TRANSATLANTIC DIFFERENCES IN GMO PREFERENCES
Melody Bauer
A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Political
Science, Concentration Transatlantic Studies.
Chapel Hill
2018
iii
ABSTRACT
Melody Bauer: Transatlantic Differences in GMO Preferences
(Under the direction of Gary Marks)
The transatlantic divide between the United States and the European Union on genetically
modified organisms is reflected in the distinct regulatory approaches, levels in crop cultivation,
and consumer acceptance. The purpose of this paper is to outline the key characteristics of the
different attitudes and regulatory approaches on genetically engineered crops and food as well as
connect the dots of the preferences of the actors involved and how they have influenced
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES ……… vi
LIST OF FIGURES ……….… vii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ……….………... viii
SETTING THE STAGE ……….………...………...…. 1
Introduction ……… 1
Agricultural Biotechnology 101 .………...……… 4
OVERVIEW OF GMO REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS
IN THE US AND THE EU ………...………….……… 6
US Regulatory System for GMOs ………. 6
GMO Regulations in Europe ………. 9
PUBLIC ATTITUDES AND CULTURAL CONTEXT ………. 14
Public attitudes toward GM Crops and Foods ………..……….…….. 14
The Impact of Culture ……….. 23
CONCLUSION ………..…….. 30
LIST OF TABLES
Table
vii
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
BEUC
The European Consumer Organisation
DNA
Deoxyribonucleic acid
EPA
Environmental Protection Agency
EC
European Commission
EFSA
European Food Safety Authority
EU
European Union
FDA
US Department of Health and Human Services Food and Drug
Administration
GE
Genetically engineered; genetic engineering
GM
Genetically modified
GMO
Genetically modified organism
NGO
Non-governmental organization
rDNA
Recombinant DNA
US
United States
1
SETTING THE STAGE
Introduction
There is a transatlantic divide between the United States (US) and the European Union
(EU) when it comes to genetically modified organisms (GMOs), which is reflected in distinct
regulatory approaches, levels in crop cultivation, and consumer acceptance. To varying degrees
in the US and the EU, the preferences of various actors, such as government regulators,
biotechnology companies, civil society, and consumers, have played a role in shaping the
perceived benefit-risk narrative on genetic technology and the subsequent regulations. The
relatively relaxed policies in the US, based on the substantial equivalence principle, stand in
contrast to the EU’s complex regulations, which contain precautionary clauses on traceability,
mandatory labeling and thresholds for tolerable “contamination” of non-genetically modified
products (Lau, 2015; Stephan, 2015).
has been remarkably stable and permissive since the 1980s, whereas public unease in Europe led
to an increasingly negative environment toward agricultural biotechnology.
GMO acceptance can also be understood in the context of contrasting cultural identities,
agricultural practices, and perceptions of land usage. American and European societies have
historically moved along distinct cultural trajectories: American society, accelerated by
industrialist and progressive forces, embraced a utilitarian approach to technology in agriculture,
whereas many European societies continue to maintain traditional conceptions of cultural
identity, “naturalness,” and moral worldviews (Stephan, 2012). While cultural identities and
values may not cause specific outcomes, they create the essential, enabling conditions for
political mobilization, and remain highly influential in shaping the public’s judgments on, and
degree of support for, GMOs. Thus, understanding the regulatory divide between the two regions
requires considering not only domestic politics but also the long-term historical evolution of
these regions (Earle & Cvetkovich, 1995; Stephan, 2012, 2015).
Table 1 provides an overview of the key characteristics of the transatlantic attitudes and
regulatory approaches on GMOs discussed throughout this paper. Public opinion, institutional
structures, cultural approaches to agriculture, and land usage are among the key features
influencing the contrasting approaches and regulatory outcomes seen in the US and the EU.
