WHAT IS DECEPTION?

Deception has generally been defined as the knowing and intentional trans- mission of information by a sender for the purpose of fostering a false belief in the receiver (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Ekman, 1985; Knapp & Comadena, 1979). The transmission of information can be through verbal or nonverbal signals (e.g., answering “yes” or nodding one’s head in response to a direct question) or, as we address below, through the omission of verbal or non- verbal signals that are consequential to the statement being made. Regard- less of the form of deception used, the end result is an intentionally fos- tered false belief on the part of the recipient.

Before we discuss various forms of deceptive communication in detail, let us acknowledge briefly what is excluded in this definition of deception. First, this definition excludes the communication of false information be- lieved by the sender to be true, such as would be the case if a father were to tell his daughter that a concert began at 7:00 p.m. because he believed that it did, even though it actually began at 6:00. It similarly excludes the ac- cidental transmission of false information. For instance, if a husband and wife were engaging in teasing behavior, saying things to each other that were not factually true, and a passerby overhearing the exchange believed the statements to be true, the couple would not be guilty of deception un- der this definition because they were not communicating with the intention of causing the passerby to form a false conclusion.

This definition also excludes what people often refer to as self-deception. Gur and Sackeim (1979) defined self-deception as occurring when a person simultaneously holds two contradictory beliefs but is unaware that he or she holds one of them. Self-deception falls outside of the traditional defini- tion of deception in at least two ways: first, it does not involve the transmis- sion of information from one person to another; and second, one cannot foster a false belief in oneself while knowing all along that the belief is false (see Fingarette, 1969).

Finally, this definition of deception excludes the transmission of false in- formation that is not intended to be believed. A good example of such a sit- uation is the use of sarcasm. When people behave in a joking or sarcastic manner, for instance, their nonverbal behaviors (particularly their vocal be- haviors and facial expressions) signal to the receiver that the information being conveyed is not meant to be believed literally (see Zuckerman, De- Frank, Hall, Larrance, & Rosenthal, 1979).

Forms of Deception

Deceptive communication can take a number of forms. In this section, we discuss two characteristics of deceptive acts that allow for categorization of their forms. The first is the manner in which a deceptive behavior fosters a false impression on the part of the receiver, and second is the extent to which a deceptive act is sanctioned or proscribed within a given social sys- tem.

Means of Fostering False Impressions. Behaviorally, deception includes

both acts of simulation (giving wrong or misleading information) and acts of dissimulation (hiding or omitting relevant information). Deceptive acts in the former category can range from minor exaggerations to outright falsifi- cation. Falsification is the intentional presentation of untrue information as though it were true. For instance, if a job applicant were to claim to have held a position that he or she never actually held, this would qualify as falsi- fication. Two studies examining the forms of deception people use have re- ported that falsification is a common form. In their diary study of everyday deceit, Metts and Chronis (1986) found that falsification was used in nearly half (48%) of all deceptive statements, whereas an earlier study by Turner, Edgley, and Olmstead (1975) had reported that falsification characterized 30% of the deceptive acts surveyed. Participants in the Metts and Chronis study indicated that they commonly used falsification as a means of decep- tion in situations when attempting to protect their images, avoid hurting their partners, or avoid relational trauma.

Exaggeration involves overstating or amplifying something that is true in principle. For instance, one might exaggerate about prior work history when applying for a new job by overstating the level of responsibility one had at a previous job. In this instance, the general information (employer, type of work, etc.) about the previous job would be true, but the details would be overstated so as to create a more favorable impression on a pro- spective employer. Turner et al. (1975) reported that only 5% of the decep- tive acts they surveyed involved exaggeration, although the percentage may actually be higher if communicators fail to regard everyday exaggera- tions as forms of deception.

By contrast, acts of dissimulation (which are sometimes referred to as sins of omission) involve the withholding of information that is consequen- tial to the impression being created. In an act of dissimulation, all of the in- formation the speaker provides may actually be true; however, a false im- pression is created in the receiver by the information that is not provided.

