close to the scene since this could be
exploited by suicide bombers” (E20).
4.5.1.13Traffic Jams and Closing the Roads by the Security Checkpoints and Concrete Barriers
There is constant traffic congestion at security checkpoints throughout the country, and especially in Baghdad. This is a particular problem for responders trying to get to the disaster scene since the traffic congestion can cause delay. Interviewees E6, E10, E12, and E22-E24 had the same opinion about the traffic jams as being a major challenge facing responders in the directing stage. Interviewees E3, E8 and E12 agreed with this point and saw another challenge regarding security checkpoints, saying that congestion at security checkpoints causes delay in the arrival of civil defence teams, while interviewee E11 points out that there is
a “traffic difficulty in passing through some unpaved roads in many neighbourhoods and
residential areas” and the “chaotic nature of road works without proper notification or
signage, as well as the lack of safety and security standards, since there exists no clear
timetable of works to be completed”.
However, interviewees E2, E7, E16, E17, and E25-E28 brought up a new challenge for the directing process regarding security concrete barriers, saying that there was a multitude of concrete barriers and closed roads because of the security reasons.
In terms of closing the roads because of the security situation, interviewees E2, E11 and E19 mention that there are sudden road closures as a result of a lack of coordination with the security