Ultimately, I will seek to understand the influence of some of the actors involved on the different
regulatory approaches, and to what extent the differences (for example, cultural and/or
3
Table 1: Contrasting attitudes and regulations on GMOs
Factors
United States
European Union
Regulation
Permissive environment;
principle of substantial
equivalence; GM foods and
crops are prevalent in the
marketplace
Negative regulatory
environment; precautionary
principle; variations of
acceptance in member states,
with the majority being
hesitant or hostile toward
GMOs
Public opinion
Public is generally optimistic,
with a minority opposed to
GMOs; less favorable
opportunity structures for
anti-GMO movement
Initial lack of public trust;
influence of anti-GMO
movement; public is generally
pessimistic toward
agrobiotechnology
Institutional structures
Strong biotechnology sector
and strong
pro-agrobiotechnology coalition in
government and industry
Complexities of multilevel
governance
Cultural approaches to
agriculture and land usage
Modern, bifurcated approach
to agriculture; values of
efficiency, productivity, and
utilitarianism
Agricultural biotechnology 101
Biotechnology can be defined as “any technological application that uses biological
systems, living organisms, or derivatives thereof to make or to modify products or processes for
a specific use” (United Nations, 1992, p. 3). Biotechnology is in itself nothing new. Humans
have bred crops selectively for environmental robustness or higher yields for several thousands
of years, and the knowledge of crossbreeding can be traced back to the start of sedentary
agriculture (Stephan, 2012). However, the advances of molecular genetics in the 1970s and
1980s enabled the selection of a specific part of a gene, or genes, responsible for producing an
attribute in a plant or animal, such as the production of an enzyme or resistance to a particular
disease. These genes could then be multiplied to increase a specific effect or added to an entirely
different microorganism, animal, or plant. These technological developments in genetic
engineering facilitated the targeted modification of an organism beyond traditional breeding
methods (TNS Opinion & Social, 2010).
Since the 1980s, biologists have used genetic engineering to alter a plant’s characteristics,
such as to increase resistance to diseases or longer shelf life for fruit. In 1994, Calgene’s FLAVR
SAVR tomato was the first genetically engineered food product to be commercialized in the US
market. Only some 1.7 million hectares of insect resistant Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) corn and
cotton as well as transgenic herbicide-tolerant oilseed rape and soybeans were cultivated globally
in 1996, the year GM crops were commercialized (Lucht, 2015). By 2016, 185.1 million hectares
of genetically modified crops were planted by some 18 million farmers in 26 countries—an
increase of 110%
1(National Academy of Sciences [NAS], 2016). GM crops are cultivated
predominately in the Americas, with the US (72.9 million hectares in 2016), Brazil (49.1) and
Argentina (23.8) being the top producers; whereas only 136 hectares were cultivated in five EU
5
OVERVIEW OF GMO REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE US AND THE EU
US regulatory system for GMOs
From the onset, genetic technologies have been the subject of regulatory controversy. The
development of recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (rDNA) techniques in the US during the
1970s sparked intense debate within the wider scientific community as well as public concern
that mutant organisms might be released into the environment (Marden, 2003). The 1974 Berg
letter to Science and Nature, signed by a number of prominent researchers, invited scientists
from around the world to defer voluntarily from conducting rDNA experiments until the
potential risks of such molecules had been better evaluated or adequate methods had been
developed for preventing their spread (Gaskell & Bauer, 2006). In February 1975, 140 scientists
and lawyers convened at the Asilomar conference to discuss the ramifications of the scientific
breakthrough. They decided to introduce responsible self-regulation in order to mitigate future
state and federal government regulation of genetic engineering and adopted interim guidelines,
which were then endorsed by the National Institutes of Health, a US federal medical research
agency. These guidelines and their apparent effectiveness at biological containment were a
soothing gesture to American lawmakers and the US public at large and set the stage for
declining public interest in novel genetic techniques. Additionally, the lack of safety crises in the
US in the ensuing years allowed rDNA research to gain respectability (Marden, 2003; Stephan,
2015).
By the 1980s, the introduction of GM crops and foods to commercial markets was
7
technology and a movement to draft new legislation specific to its application. As a result of
American scientists being the first movers in both the scientific and regulatory aspects of
biotechnology, the US had developed its position as a global leader in the field, and scientists
and governments supporters were reluctant to cede this (Marden, 2003; Stephan, 2015).
