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Institutional Finance

Lecture 08 : Liquidity, Limits to Arbitrage – Intro (Merger Arbitrage)

Markus K. Brunnermeier

Preceptor: Dong Beom Choi

Princeton University

(2)

 Convergence trades (pairs trading), statistical arb

Equity: value, B/M, P/E, size,

momentum, merger, carve outs

Fixed income: swap spread, yield curve,

mortgage, distressed

FX: carry trade (uncovered interest

parity), devaluation

Derivative: index options, correlation trade

Across markets: index arb, covertible bond arb,

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Returns are generated by isolating and bearing

deal risk

Risky application of the Law of One Price

o Conditional on deal success, there is a perfect

substitute

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 Cash merger

o Buy target and wait

 Fixed-exchange ratio stock

o Buy target

o Short acquirer immediately

 Floating-exchange ratio stock

o Buy target

o Short acquirer during pricing period (not immediately)

 Collar stock merger

o Buy target

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 Promised Payoff = $65

o Payoff is independent of acquirer stock price

o Buy target

o Do not take a position in the acquirer

Promised Payoff as a Function of Acquirer Stock Price

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 - 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

Acquirer Stock Price

P ro m is ed P ay of f

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 Promised Payoff = 1.25 shares x PAcquirer

o Buy 1 share of target

o Short sell 1.25 acquirer shares

Promised Payoff as a Function of Acquirer Stock Price

-10.00 20.00 30.00 40.00 50.00 60.00 70.00 80.00 90.00 100.00 - 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

Acquirer Stock Price

P ro m is ed P ay of f

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 Promised Payoff = $50

worth of acquirer shares, based on

average price over a pricing period

o Initially, just like a cash deal o After pricing period, just like a

fixed-exchange ratio deal

o Buy target

o No initial position in acquirer o Short sell acquirer during the

pricing period

Promised Payoff as a Function of Acquirer Stock Price

-10.00 20.00 30.00 40.00 50.00 60.00 - 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 Acquirer Stock Price

P ro m is ed P ay of f

Promised Payoff as a Function of Acquirer Stock Price

-50.00 100.00 150.00 200.00 250.00 - 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200

Acquirer Stock Price

P ro m is ed P ay of f

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 Promised Payoff

o PAcquirer< $90.74: 1 target = 2.15 acquirer

o $90.74 < PAcquirer< $136.14: 1 target = $195.10

o PAcquirer> $136.14: 1 target = 1.433 acquirer

Promised Payoff as a Function of Acquirer Stock Price

-50.00 100.00 150.00 200.00 250.00 300.00 350.00 - 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200

Acquirer Stock Price

P ro m is ed P ay of f

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(10)

 Managers tell you the strategy comes down to figuring

out which deals are going to blow-up

 Ask them the following:

o How many deals are out there?

o How many are in your portfolio?

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 Managers tell you the strategy comes down to figuring

out which deals are going to blow-up

 Ask them the following:

o How many deals are out there?

50

o How many are in your portfolio?

(12)

 Managers tell you the strategy comes down to figuring

out which deals are going to blow-up

 Ask them the following:

o How many deals are out there?

50

o How many are in your portfolio?

50

(13)

 Managers tell you the strategy comes down to figuring

out which deals are going to blow-up

 Ask them the following:

o How many deals are out there?

50

o How many are in your portfolio?

50

o What is your maximum weight?

(14)

Median Arbitrage Spread 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 125 115 105 95 85 75 65 55 45 35 25 15 5

Number of Trading Days Until Resolution

A rb it ra g e S p re a d ( % ) Successful Deals Failed Deals

Source: M it chell and Pulvino, 2001, Journal of Finance.

 Deals with big spreads!