One form of dissimulation is equivocation, which involves providing vague, ambiguous answers to a question, evading the question, or even changing the topic in an effort to prevent directly answering it. When pro-

viding equivocal answers to questions, people may mislead others by talk- ing around a question, appearing to answer it without really doing so. Bavelas, Black, Chovil, and Mullett (1990) suggested that equivocation is a popular strategy for deception because people can use it to create false im- pressions without actually being dishonest or saying anything untrue. In- deed, in the study by Turner et al. (1975), equivocation was the most com- monly used form of deception, characterizing 32% of the deceptive acts surveyed.

Another form of dissimulation is outright omission, which involves hiding or withholding information that, if it were revealed, would change the na- ture of one’s story. For instance, a teenager explaining to his mother how he wrecked her car might provide several truthful details of the incident but strategically omit those that suggest he was responsible for the crash, in an effort to hide or downplay his culpability. Omissions can take the form of concealment, wherein all of the relevant truthful information is withheld, or half-truths, wherein only part of the information is withheld. Metts and Chronis (1986) reported that concealment was used 27% of the time in their study, whereas half-truths were used 23% of the time.

As forms of deception, falsification, exaggeration, equivocation, and omis- sion are distinct communicative behaviors but they need not be used in iso- lation. Indeed, it is quite possible for a person to use multiple forms of decep- tion within a given communicative act. When misleading another, for instance, one might offer some information that is untrue (falsification), while also overstating other parts of the story (exaggeration), leaving out certain facts (omission), and being ambiguous about some details (equivocation).

Social Proscription. Most forms of deception are considered immoral

by almost all cultures (Druckman & Bjork, 1991). However, some communi- cative acts that fit the definition of deception are tolerated, or even sanc- tioned, by social norms and customs. A good example involves the forms of deception associated with politeness. When commenting on another’s ap- pearance, for instance, norms of politeness generally dictate that one ac- centuate the positive aspects of the appearance and neglect the negative, so as to avoid hurting the other person’s feelings (see, e.g., Martin, 1991). Politeness norms not only dictate this type of deceptive response but re- quire it and even offer sanctions for its violation (e.g., corrective comments such as “that’s not a very nice thing to say”). Joking, teasing, role playing, and engaging in make-believe or fantasy talk are all further examples of forms of deception that tend to carry little or no social disapproval.

That a deceptive act may not be socially proscribed is consequential for two reasons: first, senders and receivers may not consider the act to be a form of deception in the first place; and second, senders may not experience the emotional and physiological consequences that attend socially pro-

scribed behaviors. Underlying forms of socially acceptable deception (includ- ing politeness) is a consideration for the respective harms that deceiving and truthtelling can have on receivers. Deceptive acts that are not considered harmful (e.g., joking, role playing) tend not to elicit the serious social disap- proval that accompanies deceptive acts such as falsification or omission. Conversely, the sanction of deceptive acts in the service of politeness recog- nizes that bald, unedited honesty can be extremely damaging to receivers (e.g., when they are told outright that they are incompetent, unattractive, or unloved) and that deception designed to mitigate or soften these damages may be warranted (see Brown & Levinson, 1987). Indeed, research has found that when people deceive with the motivation to help others or simply to be polite, they experience little detection apprehension and may actually con- sider their deceptive acts to be warranted. As a result, they display few of the nonverbal signals that characterize deception in other contexts (see, e.g., Buller & Burgoon, 1994; Hample, 1980; Metts & Chronis, 1986).

When deception is attempted in the service of unsanctioned ends, how- ever, it often covaries with certain mental and physical activities for the de- ceivers. In the next section, we address some of the mental and physical correlates of deceptive behavior, an understanding of which can aid in re- ceivers’ attempts to detect deception when it is present.

WHAT HAPPENS TO PEOPLE