In 1986, the finalized Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology
2outlined the coordinated, risk-based system of the federal agencies involved with the review of
biotechnology research and products. The US policy was built on three tenets: (1) the substantial
equivalence principle: a focus on the substantial equivalence of a GM crop or food product to a
traditional counterpart in terms of composition, nutrition, and safety, rather than on the fact that
genetic engineering was used in the process; (2) only regulation grounded in verifiable scientific
risk would be tolerated; and (3) as the technology used in GM products is on a continuum with
other agricultural innovations, any risks are seen as similar to those of traditionally produced
foods (Marden, 2003; Lau, 2015; USDA-APHIS, 2017). Ultimately, the approach was that
effective scientific and industry self-regulation could preclude inhibitory legislation, ensuring the
development of the GMO industry (Marden, 2003).
In the US, three federal agencies are responsible for regulating GM products under the
same laws governing the health, safety, efficacy, and environmental impacts of conventional
products. The Department of Agriculture Animal and Health Plant Inspection Service
(USDA-APHIS) controls the importation, handling, interstate movement, and environmental release of
transgenic plants, with the aim of protecting existing crops from risk. The Department of Health
and Human Services Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates GMOs in food, drugs, and
biological products, while GMO microorganisms and pesticides are managed by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Officials of the three regulatory agencies collaborate
to ensure that any arising safety or regulatory issues are appropriately resolved (USDA-APHIS,
2017; the Library of Congress, 2015).
Depending on the characteristics of a given GM product, it may be subject to the
jurisdiction of one or more of these agencies. The USDA requires businesses to submit a wide
range of information before GM plants can be introduced in the US under regulated or
nonregulated status. New GM foods require premarket approval if they contain high levels of
allergens or toxic substances or reduced levels of essential nutrients
3; the FDA recommends a
voluntary consultation process to determine whether new products would require this approval.
However, as GM foods fall under the FDA classification of “generally recognized as safe,” they
typically do not require special labeling or premarket approval (Lau, 2015; FDA, 2018). The
more lenient approach seen in the US is complemented by the threat of litigation against both
individual companies and federal regulators (Stephan, 2015).
Some argue that, “The core scientific principles of US regulations, such as ‘substantial
equivalence,’ cannot be understood outside their political, legal, and cultural context” (Stephan,
2015, p. 17) and that regulatory outcomes are partial to what benefits food producers and
retailers. In addition, the revolving door migration among agrobiotechnology industry lobbyists
and regulators is seen not only as a political foible but also as an expression of a wider belief
system that produces a far-reaching consensus between the two groups: to lobbyists and
regulators, GM products are generally progressive and benign and offer impressive economic
opportunities. The data on American public opinion
4indicate that the general population holds a
3 Insecticides are a special subclass under the jurisdiction of the EPA (Lau, 2015).
9
largely positive reading of technological progress, albeit with weaker confidence in its safety and
latent concerns about physical and moral ramifications (Stephan, 2015).
GMO regulations in Europe
The American approach to regulation stands in contrast to developments in Europe. In the
early 1990s, the topic of GM foods in the EU remained limited to parliamentary debates about
the transposition of European directives concerning the dissemination of GMOs and to various
media articles on biotechnology. The use and commercialization of GMOs started to gain
traction with the public at the end of 1996 when animated debate surrounded the authorization of
Bt corn and the very first imports of transgenic seeds arrived in Europe from the US. Public
opinion was marked strongly at this stage by various completely legitimate scares, such as
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), HIV-contaminated blood, asbestos, and other
perceived regulatory failures. While these issues had nothing to do with GM foods, they led to
strong public distrust toward the food and agricultural industry and government regulatory
agencies, which were perceived as potentially disregarding health risks in order to protect certain
political or economic interests (Bonny, 2003; Paarlberg, 2014).
Trust is an important factor for the perception of many types of risk, including those
related to GM foods (Land & Hallman, 2005). As Dan Glickman, former US Secretary of
Agriculture, observes:
With all that biotechnology has to offer, it is nothing if it’s not accepted. This boils down
to a matter of trust. Trust in the science behind the process, but particularly trust in the
regulatory process that ensures thorough review—including complete and open public
involvement. (Glickman, 1999)
Thus, because confidence in European government institutions, industry, and certain
debates on GM crops and foods in many European countries. European NGOs, such as Friends
of the Earth, Greenpeace, and the European Consumer Organisation (BEUC), saw no consumer
benefit from GM foods that might justify even a hypothetical risk and began warning consumers
against such products, simply on precautionary grounds (Paarlberg, 2014).