 Market distinguishes good and bad deals, ex ante

o About 10% of all deals fail

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YEAR JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC YTD RF Excess 2006 3.1% 1.2% 2.0% 1.4% -0.1% 0.8% 0.8% 0.7% 8.4% 4.5% 3.9% 2005 0.0% 0.7% 0.1% -1.4% 1.6% 1.1% 1.1% 0.7% 0.6% -1.6% 1.3% 1.8% 6.3% 2.9% 3.4% 2004 1.0% 0.6% 0.1% -0.9% -0.1% 0.3% -1.0% 0.2% 0.6% 0.5% 1.6% 1.1% 4.1% 1.2% 2.8% 2003 0.2% 0.0% -0.1% 1.3% 1.8% 0.4% 0.7% 0.7% 0.6% 0.7% 0.3% 0.7% 7.5% 1.4% 6.1% 2002 0.9% -0.4% 0.6% 0.0% -0.3% -1.2% -1.9% 0.5% -0.4% 0.4% 0.6% 0.5% -0.9% 2.2% -3.0% 2001 1.1% 0.4% -0.8% 0.2% 1.7% -0.8% 0.9% 0.9% -2.7% 0.8% 0.2% 0.8% 2.8% 4.8% -2.1% 2000 1.6% 1.9% 0.8% 2.5% 1.5% 1.6% 1.2% 1.3% 1.4% 0.5% 1.2% 1.2% 18.0% 6.1% 11.9% 1999 0.7% 0.3% 1.1% 1.3% 2.0% 1.6% 1.4% 0.5% 1.3% 0.7% 2.2% 0.5% 14.3% 4.5% 9.8% 1998 1.0% 1.9% 1.1% 1.6% -0.6% 0.5% -0.6% -5.7% 1.7% 2.1% 2.3% 1.9% 7.2% 5.2% 2.0% 1997 1.0% 0.4% 1.1% -0.7% 1.9% 2.1% 1.6% 1.0% 2.1% 0.8% 2.0% 1.9% 16.4% 5.6% 10.8% 1996 1.6% 1.3% 1.5% 1.6% 1.5% 0.8% 0.8% 1.6% 0.8% 1.2% 1.4% 1.4% 16.6% 5.1% 11.5% 1995 0.9% 1.5% 1.5% 0.4% 1.3% 2.5% 1.4% 1.4% 1.6% 0.9% 2.1% 1.3% 17.9% 7.1% 10.8% 1994 1.5% -0.4% 1.4% -0.3% 1.2% 0.9% 0.7% 2.0% 0.6% -0.3% -0.2% 1.5% 8.9% 3.5% 5.3% 1993 2.1% 1.6% 0.5% 1.3% 1.2% 2.3% 1.5% 1.7% 1.9% 2.1% 0.9% 1.7% 20.2% 3.5% 16.7% 1992 2.0% 1.0% 1.3% 0.1% 0.0% 0.3% 1.5% 0.1% 1.3% 0.4% -2.2% 1.9% 7.9% 4.2% 3.8% 1991 0.0% 1.6% 2.3% 2.8% 1.6% 1.1% 1.4% 0.6% 1.1% 1.4% 1.4% 1.2% 17.9% 6.6% 11.2% 1990 -6.5% 1.7% 2.9% 1.0% 2.3% 0.7% 0.0% -0.8% -4.6% 0.7% 2.2% 1.2% 0.4% 7.9% -7.5% Mean 10.2% 4.5% 5.7% Std 6.8% 1.9% 6.3% Source: Hedge Fund Research Inc. - © 2006 HFR Inc. - www.hedgefundresearch.com Sharpe 0.91

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Value Weighted Average Return Histogram 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 -10% -8% -6% -4% -2% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% Monthly Return F re q u e n c y

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 2 Types of Shocks

o Bidding contests are great news

• Higher than expected payoffs for target shares • Tend to be idiosyncratic

• Recently, few of these

o Failures are bad news

• Very negative returns on failed deals

• Tend to be correlated with the market (and each other) • Recently, lots of these

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If deal risk is idiosyncratic

o Rf is appropriate rate to compensate for time

If deal risk is systematic

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 Merger arbitrage returns are largely uncorrelated with the market in neutral and bull

markets. However, correlations increase significantly in bear markets

Merger Arbitrage Returns

Piecew ise-linear Regression

-8% -6% -4% -2% 0% 2% 4% -30% -20% -10% 0% 10% 20%

Market Excess Return

M e rg e r A rb it ra g e E x c e s s R e tu rn

(20)

Beta is different in up and down markets

Cannot use standard methods to evaluate risk

arbitrage performance

o Linear asset pricing models do not apply

o “Alpha” may not reflect excess return

Risk Arbitrage is like selling out-of-the-money

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Simple, entry-level strategy

Capital tends to chase performance

o Lots of money flowed into strategy over the past 5

years

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Simple, entry-level strategy

Capital tends to chase performance

o Lots of money flowed into strategy over the past 5

years

Recent returns have been modest

But, providing a service

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Carve Out: A situation in which a parent company

sells part of its subsidiary, usually in an IPO. Usually, the parent company will eventually sell the rest of the child company in the open market, also called partial spinoff.

Negative Stub Value: Parent’s ownership stake of

subsidiary exceeds parents market cap.

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Managing a portfolio of individual merger

arbitrage positions

o Leverage

o Determining the weight for a newly announced deal

o Value of financial slack

o Deciding whether to pursue other non-merger

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• No constraints

Initial Margin (50%) Reg. T 50 % • Can’t add to your position;

• Not received a margin call.

Maintenance Margin (35%) NYSE/NASD 25% long 30% short • Fixed amount of time to get to a specified point above the

maintenance level before your position is liquidated.

• Failure to return to the initial margin requirements within the specified period of time results in forced liquidation.

Minimum Margin (25%)

• Position is always immediately liquidated $

(26)

Hold well diversified portfolio

References

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