The oil and gas industry is a multinational operation and is governed by both national and international health and safety regulations and codes of practice which are developed and enforced by governmental departments and other authorities throughout the world (such as OSHA in the USA, and the HSE in the UK).
In addition to these governmental authorities there are a number of industry bodies which produce guidance and international standards which oil and gas organisations can use to ensure they are following good practice. Governments and enforcing authorities tend to work with these industry bodies to develop these international standards and codes of practice which are born out of specialised knowledge and experience.
Models of risk management which have developed over time are shared globally
throughout the industry, and minimum standards of health and safety become commonly accepted and adopted by multinational companies. The industry bodies also serve as a forum for the exchange of ideas as wells as a communication method to notify others of hazards or improved working practices.
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3.13 - Industry-Related Process Standards, Engineering Codes, and Good Practice.
Notable nongovernmental industry bodies which produce guidance and standards include: International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (IOGP).
Oil and Gas UK.
OPITO. (Offshore Petroleum Industry Training Organisation) International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO).
A useful document which show the large number of relevant ISO standards is available on the IOGP website here: http://www.iogp.org/Portals/0/Standards/standardsposter.pdf
Examples of relevant ISO standards include:
ISO 19900 General Requirements for Offshore Structures. ISO 14001 series Environmental Management Systems.
3.14 - Inherent Safe and Risk Based Design Concepts.
One of the main elements of developing inherently safe processes is to recognise that, by reducing the complexity of the plant at the design stage, and simplifying the operation process, a significant reduction in the likelihood of accidents can be achieved. This is because there is less equipment to malfunction and fewer opportunities for human error. The design of a process which is as inherently safe as possible is the main goal of process designers. It is impossible to design out all risks, but process designers can use a
hierarchical approach, with hazard avoidance being the priority, followed by the control of any risks remaining.
Control features, such as designing a system which can withstand the maximum likely pressure possible, are desirable elements where hazards cannot be designed out
completely. However, where control is not possible, then mitigation by designing in means of reducing the magnitude of a hazard if it is realised is acceptable.
The basic principles of inherently safe design are as follows:
Minimisation. 'What you don't have, can't leak.' Smaller inventories of hazardous
materials reduce the consequences of leaks. Inventories can often be reduced in almost all unit operations as well as storage. This also brings reductions in cost, while less material needs smaller vessels, structures and foundations.
Substitution. If minimisation is not possible, an alternative is substitution. It may be possible to replace flammable refrigerants and heat transfer with non-flammable ones, hazardous products with safer ones, and processes that use hazardous raw materials or intermediates with processes that do not. Using a safer material in place of a hazardous one decreases the need for added-on protective equipment and thus
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3.14 - Inherent Safe and Risk Based Design Concepts.
decreases plant cost and complexity.
Moderation. If minimisation and substitution are not possible or practicable, an
alternative is moderation. This means carrying out a hazardous reaction under less hazardous conditions, or storing or transporting a hazardous material in a less hazardous form. For example you could reduce the temperature or pressure of a process, even though this might take longer.
Simplification. Simpler plants are inherently safer than complex plants, because they
provide fewer opportunities for error and contain less equipment that can go wrong. Simpler plants are usually also cheaper and more user friendly. Problems should be designed out, rather than adding equipment to deal with those problems.
Error Tolerance. Equipment should be able to tolerate deviations, poor installation, or maintenance without failure. For example, expansion loops in pipework are more tolerant to poor installation than bellows. Piping and joints can be made capable of withstanding the maximum possible pressure if outlets are closed.
Limitation of Effects. If the above cannot prevent an incident, the effects of the
failure should be limited. For example, the overpressure from explosions can be directed away from populated parts of the installation, or bunds can be installed around storage tanks.
Preventing Human Error. Failsafe features should be designed in, such as valves
which fail to a SHUT position. Equipment should be chosen so that it can be easily seen whether it has been installed correctly or whether it is in the open or shut
position. Safe plants are designed so that incorrect assembly is difficult or impossible. Avoiding Knock-On Effects. Safer plants are designed so that those incidents, which
do occur, do not produce knock-on or domino effects. For example safer plants are provided with fire breaks between sections to restrict the spread of fire, or if
flammable materials are handled, the plant is outside so that leaks can be dispersed by natural ventilation.
The possibility for affecting the inherent safety of a process decreases as the design proceeds and more and more engineering and financial decisions have been made. It is much easier to change the process configuration and inherent safety in the conceptual design phase than in the later phases of process design. For instance the process route selection is made in the conceptual design and it is many times more difficult and expensive to change the route later. Time and money is also saved when fewer expensive safety
modifications are needed and fewer added-on safety equipment are included to the final process solution.
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3.15 - The Concept of Hazard Realisation.
When a hazard leads to injury or damage we say that the 'hazard has been realised'. It is where a hazard control system has failed which, in turn, causes a hazardous event to occur. The realisation of a hazard can be catastrophic in the oil and gas industry. Here is an
example based on the Buncefield disaster:
1. During tank filling the overfill sensors fail, and the tank filled until it spills over the top of the tank.
2. The spillage of highly flammable liquid creates a large vapour cloud which travels until it finds an ignition source. It ignites.
3. The ignition causes a large explosion.
4. The explosion leads to damage, injuries and fatalities.
5. Other tanks are damaged, leading to further loss of containment and more fire. Luckily the Buncefield disaster did not result in any fatalities.
Let us look at another example now, the Feyzin disaster in France in 1966.