As a wave of public opposition to GMOs swept through Europe, the EU’s initial Novel
Foods Regulation in 1997, which included relatively moderate provisions on GMOs, became
meaningless (Stephan, 2015). The anxieties of European consumers led several EU member
states to resort to national bans on GM crops and the European Commission to establish its
general policy for GM food regulation in 2002. The Commission also founded the European
Food Safety Authority (EFSA), a scientific committee and the legislative body responsible for
conducting environmental and health risk assessments of any GMO to be cultivated or marketed
within the EU (Regulation (EC) 178/2002).
In addition to the public outrage caused by various food-industry related crises in the
1990s, the EU’s tradition of risk-averse regulation in other areas meant that the precautionary
principle became the central tenet for GMO regulation. Detailed in Article 191 of the Treaty of
the Functioning of the European Union, the precautionary principle is a risk management
strategy whereby if a given policy or action may cause harm to the public or environment, and if
there is no scientific consensus on the issue, the policy or action in question should not be
pursued (EUR-Lex, 2016; European Commission, 2015).
5The European legislation on GMOs
(for example, Regulation (EC) 1829/2003 on GM food and feed, Regulation (EC) 1830/2003
concerning the labeling and traceability of GMOs and GM products, and Directive 2009/41/EC
5 The situation should be reviewed, however, once more scientific information is available. The
11
on the contained use of GM microorganisms) seeks to protect the environment and human and
animal health, defend consumer interests, and ensure that the EU’s single market works
effectively (Regulation (EC) 178/2002).
The EU’s GMO authorization process includes extensive and case-by-case assessment by
the EFSA. The labeling and traceability regulations of GM foods are both process- and
product-oriented and aim to label goods that involve genetic engineering at any stage of production.
Labeling is required for food products that contain over 0.9% of biotechnological events
(Regulation (EC) 1829/2003) and for GMOs for food use, food items containing or consisting of
GMOs, and GMO derivatives, regardless of whether or not the GMOs are detectable in the end
product (for example, sugar from GM sugar beets) (Regulation (EC) 1830/2003; Henard et al.,
2012; European Commission, 2015).
6Approval of GM crops at the EU level can conflict with the regulatory policies of
individual member states, and the ultimate deciding power rests with member states. The de
facto moratorium initially set by various EU countries on the cultivation and importation of GM
seeds and foods continues today, with Directive (EU) 2015/412 allowing EU member states to
challenge EFSA risk assessments and to restrict or prohibit the cultivation and use of a particular
EU-approved GMO within their borders, if the member state provides additional data
demonstrating that the GMO poses a risk to environmental or human health (EC
MEMO/15/4779). However, such challenges are brought primarily for political or economic
reasons. An example of this is France’s ban in 2008 of EU-approved MON810 corn, which
contains an engineered insecticidal protein. France alleged that MON810 was an environmental
risk because of the potential for insects to develop resistance to insecticide (the hypothetical
impacts had been rejected by the EFSA). Because the scientific basis of the ban was unclear, the
French government’s position was seen as being largely (bio)political, with ministers deciding
against scientific opinion to give the appearance of being “green” for the sake of political
expediency. The French ban of MON810 was declared unlawful by the European Court of
Justice in 2011, yet the French government continues to ban MON810. France’s moratorium on
MON810 and other similar restrictions by individual EU member states indicate “government
interference with science to justify political handling of risk management and bypass European
and national agencies in charge of biotech risk assessment under European directives” (Kuntz et
al., 2013, p. 499).
13
Germany. Finally, there are several member states that are opposed to biotechnology: Austria,
Hungary, Slovenia, the Wallonia region of Belgium, Luxembourg, Greece, Italy, and Latvia
(Henard et al., 2012).
Despite the Commission’s stated priority for a science-based policy geared toward a
knowledge-based bio-economy, country-specific pressures have influenced the legal framework.
John Dalli, a former EU Health and Consumer Policy Commissioner, maintains that, “The
problems of implementation of the GMO legislation [at the EU level] do not stem from its design
or its objectives, which remain relevant, but rather from the way these sensitive issues are
handled at a political level” (European Commission, 2011). The multilevel governance of the EU
grants member states the role of principal agents of enforcement (with many veto points),
PUBLIC ATTITUDES AND CULTURAL CONTEXT
Public attitudes toward GM crops and foods
In addition to regulation, public perception may be a significant hurdle to the acceptance
of new technology. Consumers are generally keen to know about the foods they eat, sources of
food, and, if the food is processed, what ingredients may have been added (Wunderlich & Gatto,
2015). Because the average consumer does not have the scientific knowledge or resources to
decide for her/himself whether GM foods constitute a risk, they have to rely on the competence,
transparency, and honesty of the various actors participating in the food supply chain to assess
the risk of eating GM foods. Thus, trust is an essential component of public perception and
acceptance of genetic technology, with a broad range of actors—from civil society, scientists,
regulatory agencies, industry, and the media—contributing to the formation of this trust (Lang &
Hallman, 2004). The degree of trust that the public places in actors and institutions is influenced
by the wider cultural context (Stephan, 2012).
Consumer concerns about the safety of GMOs can have a direct impact on GMO
management, and various forums of public involvement provide opportunities for the public to
affect the policies, and therefore trajectories, of technology. Whether the public displays trust
toward the institutions that appear to control GMOs is a crucial issue for academics and
15
Stephan notes, “Too much evidently depends on how questions are framed, on what terminology
is used or on what information is supplied” (2015, p. 17).
Well before the safety crises that triggered the anti-GMO events in Europe, a groundswell
of opposition was detected, with a sizeable majority of Europeans considering agrobiotechnology
applications as harmful to health and the environment and 85% of respondents calling for stricter
regulations (Zechendorf, 1994). Surveys since the early 1990s showed that members of the
European public had generally not yet made up their minds about biotechnology, but that if they
did want more information, they were more likely to trust anti-GMO groups espousing negative,
value-based attitudes toward the technology than to trust industry and government sources (Tait,
2001). Anti-GMO groups made a strong impact on public perception, and they received
extensive publicity due to the dynamism of their actions: countless mass dissemination of
warnings, petitions, alerts, and leaflets; standard letters to elected officials and agricultural firms;
lawsuits; demonstrations; and sabotaging GM crop trials and imports. The endless circulation
and use of anti-GMO information on the Internet gave it credibility; compound repetitions made
it seem more reliable (Bonny, 2003). However, much of the anti-GMO information in circulation
at the time was partial and biased; examples of comments from anti-GMO activists include the
following: “GMOs are unsafe and must never be released into the environment.” “We don’t
know enough about GMOs to risk releasing them—what is being done about this?” “Why
doesn’t someone do something to understand the risks of what GMOs are?” (EUR 24473, 2010,
p. 209). The 1999 Eurobarometer showed that, in regards to GMOs, actors judged by
There is a greater focus nowadays on new technologies as a result of increased concern
about sustainability, with Europeans favoring the impetus toward innovation so long as the
public is involved in decisions about new technologies when social values are at stake and there
are appropriate regulations to balance the market. The latest Eurobarometer in 2010 indicates
that while the crisis of confidence in regulation and technology that characterized the 1990s is no
longer the dominant perspective in Europe, GM foods remain the Achilles’ heel of
biotechnology. Although attitudes toward genetic engineering improved slightly after the peak of
public opposition from 1996 to 2000, the overall picture throughout 1996 to 2010 as presented in
Figure 1 and Table 2 is one of declining support across many European countries; opponents
outnumber supporters three to one, and in no country is there a majority of supporters
7(Gaskell
et al., 2006, 2010).
7 In the 2005 Eurobarometer, only 27% of respondents regarded GM food positively; this number dropped to 23% by 2010 (Gaskell et al., 2010).